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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the contributions to the global constitutional process made by the 
human rights machinery of the United Nations.  To do this, it considers the philosophical and 
theoretical positions related to understanding constitutionalism either as government or as 
governance.  This contrast is then used to help develop the idea of the constitutional process, 
which is followed by a translation of these ideas into the international realm.  Subsequently, it 
examines the United Nations Human Rights Council from the perspective of a polycentric 
international society.  This is then followed by an examination of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from a cosmopolitan perspective.  Ultimately, 
it is concluded that, whilst the existing contributions made by these organs are seemingly 
negligible, the particular theoretical approach undertaken is successful in highlighting certain 
opportunities for reforms that have hitherto been unexamined. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
“It is a law of nature we overlook, that intellectual versatility is the 
compensation for change, danger, and trouble.  An animal perfectly in 
harmony with its environment is a perfect mechanism.  Nature never 
appeals to intelligence until habit and instinct are useless.  There is no 
intelligence where there is no change and no need of change.  Only those 
animals partake of intelligence that have to meet a huge variety of needs 
and dangers.”1 
 
 As with many times throughout human history, it can be said that the present age 
gives rise to ‘a huge variety of needs and dangers’.  Such a scenario, however, need not be 
interpreted as a negative thing.  Instead, present deficiencies can be seen as highlighting 
opportunities for improvement; change and risk open up possibilities for the betterment of the 
human condition.  In amongst the vast array of these opportunities and possibilities, there 
exists a position which maintains that “[t]he problem of international constitutionalism is the 
central challenge faced by international philosophers in the twenty-first century.”2  Indeed, 
there are numerous examples “of how constitutional questions and claims are emerging 
beyond the state and how they require the input of different disciplines at the intersection of 
law and politics.”3 
 It is this concept of constitutionalism, this intersection of law and politics, which lies 
at the heart of the present investigation.  This intermingling of diverse fields creates an 
inherent need for an approach which is somewhat syncretic in nature.  It is an approach which, 
of necessity, must attempt “to cross the arbitrary and artificial mental frontiers which have 
1 Wells, H. G., The Time Machine, (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1953), p. 87. 
2 Allott, P., The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), (henceforth, Allott), p. 61. 
3 Wiener, A., et al, ‘Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, (2012) 1(1) Global 
Constitutionalism 1, p. 1. 
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done so much harm to the creative potentiality of the human mind.”4  Adopting such an 
approach, however, need not equate to an absence of specificity as regards the precise matter 
under investigation.  At a more exact level, then, it must be said that the essence of this 
present inquiry is an attempt to examine the extent to which the human rights machinery of 
the United Nations (UN) contributes to the operation of a constitutional process at the global 
level. 
 The central argument being advanced throughout this study is one which contends 
that, whilst such a contribution may be both possible and desirable for a variety of reasons, it 
is not currently one which can be considered as being either significant or inherently self-
sustaining.  Before reaching such a conclusion, however, there are a variety of subsidiary 
factors that must first be considered.  For instance, before such matters can be addressed 
directly, attention must be paid to the more fundamental question of how human rights and a 
global constitutional process relate to one another, if at all.  Additionally, if the emergence 
and expansion of constitutional questions is indeed a core challenge to contemporary 
international philosophers, is it not reasonable to presume that some attempts have already 
been made to address such issues?  There are also questions to be asked regarding exactly 
what is meant by a ‘constitutional process’ and how it could possibly be ‘global’. 
In order to more closely consider these, and other, issues, there is necessarily a degree 
of engagement with discussions of law, politics, philosophy and other areas of human thought 
and practice.  The upcoming discussion, then, is at once legal and political.  It is 
philosophical, and it is arguably even sociological, and yet it is simultaneously none of these 
things.  It is, in essence, a constitutional discussion.  The exact nature of constitutionalism 
itself, however, is a subject of some debate.  It is for this reason that the discussion begins, in 
chapter 2, with a consideration of the distinction between a perspective of constitutionalism 
as government and one of constitutionalism as governance.  Whilst this distinction is perhaps 
one of academic utility rather than practical application, it nevertheless provides the 
theoretical underpinning to much of the subsequent investigation into more nuanced areas of 
constitutional thought. 
Before commencing such an inquiry itself, however, there are a number of other 
factors that must first be considered, albeit briefly.  In particular, the point ought to be made 
that this is not an investigation into the concept or practices of human rights.  There is 
4 Allott, p. xii. 
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inevitably a certain extent to which claims regarding the tension between state sovereignty 
and global human rights norms are examined within this inquiry.  Whilst doing so, however, 
it is not the aim of this inquiry to engage with the implications and conclusions that might 
arise regarding the actual human rights practices of individuals themselves.  Instead, it is 
intended that this forms part of a discussion which takes place at the junction of human rights, 
the United Nations and issues of global constitutionalism.  As such, the investigations into 
human rights and the United Nations system function principally as case studies in order to 
examine, elucidate and clarify the theoretical claims made in the inquiry into issues of global 
constitutionalism. 
Simultaneously, and as stated above, it is primarily a constitutional discussion.  As 
well as being distinct from a discussion focussed purely on human rights, this also 
distinguishes this investigation from many of the existing discussions surrounding what is 
known as ‘global governance’.  Whilst there is inevitably a certain degree of overlap, this 
latter concept can be understood as “a back-and-forth political process carried out between all 
actors, at all levels, in an attempt to garner legitimacy, secure authority, and develop capacity 
to govern effectively.”5  In contrast to this approach, the constitutional approach adopted in 
the present inquiry, although it includes a certain degree of political considerations, also 
incorporates a greater element of legal, philosophical and sociological analysis which is 
sufficient as to distinguish it from the primarily political approach adopted within the 
majority of studies into global governance. 
In order to more accurately delineate the mechanisms by which this investigation shall 
advance, this chapter proceeds in three parts.  Initially, a brief synopsis of key arguments is 
provided, in order to outline certain principal themes, their connections and progression.  
Secondly, there is a review of the existing academic debate surrounding similar themes.  
Whilst this review is not intended to be exhaustive, its aim is to provide a general overview of 
how the upcoming discussions fit within the wider scholastic context.  Finally, this chapter 
concludes with a brief examination of the methods by which the later, more detailed 
arguments shall advance. 
 
 
5 Klick, M., ‘Configuring Global Order: Institutions, Processes, and Effects’, (2011) 17 Global Governance 557, 
pp. 557-8. 
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1.1  Overview 
 As stated above, it is the aim of this inquiry to examine the extent to which the UN’s 
human rights machinery contributes to the operation of a constitutional process at the global 
level.  On this basis, three distinct factors can be identified as providing a framework from 
which such an inquiry can proceed.  Firstly, there is a need to determine the nature of ‘a 
constitutional process’.  Secondly, this must then be translated to the global level, if such a 
move is at all possible.  Finally, there must also be a consideration of the role played by the 
human rights organs of the United Nations. 
 At a fundamental level, then, the upcoming discussion follows this basic, tripartite 
structure.  Chapters 2 and 3 examine the concept of a constitutional process, how it can be 
operated and how it connects with the general concept of ‘rights’.  Chapters 4 and 5 then 
focus on translating these conclusions to the international realm, with chapters 6 and 7 
concentrating on the human rights machinery of the UN itself.  The discussion then concludes 
in chapter 8 with a consideration of certain implications that arise from the preceding analysis 
and attempts to provide some degree of resolution to the primary issue at hand. 
 More specifically, chapter 2 focuses on examining a distinction between 
constitutionalism as government and constitutionalism as governance.  Whilst this distinction 
is not explored in any great detail in much of the existing academic literature, it is argued that 
its origins can be traced at least as far back as ancient Greece and Rome.  Examining this 
history of constitutionalism forms a large part of this chapter, although attention is also paid 
to consideration of how this binary distinction continues to appear within contemporary 
constitutional thought. 
 Having explored this particular distinction, chapter 3 then progresses to more 
thoroughly investigate the ways in which these different perspectives on constitutionalism 
interact with concepts of rights.  Underlying this analysis is the more fundamental question 
regarding whether or not such a bifurcation in constitutional thought is truly insurmountable.  
This results in the inquiry developing the idea of a constitutional process as a singular 
alternative that is capable of incorporating elements of both constitutionalism as government 
and as governance.  As shall be seen, whilst the simple connection between a constitution and 
the idea of a process is not entirely novel, the distinct ways in which this vision of the 
constitutional process is originated allows for greater emphasis to be placed on certain key 
5 
 
elements.  In particular, the combination of liberalism and constitutionalism is highlighted as 
a means by which rights can become integrated into the constitution itself, as opposed to 
being seen as entirely pre-constitutional, post-constitutional or completely external and 
unrelated to the constitution. 
 Having established a conceptual basis for understanding the relationship of rights to a 
constitutional process, the discussion then proceeds to examine whether or not this analysis 
can withstand being translated into the global sphere.  Specifically, chapter 4 examines the 
tension between hierarchy and anarchy at the international level and connects this with 
contemporary debates surrounding ideas of global constitutionalism.  The chapter then 
proceeds to investigate the values which may underpin a global constitutional process, 
arguing for a particular analogy between state sovereignty and individual liberty. 
 Chapter 5 then begins by exploring some of the consequences to accepting such an 
analogy.  In particular, it attempts to assess the question that if liberal values and a 
constitutional process exist at an international level, as claimed in chapter 4, must this result 
in an integration of rights into the constitutional process, as considered in chapter 3?  The 
primary difference observed is the distinction between states and individuals and the chapter 
proceeds to identify three principal mechanisms by which a liberal global constitutional 
process, founded on the sovereign equality of states, might be preserved. 
The particular trichotomy identified consists of great powers, polycentricity and 
cosmopolitanism and chapter 5 progresses to assess the suitability of these approaches.  
Whilst reliance on the beneficence of great powers is rejected as being unsustainable, the 
remaining two alternatives are considered to be potentially viable.  The chapter therefore 
considers each of these options in turn, establishing a connection between these possibilities 
and the human rights machinery of the United Nations.  More precisely, on the one hand a 
link is developed between the idea of international polycentricity and the UN’s Human 
Rights Council (HRC), and on the other a link is established between global cosmopolitanism 
and the UN’s Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 
As a result of these connections, the subsequent two chapters proceed to examine each 
of these institutions in turn.  Chapter 6 focuses on the connection between the HRC and the 
idea of polycentricity in an attempt to assess the HRC’s suitability for the role identified for it 
in chapter 5.  Chapter 7 advances along similar lines regarding the link between the OHCHR 
and ideas of cosmopolitanism.  Despite not forming the core focus of the overall discussion, 
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it is arguably this examination of the OHCHR from a cosmopolitan perspective which 
constitutes one of the most novel elements of this entire inquiry as, at the time of writing, 
there are no significant academic works which attempt a similar analysis.  Having considered 
this position, chapter 8 then concludes this investigation with an attempt to provide some 
normative suggestions as to reforms that would be necessary were there a desire to correct a 
number of the deficiencies identified in chapters 6 and 7.  Upon reaching such a position, it is 
then possible to more fully consider the extent to which the UN’s human rights machinery 
contributes to the operation of a constitutional process at the global level. 
 
1.2  Literature Review 
 Before embarking upon this inquiry, it would first be useful to provide a degree of 
intellectual context to the present discussion.  In this regard, the first point to be noted has, in 
fact, already been stated.  This is the argument that a constitutional approach necessarily 
involves the intermingling of a broad range of ideas and concepts, particularly from the 
realms of law and politics.  Consequently, it can be said that a constitutional approach is a 
syncretic approach.  It attempts to draw upon elements from a wide variety of different, and 
sometimes competing, perspectives.  In doing so, however, such an approach must 
simultaneously refrain from being defined or restricted by these other, external concepts.  As 
a result, the intellectual context in which this present discussion can be situated is also an 
environment which is not restricted to a specific pre-determined field of study or enquiry.  
Instead, it is those creations which, consciously or otherwise, cross boundaries and blur edges 
that are of most relevance, and most significance, to the current investigation. 
 In acknowledging this, however, it is also necessary to recognise the fact that the 
multidisciplinary nature of a particular work does not automatically prove its relevance to the 
present inquiry.  Indeed, even a purely constitutional work, whilst arguably incorporating an 
appropriate blend of law and politics, might not be inherently useful unless it also considers 
the other concept referred to in the question stated above – human rights.  Consequently, the 
discussions that are of most relevance to the one at hand are those which possess a 
constitutional nature yet also consider issues and questions of human rights. 
7 
 
In this regard, an initial piece worth noting is Stephen Gardbaum’s work on Human 
Rights and International Constitutionalism.6  Whilst this is undoubtedly one of the few works 
to directly consider both human rights and constitutional issues at an international level, it is 
focused “less on the relationship between these two legal systems than on their differences 
and respective functions.”7  The result is a work which is more akin to a comparative study of 
two discrete areas of international law rather than an in-depth analysis of how the concepts 
themselves relate to one another. 
In many ways, this is a broadly similar approach to that presented by Joel Trachtman 
in The Future of International Law,8 as both human rights and international constitutionalism 
are treated as distinct functional areas of international law.  One consequence of this 
functional approach is that it provides no natural link between constitutionalism and the 
concept of human rights.  Whilst human rights themselves are not ignored, they are 
considered as simply another area in which international law can and does function.  Indeed, 
they are seen as being “determined through political, constitutional, and essentially 
contractarian processes, which we can expect to differ to some extent in different states.”9 
This position stands in notable contrast to the understanding presented by Illan rua 
Wall in Human Rights and Constituent Power,10  which suggests “the opening of human 
rights by constituent power, a confluence of the two discourses.”11  In Trachtman’s case, this 
distinction is expressed, at least in part, through an attempt to “avoid the vague term 
‘governance’ in favor of the more concrete term ‘government.’”12  Whilst it could be said that 
the relative nature of a term as being vague or concrete depends in large part on the 
definitions being applied to them, this distinction is nevertheless a useful one and it is 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 2 of the present study. 
Wall’s analysis does also warrant some consideration, however, as it characterises 
human rights as a discourse which “takes its place at the junction of politics and law, [being] 
6 Gardbaum, S., ‘Human Rights and International Constitutionalism’, in Dunoff, J. L., and Trachtman, J. P., 
(eds.), Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
7 Ibid., p. 233. 
8 Trachtman, J. P., The Future of International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
(henceforth, Trachtman). 
9 Ibid., p. 119. 
10 Wall, I. R., Human Rights and Constituent Power: Without Model or Warranty, (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 
(henceforth, Wall). 
11 Ibid., p. 145. 
12 Trachtman, p. 8. 
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both a political demand and the juridical decision.”13  Such an understanding of human rights 
as simultaneously relating to both law and politics inevitably sites the concept firmly within 
the constitutional realm.  From this position, an argument is advanced which attempts “to 
develop a sense of human rights as an event to be created each time rather than a property to 
be protected.”14  In doing so, however, the distinctiveness is lost between what is properly to 
be called human rights and what is properly constitutional.  Instead, both are seen as relating 
to the act of constitution, where each “must be understood in its essence as creation ex 
nihilo … the idea of creation from the nothing.”15  In this way, ‘human rights’ becomes an 
open-ended process of continual creation, one which “displaces the juridical metaphysics of 
sovereignty and instead proposes no transcendent solution, no model that might come with a 
guarantee from the experts of its definite success.”16 
 This vision of human rights and constituent power forming a communal and ongoing 
creative process does seem to possess a certain degree of utility, particularly as regards those 
works which argue that “international society would seem to be undergoing a process of 
constitutionalization.”17  One such work is The Constitutionalization of International Law by 
Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein.18  The suggestion here is that 
constitutionalization is “a process, inspired by constitutional thought.”19  Whilst little precise 
detail is given, the process envisaged here does not appear to contain the same ongoing, 
open-ended and creative potential that seems to emanate from Wall’s work.  In contrast, the 
suggestion is made that “the point of constitutionalization is, often enough, to remove matters 
from the ordinary political process.”20  The very fact of stating that constitutionalization 
could have some kind of goal or purpose, or ‘point’, to it suggests that it is possible to 
conceive of a time when the process is complete and, therefore, no longer relevant.  As 
discussed by Wall, however, an alternative form of process does exist and the possibility that 
a constitution could be thought of as a process itself, and not simply as the end result of a 
process of constitutionalization, is examined in chapter 3. 
13 Wall, p. 1. 
14 Ibid., p. 133. 
15 Ibid., p. 143.  Emphasis in original. 
16 Ibid., p. 146. 
17 Klabbers, J., ‘Setting the Scene’, in Klabbers, J., et al, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 7. 
18 See ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 10. 
20 Ibid., p. 19. 
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Despite the utility of this approach, however, it does not appear strictly necessary to 
understand a constitution as a process in order to link human rights and constitutional matters 
at the international level.  One work that can be seen as achieving this, at least to some extent, 
is Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order by Kurt Mills.21  Whilst not being explicitly 
constitutional in scope, this work focuses on examining “increasing interdependence and a 
reconceptualization of sovereignty, … incorporating human rights as a legitimating factor in 
the emerging global order.”22  This focus on sovereignty involves a necessary blend of law 
and politics that can arguably be seen as being constitutional, particularly to the extent that it 
incorporates an argument that “[i]nternational law has recast the relationship between the 
individual and the state, as well as between the individual and the broader international 
community.”23  This tripartite relationship, between the individual, the state and the 
international realm, can be seen as forming the core area of concern for an examination of the 
relationship between human rights and global constitutionalism.  In the course of examining 
this relationship, Mills advances the argument that “there are two constitutive principles of 
state legitimacy – human rights and popular sovereignty.”24  By establishing a conceptual 
connection between the protection of human rights and the legitimacy of state authority and 
behaviour, this position ultimately lends support to the claim that “statehood is increasingly 
imbued with responsibility as well as rights”.25 
 The prominence of human rights within this argument naturally leads to an emphasis 
on the particular responsibility of a state regarding the protection of its inhabitants.  This 
responsibility to protect, or even just R2P, can arguably be seen, therefore, as containing 
substantial links to the discussions on the relationship between human rights and state 
sovereignty.  Indeed, one definition of the concept of R2P has simply described it as the 
“principle that holds that sovereign states are responsible and accountable both to their own 
people and to the international society of states for the protection of their populations.”26  
Despite a significant overlap of particular themes, however, discussion of the responsibility to 
protect rarely uses the language of constitutionalism.  Instead, the focus is primarily on issues 
of sovereignty and human rights, not unlike in Mills’ work referred to above.  Nevertheless, it 
21 Mills, K., Human Rights in the Emerging Global Order: A New Sovereignty?, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1998), (henceforth, Mills). 
22 Ibid., p. 2. 
23 Ibid., p. 187. 
24 Ibid., p. 43. 
25 Ibid., p. 194. 
26 Glanville, L., Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History, (London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2014), p. 1. 
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must be conceded that certain themes do appear to be held in common and the nature of the 
link between sovereignty and constitutionalism at an international level is investigated more 
thoroughly in chapter 4 of the present study. 
 Despite appearing to hold certain themes in common, however, the present discussion 
is not principally concerned with either humanitarian interventions or the philosophical 
construction of sovereignty.  Of greater relevance, therefore, are the principles on which the 
idea of R2P is grounded.  In particular, the idea that “the state is nothing more than the sum 
of its parts”27 is one which lays the groundwork for an argument that protecting the liberty of 
states requires protection of the liberty of the individual members of those states.  This is an 
idea that is explored further in chapter 5. 
 Chapter 5 also gives greater consideration to the role played by the United Nations in 
a global constitutional process.  In relation to this connection between the UN and global 
constitutionalism, a work that is particularly worth noting is The United Nations Charter as 
the Constitution of the International Community by Bardo Fassbender.28  As might be 
expected, Fassbender presents the argument that the “constitutional law of the international 
community … is built on and around the Charter of the United Nations”.29  In making this 
claim, however, there is little discussion of the connections, if any, between rights and 
constitutions.  Fassbender does raise the suggestion that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights helps provide “ample evidence of the fact that the Charter has left behind the 
traditional state-centric view of international law, by gearing its rules to the ultimate goal of 
the general welfare of peoples and individual human beings.”30  Nevertheless, beyond such 
claims, there is little investigation into how these international human rights interact with an 
understanding of the UN charter as an international constitution.  Furthermore, despite a 
focus on the UN, the emphasis is on the Charter itself and there is no discussion of the role 
played or contribution made by the UN’s human rights organs. 
 It is this particular analysis, then, which the present discussion is intended to address 
and which would appear to be a subject that is as yet unexplored by much of the existing 
academic literature.  There are works which appear to note this gap and yet some, such as 
Gardbaum, proceed from an assumed and unexplained theoretical basis whilst others, such as 
27 Mills, p. 42. 
28 Fassbender, B., The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community, (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). 
29 Ibid., p. 1. 
30 Ibid., p.102. 
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Wall, discuss the abstract theoretical position at the expense of any international political or 
legal considerations.  Other works, such as those by Klabbers or Fassbender, are relatively 
attentive to issues of international or global constitutionalism and yet pay scant attention to 
matters of human rights.  Still others, such as Trachtman or Mills, imply particular opinions 
on the matter without fully exploring the reasoning or implications beyond what is necessary 
for the advancement of other arguments.  It is, therefore, this particular void that the present 
investigation is intended to fill and it is to the debates surrounding such matters that, it is 
hoped, it will contribute. 
 
1.3  Methodology 
 Before attempting to provide the contribution identified above, it might first prove 
useful to outline the approach being taken to address it.  In this regard, one particularly 
relevant work is The Health of Nations by Philip Allott.31  This “essay is proposed as a 
contribution to the self-explaining of international society at the level of transcendental 
theory and pure theory”.32  In the course of the theoretical exploration of ideas that is 
presented therein, the suggestion is advanced that “[t]he idea of constitutionalism is a golden 
thread running through the better history of the human race, a perennial and universal 
possibility in humanity’s social self-constituting, a meta-cultural and meta-temporal 
theoretical potentiality.”33  This somewhat hopeful, and somewhat abstract, understanding of 
constitutionalism is predicated upon an argument that a “society does not have a constitution.  
A society is a constituting, an unceasing process of self-creating.  A society constitutes itself 
simultaneously in three dimensions – as ideas, as practice, and as law.”34  As was indicated 
above, this idea of a constitution as an ongoing process that both affects and is affected by 
society is a concept that is taken up in chapter 3 of the present discussion. 
 In contrast to Allott’s approach, however, there is no strict adherence to the tripartite 
distinction between ideas, practice and law.  Instead, there is a greater emphasis on the 
syncretism of constitutional theory and the constitutional process is presented as involving a 
particular combination of all these areas.  However, in reaching towards this more practical, 
and more legal, view of constitutional thought, there is perhaps something of a 
31 See supra, fn. 2. 
32 Allott, p. 81. 
33 Allott, p. 342. 
34 Allott, p. 79. 
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rapprochement with Allott’s view of history.  Of particular note is the suggestion that “[t]he 
history of the human world is the history of the making of human reality, a self-consciousness 
of the self-creating activity of human consciousness, the mind’s mirror of the mind.”35  To 
put it another way, amongst the areas touched upon in the present discussion is a particular 
strand of history.  This is not to say, however, that this discussion is historical by nature.  
Instead, what is of relevance and importance is the understanding that can be gleaned from 
thoughts that have been developed and expressed in the past, rather than any attempt to 
establish an exact depiction of specific historical developments.36 
 This consideration of historical thought highlights the way in which constitutional 
theory was not insulated from certain developments, particularly those whereby 
“[p]hilosophy very soon identified and appropriated … the amazing universal power of 
dialectical thought.”37  It is in attempting to assess the significance of a particular binary 
approach to constitutional perspectives that this present discussion develops and outlines its 
own approach to the idea of a constitution as a process.38  This process, however, is not 
presented as participating in this dualistic conceptualisation of human reality and there is 
instead a particular reluctance to embrace pre-determined dialectical narratives.  As a result, 
this investigation can instead be positioned amongst those theories which attempt to develop 
a form of ‘middle ground’, where the aim is “to achieve reconciliation between the two 
positions, generally by respecting elements in each.”39 
 This synergy, between constitutionalism and attempts to develop a middle ground, 
gives added impetus to the rejection of the idea that a constitutional process is divisible into 
the ideal, the practical and the legal.  In particular, it ought to be noted that, “[r]ather than the 
ideal, the style of middle-ground philosophical argument will tend to stay on the ground, 
close to the empirical facts of a case or to a sense perception.”40  It is in this way that the 
present discussion foregoes analysis of a ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ theory of 
constitutionalism and instead looks to particular circumstances and situations in the real 
world.  It is a position which attempts to “start with the actual beliefs and values of existing 
35 Allott, p. 3. 
36 In particular, see infra, Chapter 2. 
37 Allott, p. 82.  Emphasis removed. 
38 See infra, Chapter 3. 
39 Navari, C., ‘The Terrain of the Middle Ground’, in Navari, C., (ed.), Ethical Reasoning in International 
Affairs: Arguments from the Middle Ground, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 1. 
40 Ibid., p. 7. 
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societies and look for tensions between these and the institutions of those societies”.41  
Specifically, the institution of the United Nations is examined in relation to international 
society, not because it represents a pre-existing ideal, but because it is in existence.42 
 This attempt to engage with actual beliefs and practices is similar, to some extent, to 
the approach taken by Mervyn Frost in Constituting Human Rights.43  Here, the argument is 
presented that “[h]uman rights claims are central for any understanding of our contemporary 
world because of the way in which concepts of individual human rights are embedded in the 
internal structure of the two major global practices of our age”.44  In essence, the suggestion 
is made that establishing a focus on certain human rights can help address “a somewhat 
excruciating ethical puzzle which is that the constitutive rules of global civil society seem to 
be pulling us in a strikingly different direction to the constitutive rules of the society of 
democratic and democratizing states.”45 
 Despite utilising an arguably similar approach, however, the actual discussion and 
conclusions that Frost presents are less relevant to the present inquiry than they may at first 
appear.  This is, at least in part, because that work is explicitly not directed at anyone who 
will “quite properly understand that I am without rights, I am a slave, a minion, a servant, a 
subject, a lackey of another who is my master, my lord, my owner.”46  Thus, it presents an 
argument that human rights are ‘central for any understanding of our contemporary world’, 
but only to the extent that we already value, desire or utilise human rights in some way.  In 
this manner, Frost’s work can be seen as participating in the “recurrent human aspiration, 
transmitted from one generation to another, throughout recent centuries, to construct an 
international legal order applicable both to States (and international organizations) and to 
individuals, pursuant to certain universal standards of justice.”47 
 In comparison to such an approach, it would be misleading to describe the present 
discussion as ‘aspiring’ to ‘construct’ an international order in accordance with ‘universal 
standards of justice’.  In contrast, the constitutional process is specifically presented as a 
41 Ibid., p. 13. 
42 For greater discussion of the reasoning and justification behind a consideration of the United Nations, see 
infra, Chapter 5. 
43 Frost, M., Constituting Human Rights: Global civil society and the society of democratic states, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), (henceforth, Frost). 
44 Ibid., p. 137. 
45 Ibid., p. 16. 
46 Ibid., p. 6. 
47 Trindade, A. A. C., The Access of Individuals to International Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), p. 6. 
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position which is capable of acting as a vehicle for such normative aspirations without 
inherently requiring a commitment to any normative claims from which such aspirations 
might be constructed or construed.48  It is, therefore, a position which can provide a 
framework for normative theory and yet does not require the adoption of normative 
arguments. 
 It would be equally misleading, however, to present the suggestion that this form of 
constitutional process is objectively neutral and entirely free of normative values and 
implications.  For instance, a coherent argument could be made that this discussion is 
founded on an assumption that order is preferable to disorder, or one that holds knowledge to 
be preferable to ignorance.  It must be conceded that there may be some truth to such 
contestations.  Such a concession, however, does not inevitably invalidate any conclusions at 
which this discussion may arrive.  Instead, it merely restricts the utility and applicability of 
these conclusions to a realm in which such assumptions are held in common. 
 At this point, the objection could naturally be raised that this is an inherently similar 
difficulty to the restriction that was identified in Frost’s work above, thereby nullifying any 
attempt to differentiate the two.  To a certain extent, this comparison can be seen as being 
broadly accurate.  Particularly from an epistemological perspective, there is a shared focus on 
the ‘middle ground’ and attempts to explore and utilise the ‘actual beliefs and practices of 
existing societies’, as was discussed earlier.  It is necessary, however, to distinguish the 
limitations and restrictions that have been identified. 
 In this particular work, Frost attempts “to show that claims about human rights are 
central to any understanding of contemporary world politics.”49  This conclusion, however, is 
predicated upon an understanding that there exists “a society without geographical borders … 
[which] comprises all those who claim basic rights for themselves and recognize them in 
others.”50  In essence, therefore, it is an argument that human rights are important as long as 
we participate in a society of people who consider human rights to be important. 
 Whilst arguably sharing a particular epistemology, it cannot be said that the present 
discussion incorporates a similar degree of circularity.  It can safely be conceded that the 
utility of the upcoming analysis rests on an assumption that world order is preferable to world 
48 See infra, Chapter 3. 
49 Frost, p. 137.  Emphasis in original. 
50 Ibid., p. 7. 
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disorder.  To the extent, then, that one desires to establish or maintain chaos and disorder at 
the global level, this essay has little to contribute.  In contrast to Frost’s approach, however, it 
is not the intention of this discussion to promote a normative argument that a global 
constitutional order is, would be or could be desirable in any way.  Were that to be the case, 
the present investigation would indeed be at risk of developing the same circularity that has 
been identified in Frost’s work above.  Instead, it must be taken as a founding assumption of 
the present discussion that developing a deeper understanding of world order in some way is 
a goal worth pursuing.51 
 In saying this, it perhaps ought to be noted that it would be perfectly plausible to 
argue against specific world orders, and even establish certain forms of disorder as being 
preferable to them.  This is not in itself, however, an argument against the desirability of 
world order.  Rather, it is a position that stems from a preference for certain forms of order 
over others.  It has been argued, for instance, that even an anarchical system can be said to 
contain a particular form of order, provided that certain factors are present.52 
 There is an extent, then, to which the upcoming inquiry can be said to share a 
particular epistemology with that of Frost.  Equally, however, there is an attempt to avoid the 
adoption of a similar normative perspective and thereby restrict the possibility of developing 
the same degree of circularity.  This is facilitated by an ontological understanding more akin 
to that of Allott, which focuses on the nature of a global constitutional process occurring in 
and amongst international society.  If, however, this describes the particular ontological and 
epistemological context within which the present discussion can be situated, it remains 
unclear as to exactly how such an inquiry might progress. 
Thus far, there has been a rejection of the normative approach taken by Frost and of 
the purely theoretical approach adopted by Allott.  As a result, it is perhaps unsurprising to 
acknowledge the need to draw upon “a pluralistic methodology that aims to find ways of 
linking apparently disparate bodies of knowledge and understanding.”53  To some extent, 
such an approach could perhaps be situated within what has become known as the ‘English 
51 At this point, it is perhaps worth briefly noting the corollary argument – that if the present investigation is 
considered successful in developing a particular understanding of world order, then preventing the necessary 
developments or reversing certain arguments may also help develop a particular understanding of world 
disorder.  Exploring this possibility, however, is outside the scope of the present inquiry. 
52 See, for example, Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (4th edn.), 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
53 Little, R., ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, (2000) 6(3) European 
Journal of International Relations 395, p. 397. 
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School’ of international relations.  Labelling the present discussion in this way, however, has 
the potential to be as equally misleading as helpful, not least because it has “been argued that 
members of the English School have never adhered to a common perspective and so any 
attempt to link them together within a single tradition of thought inevitably results in a set of 
inconsistent and incoherent ideas.”54  Despite these drawbacks, acknowledging the inherent 
utility of, and need for, an approach grounded in methodological pluralism does allow for the 
development of an outline as to how the present discussion will proceed. 
 As was briefly discussed earlier, the following two chapters of this discussion intend 
to focus on the development of a particular perspective of constitutionalism, its operation and 
its interaction with concepts of rights.  As a result, this section of the present inquiry adopts a 
principally theoretical approach that is perhaps closest in nature to Allot’s work outlined 
above.  The purpose of utilising such an approach is primarily to furnish the subsequent 
discussion with a sound theoretical background on which it is able to draw. 
 Having developed a theoretical basis from which to proceed, the analysis in chapters 4 
and 5 attempts to apply this theory to the international realm.  In developing this level of 
application, however, the discussion moves away from the predominantly theoretical 
approach of the earlier chapters.  Instead, the methodology being applied is more akin to that 
identified in Frost’s work above, in that there is a concern to focus on the actual and existing 
international realm as it currently is, rather than attempting to construct a theoretical and 
artificial understanding of the international sphere. 
 Building upon this more practice-oriented approach, chapters 6 and 7 proceed to 
examine the principal human rights organs of the United Nations.  Coming at this point in the 
discussion, these chapters are able to utilise the theoretical understanding developed in 
chapters 2 and 3 with the benefit of the refinement and translation to the global level that 
have been applied in chapters 4 and 5.  This enables a stronger analytical approach that is 
more concerned with examining and understanding these institutions than with providing 
further development to a particular theoretical perspective. 
 Finally, upon completing this level of the analysis, possibilities are opened up for a 
more normative approach.  As a consequence, chapter 8 is able to consider certain normative 
claims that stem from the practical analysis of chapters 6 and 7 and yet are simultaneously 
54 Ibid. 
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grounded in the theoretical understanding developed over the course of the preceding 
chapters.  This final chapter is then also in a position to be able to reflect on broader issues 
regarding the nature and implications of this study as a whole. 
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Chapter 2 
Constitutional Divisions 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is the aim of this chapter to assess a particular 
distinction in constitutional analysis in order to assist in the differentiation and clarification of 
alternate theoretical strands.  The division that shall be considered is that which can be said to 
exist between a perspective that views constitutionalism as government and one that views 
constitutionalism as governance.  Although somewhat subtle, this distinction could be said to 
lie at the heart of many constitutional disagreements and, consequently, these categories shall 
be examined in due course.  Before discussing the specifics of this primitive typology, 
however, it shall be necessary to consider certain historical approaches to constitutional 
philosophy. 
A principal reason behind adopting such an approach is that, before examining certain 
theories and practices relating to constitutions and constitutional politics, it can often be 
helpful to examine the historical developments that have preceded the current understanding 
of such ideas.  In order to achieve this, it also becomes necessary to define what is meant by 
these, and similar, terms.  Although it may be possible to forego any precise definition in the 
hope that one can “frame questions and claims with sufficient precision and specificity that 
the distinct - if related - ideas ... become clear in context”,55 such a position risks accusations 
of arbitrariness and bias in the omission or inclusion of particular factors.  Instead, it seems 
prudent to engage in a discussion, however brief, of the reasoning behind the definitions 
being used here and this, it is hoped, will help clarify any ensuing analysis.  To that end, this 
chapter consists primarily of an all too brief exposition of the historical formulations of 
constitutional thought in an attempt to situate the discussions that are to follow in the context 
of their earlier precedents. 
 It must be noted at the outset that this discussion of the history of constitutional 
thought will, of necessity, be somewhat succinct.  Whilst there is no doubt much that can be 
learned from a thorough examination of the developments that have led to modern 
55 Gardbaum, S., ‘Human Rights and International Constitutionalism’, (henceforth, Gardbaum), in Dunoff, J. L., 
and Trachtman, J. P., (eds.), Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), (henceforth, Ruling the World?), p. 234. 
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conceptions of constitutionalism, this is not the intended aim of the current project.  With that 
in mind, therefore, what follows is a brief summation of particularly significant developments 
in constitutional history.  This is done with the intention of demonstrating a certain continuity 
of thought between particular historical traditions and the analyses which are to follow within 
this project. 
 
2.1  Classical Thought 
 To begin chronologically, then, it has been suggested that Greek philosophers such as 
Plato and Aristotle are amongst the earliest contributors to constitutional theory.  Whilst legal 
systems in general could be said to date back to the Code of Hammurabi, if not earlier, it has 
been suggested that “[o]f all the varied meanings of which our word ‘constitution’ is 
susceptible, the Greek politeia conforms to one of the most ancient.”56  In relation to these 
Hellenistic theorists, it has been stated that much of their continuing value 
“lies in their recognition of the nature of constitutional problems and issues 
they set forth and discourse upon. ... Some of their political propositions are 
still viable; some, happily, have been discarded; and others that have been 
neglected may deserve consideration for possible application”.57 
 Of the various contributions made by these thinkers, one of the most enduring has 
been a particular typology of governments.  For Aristotle, “[t]he words constitution and 
government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in 
states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many.”58  Each of these numerically-
sorted types is then subdivided into both positive and negative forms, thereby suggesting six 
basic systems of government, wherein “[t]he true forms of government ... govern with a view 
to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the private interest ... are 
perversions.”59 
 Aristotle acknowledged, however, that the practicalities of political rule meant that 
few constitutions fitted neatly into these ‘pure’ categories and that, in certain circumstances, 
56 McIlwain, C. H., Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, (Revised edn.), (New York, USA: Cornell 
University Press, 1947), (henceforth, McIlwain), p. 26. 
57 Polin, R., Plato and Aristotle on Constitutionalism, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 8. 
58 Aristotle, Politics III.7, as appearing in Morgan, M. L, (ed.), Classics of Moral and Political Theory, (2nd 
edn.), (Cambridge: Hackett, 1996), (henceforth, Classics), p. 413. 
59 Ibid. 
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it may be either desirable or necessary to fuse or merge particular elements in order to create 
a ‘mixed’ constitution.60  With a few alterations here and there, this concept of a mixed 
constitution was a theory “that Greek thinkers from Thucydides to Polybius (including some 
whose works are now lost) had developed.”61  Specific technical variations aside, this broad 
analysis of constitutional arrangements proved particularly influential for a relatively long 
period of time and 
“Aristotle’s treatise on politics ... and Polybios’ [sic] account of the Roman 
constitution have been treated as major works in political thought right up to 
the modern period, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the 
constitution of England was commonly described as a mixed constitution”.62 
 In the present context, however, what is particularly instructive is the consideration 
that “[t]he words constitution and government have the same meaning”.63  Despite initial 
appearances, one must bear in mind that the precise term translated here as ‘constitution’ is 
the Greek politeia referred to above.  This concept can be seen as meaning “the state as it 
actually is.  It is a term which comprises all the innumerable characteristics which determine 
that state’s peculiar nature, and these include its whole economic and social texture as well as 
matters governmental”.64  This perception of constitutional thought is supported by 
“a close analogy between the organization of the State and the organism of 
the individual human being.  They [the Greeks] thought that the two 
elements of body and mind ... had a parallel in two constitutive elements of 
the State, the rulers and the ruled.”65 
Plato, for instance, drew such an analogy between the constitution of the political body and 
the constitution of the physical body, stating that “the true city, in my opinion, is the one 
we've described, the healthy one as it were.”66 
 As a consequence of this particular understanding of constitutionalism, the ancient 
Greeks could attempt to assess constitutions as being positive or negative, just or unjust.  
60 See, for example, Politics IV.9, ibid., p. 435. 
61 Marquez, X., ‘Cicero and the Stability of States’, (2011) 32(3) History of Political Thought 397, p. 397. 
62 Hansen, M. H., ‘The Mixed Constitution versus the Separation of Powers: Monarchical and aristocratic 
aspects of modern democracy’, (2010) 31(3) History of Political Thought 509, p. 522. 
63 Loc. cit., fn. 58. 
64 McIlwain, p. 26. 
65 Vinogradoff, P., Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, (Vol. II), (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 
12. 
66 Plato, Republic II, 372e, as appearing in Classics, p. 65. 
                                                     
21 
 
Through the lens of their particular political understanding, the concept of a ‘constitution’ can 
be seen as referring to “the whole nature or ‘composure’ of a thing.  Such a conception of law 
may warrant one in saying that a particular enactment is bad, but never that it is not 
legitimate.”67  This, then, is one historical construction of constitutional thought - that 
constitutions are primarily descriptive, not prescriptive.  They relate to the functions of 
government but are devoid of any substantive content that one might equate with a modern 
political ideology.  For these thinkers, a constitution is a simple fact - it cannot be declared 
void or illegitimate, nor can it only be recognised if existing in a prescribed form.  To put it 
another way, they considered that constitutional law (if such a thing could be conceived of at 
all) was “not coercive but only normative; and that constitutions have no sanction in our 
modern sense.”68 
 This constitutional philosophy of the ancient Greeks stands in marked contrast to 
many theories concerning the Roman republic - the other primary historical source of 
Western constitutional theory.  In fact, it has been claimed that “[t]here is no change in 
political theory so startling in its completeness as the change from the theory of Aristotle to 
the later philosophical view represented by Cicero and Seneca.”69  Within this newer, Roman 
view, one of the more significant departures from Greek thought concerns the establishment 
of a form of ‘natural law’ that was somehow in existence before all other forms of human 
social organisation, and was therefore superior to them. 
 Claiming that this attribution of a prior and superior position to natural law was a 
distinct feature of Roman jurisprudence is not, however, a claim that the Greeks had no 
conception of natural law.  Nevertheless, the Aristotelian proposition “is a moral law.  It 
demands that a man be reasonable, but it permits him to be totally unreasonable if he so 
desires.”70  The Roman-Stoic view, by contrast, was of a powerful, coercive law that could be 
either embraced or resisted, but not ignored.  It can be seen as being founded upon a 
perception “of law as a rational and just principle of life which is not enacted by men, but is 
the expression of the universal and natural reason and sense of justice.”71  It is arguable that it 
was this more directive form of natural law that underpinned much of Roman constitutional 
thought and it is on this basis that one can suggest, for example, that the works of Cicero 
67 McIlwain, p. 36. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Carlyle, R. W., and Carlyle, A. J., A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, (Vol. I), (London: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1903), (henceforth, Carlyle), p. 8. 
70 Waugh, Fr. R. O'Brien, 'Natural Law', (1996) 16 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 34, p. 35. 
71 Carlyle, p. 38. 
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provide “a picture of natural justice apt to inform higher-order constitutional norms and, as a 
corollary, the limits of popular legislation and the positive legal system.”72 
 One such ‘higher-order’ norm could potentially be seen as being the idea of popular 
sovereignty.  Whilst such terminology would no doubt have been somewhat alien to Roman 
jurists, the practical outworking of such a theoretical position would seem to be present in a 
variety of ways.  For instance, 
“[i]n the exhaustive list of the various kinds of Roman legal enactment 
which Gaius gives ... lex stands first, the enactment of the whole people; 
while the authority of every other form of Roman legislation invariably 
depends upon its relation to lex.”73 
On a theoretical level at least, therefore, patricians are seen as submitting to the authority of 
the whole people as enunciated in the Lex Hortensia when they obey the requirements of a 
simple plebiscite.  Similarly, albeit much later, the authority of the Emperor can still be seen 
as being derived, at least theoretically, from the authority of the people, who are said to have 
conferred on him (by a lex) the entirety of their imperium and potestas.74   
 Whilst the specific mechanics of the Roman legal system do not directly concern the 
present discussion, these examples do hint at a particular theoretical implication that contrasts 
sharply with the Greek perception of constitutionalism examined above.  This implication is 
linked to the idea that if, somehow, particular legal enactments could not have their authority 
traced back to that of the populus as a whole, then those enactments would in some way be 
illegitimate or invalid.  This is reinforced by the belief that “[l]aw in its general sense does 
not express the will of man, but is rather that which he rationally apprehends and obeys.”75  
In other words, the Roman idea of there being a ‘law above the law’, as it were, resulted in 
theorists no longer being restricted to assessing the merits of any given constitutional system 
(and the products thereof), but were also given a standard by which to assess their legitimacy.  
This is an option that does not appear to have been open to their more Hellenistic, or more 
precisely Aristotelian, counterparts. 
72 Straumann, B., ‘Constitutional Thought in the Late Roman Republic’, (2011) 32(2) History of Political 
Thought 281, p. 290. 
73 McIlwain, pp. 44-5. 
74 See ibid., p. 46. 
75 Carlyle, p. 38. 
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 There remains, of course, a great deal that could be said about the Roman and Greek 
constitutional structures and theories.  This is particularly true when one considers that, with 
each new detail, there are a number of competing claims and counter-claims as to the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of the available evidence.76  However, it is equally true that many accounts of 
the history of constitutional thought “dwell lovingly on the Athenian democracy and the 
Roman republic - and then leap over the intervening centuries to take up the story again with 
Hobbes and Locke and the Glorious Revolution.”77  In the interest of brevity, therefore, it 
shall suffice at present to note that, historically speaking, there would seem to be two major 
strands of constitutional thought.  According to at least one interpretation, Greek thinking 
encourages a descriptive, factual account that relates constitutionalism to the institution of 
government itself.  Roman theories, on the other hand, point towards a more prescriptive 
form of understanding constitutionalism through a government's relationship with society.  
To put it another way, Greek thought sees constitutionalism as government, whereas Roman 
thought views constitutionalism as governance. 
 
2.2  The Medieval Era 
 The self-same brevity that urges this rapid progression, however, unfortunately also 
encourages the omission of a great many interesting accounts.  It is with regret, therefore, that 
these ‘intervening centuries’ must be dealt with only lightly in the present discussion.  With 
that in mind, a detailed account of the medieval period has been foregone in favour of an 
unfortunately brief summation of key developments. 
 To advance through the ages, then, it ought first to be noted that “[i]n the history of 
medieval government the greatest change of all was from feudal hierarchy to corporate 
state”78 and this development can potentially be seen as correlating closely with the conflict 
between absolutism and limited government.  From a theoretical perspective, this concept of 
‘limited government’ is often treated as being synonymous with the term ‘constitutionalism’.  
It has, for example, been suggested “that in all its successive phases, constitutionalism has 
76 See, for example, the debate surrounding the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ law in Hamza, G., 
‘The Classification (divisio) into “Branches” of Modern Legal Systems (Orders) and Roman Law Traditions’, 
(2006) 8 European Journal of Law Reform 361.  
77 Tierney, B., Church Law and Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), 
(henceforth, Tierney), XV, p. 5. 
78 Tierney, I, p. 620 
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one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government”.79  In a similar vein, this 
particular interpretation of constitutional theory has sometimes been equated with the concept 
of ‘liberal democracy’.80  It has even been argued that the practical implementation of this 
particular ideology was brought about as a result of certain constitutional changes in the 
medieval period, such as “the convocation of representative bodies, the crown’s 
accountability to law, the protection of personal liberties and freedoms, and the establishment 
of local self-government”.81 
 For all the practical changes that took place during this period, however, there seems 
to be little evidence of significant alterations to the fundamental understanding of the concept 
of constitutionalism.  With the exception of certain outliers, “the trend of medieval political 
thought … increasingly insisted on limited government adapted to particular conditions.”82  
This approach, however, was not new.  Indeed, throughout this period it is often the case that, 
“instead of simply making a gesture of respect toward Aristotle’s relativistic statements, 
some authors now embrace them wholeheartedly and insist on the absolute contingency of 
political organization.”83  The Aristotelian influence on this period, however, was not 
exclusive, with authors producing arguments based on models found “in Aristotle’s examples 
of mixed constitutions, in the government of the ancient Jews, [and] in the Roman 
Republic”.84 
In effect, the various medieval efforts to implement limited government in one form 
or another can arguably be seen as little more than attempts to fulfil the application and 
realisation of these more ancient theories.  Throughout this era, the Aristotelian categorisation 
of constitutional forms in particular appears to survive more or less intact, at least in a very 
general sense.  The Ciceronian approach of believing in a ‘higher law’, however, is more 
often transformed and solidified into various formulations of ‘divine law’.  Indeed, the 
medieval attempts to clarify the distinctions between divine law, natural law and higher law 
79 McIlwain, p. 21. 
80 See, for example, Rawls, J., The Law of Peoples, (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 12.  Here, 
Rawls actively conflates constitutionalism and liberalism, stating that he intends to “begin with a sketch of a 
reasonably just constitutional democratic society (hereafter sometimes referred to simply as a liberal society)”. 
81 Downing, B. M., ‘Medieval Origins of Constitutional Government in the West’, (1989) 18(2) Theory and 
Society 213, p. 214. 
82 Blythe, J. M., Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages, (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), p. 162. 
83 Ibid., p. 165. 
84 Ibid., p. 239. 
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are perhaps amongst the more nuanced debates within the legal philosophy of the age.85  
Although it cannot be denied that these are all very different terms, it remains equally true to 
suggest that they consistently provide a broadly similar perspective on constitutional issues, 
at least within the medieval period itself.  This is because all these “lines of interpretation 
agree that the mores and laws of actual communities derive their legitimacy and majesty not 
from the authority of lawgivers but from the capacity to convince the conscience of their 
justice and rightness.”86  Whilst the medieval era, therefore, can be said to have contained a 
number of significant developments in constitutional practice, the developments in 
constitutional theory can be predominantly related to the rediscovery and consequent 
implementation of Aristotelian and Ciceronian thought. 
 
2.3  The Early Modern Period 
 It can perhaps, then, be justifiably argued that by the start of the seventeenth century 
there was a reasonably well-established conviction in the rightness of a higher law that 
enabled a distinction to be made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ government.  Significantly, 
however, this distinction could also be used to assist in determining the legitimacy of 
government and could therefore be seen as providing a theoretical basis on which one could 
justify resistance to an established government.  Of particular note in this regard are the 
works of early modern authors such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Hugo Grotius.  
Whilst not explicitly utilising such terms, these writers can arguably be said to be situated in 
the ancient traditions of constitutionalism, whether by restricting it to an Aristotelian 
assessment of ‘the authority of lawgivers’ or by relating it to some form of higher law, 
particularly as translated through the medieval notion of divine law. 
 To put it another way, these seventeenth-century writers can be seen as having 
developed, consciously or otherwise, ancient methods of constitutional assessment into 
theories concerning the legitimate processes and subjects of government rather than just its 
particular form.  Locke, for example, suggested that “the state must respect rights, and when 
it does not, it acts ultra vires - beyond its proper powers - and imposes no duty of 
85 See, for instance, Crowe, M. B., ‘St. Thomas and Ulpian’s Natural Law’, in Gilson, E., (ed.), St. Thomas 
Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies, (Vol. I), (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1974). 
86 Patrick, D., Old Testament Law, (London: SCM Press, 1985), p. 7. 
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obedience”87 and this could be held true regardless of whether the state concerned was a 
monarchy or a republic.  Even this, however, was founded upon a broadly Aristotelian 
distinction between democracy, oligarchy and monarchy.88  Of all the various aspects of the 
theories advanced by such authors, those of most relevance to the present discussion are the 
ways in which rights-based dialogue began to be incorporated into constitutional and political 
philosophy.  It is, therefore, this aspect that shall now be most closely examined. 
 To continue chronologically, then, the first theorist to be considered is the Dutchman 
Hugo Grotius.  Writing in the first half of the seventeenth century, Grotius developed many 
of his ideas within a political environment that was closely tied to certain inherited aspects of 
the Roman legal system.  Contrasting with the more Aristotelian approach utilised by Locke, 
within the Roman tradition inherited by Grotius it was generally “believed that political 
power was delegated or transferred to a sovereign by the community, and that the distinction 
between a monarch or an assembly as the recipients of this delegated power was relatively 
unimportant.”89  However, the nature of these ‘recipients of delegated power’ began to be 
seen as important when writers such as Grotius considered the notion of liberty.  This concept 
was linked to classical republicanism and “[i]n order to illuminate their argument, these 
republicans [including Grotius] turned to two ancient republics: one was Rome ... and the 
other ... was Athens.”90  What is of interest at the present time, however, is neither Grotius’ 
republicanism nor his interest in liberty, at least not directly.  Instead, it is the fact that 
Grotius can be described as having been amongst the “first of the natural lawyers to develop a 
fully fledged account of subjective natural rights”.91 
 As regards specifically legal philosophy, Grotius is famous for his depiction of a 
natural law that “would take place, though we should even grant, what without the greatest 
Wickedness cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no Care of human 
Affairs.”92  It can also be argued, however, that he “made important contributions to an 
influential doctrine of individual natural rights”93 and the limits of the legitimate actions of 
government.  Nevertheless, and as was discussed earlier, an account of governmental 
87 Edmundson, W. A., An Introduction to Rights, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 30. 
88 See, for instance, Laslett, P., (ed.), John Locke: Two Treatises of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988).  In particular, p. 354 (The Second Treatise, Chap. X). 
89 Tuck, R., Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 157. 
90 Ibid., p. 160. 
91 Straumann, B., ‘Is Modern Liberty Ancient?  Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius's Early 
Works on Natural Law’, (2009) 27 Law & History Review 55, (henceforth, Straumann), p. 58. 
92 Tuck, R., (ed.), Hugo Grotius: The Rights of War and Peace, (Indianapolis, USA: Liberty Fund, 2005), 
(henceforth, Grotius), Vol. I., p. 89 (The Preliminary Discourse, para. XI). 
93 Straumann, p. 55. 
                                                     
27 
 
legitimacy being based on provisions of natural law was not necessarily a particular 
innovation of the early modern period.  Indeed, it can be argued that Grotius explicitly links 
his account of natural rights to specific Roman remedies, as well as certain Ciceronian 
theories of natural law.94 
Of particular importance to the current discussion is that Grotius seemingly 
transforms these provisions of Roman law into universalizable precepts of a universal natural 
law.  This development of the concept of natural, individual rights is then used to provide a 
standard by which to assess the legitimacy of governmental behaviour - the rights form part 
of a normative, coercive order of natural law which is superior to any earthly sovereign.  
Indeed, Grotius distinguishes between a ‘Right of Superiority’, connected to Aristotle, and a 
more fundamental ‘Right of Equality’, which he connects to Cicero and Seneca.95  Whilst it 
is true, for the most part, that “Grotius’s Roman rights doctrine was conceived for the high 
seas, ... [it also] left domestic sovereignty in a more ambiguous condition, with space for 
certain rights to be claimed against public authorities.”96  In this regard, for instance, he 
points out that “Contracts between a Prince and one of his Subjects require no other Rules 
than those which ought to be observed between two private Persons.”97 
 In essence, Grotius can be said to have been concerned with establishing the means to 
assess the legitimacy, or otherwise, of a sovereign body’s interactions with its subjects and he 
did so through the mechanism of individual rights.  Importantly, however, in Grotius’ work, 
the legitimacy of these interactions between sovereign and subjects precedes the recognition 
or establishment of that sovereign’s authority. Indeed, with the sole exception of the 
inheritance of debt, Grotius claims that “[b]y the bare Law of Nature no Man is bound by the 
Fact of another”.98  The exception for the inheritance of debt is significant, as it enables 
Grotius to allow for the public seizure of private property in order to satisfy a debt incurred 
on behalf of the community as a whole.99  In other words, the constitutional theory of Grotius 
can be seen as allowing for consideration of the goals of government and not merely its form.  
Whilst it would be difficult to suggest that this was the primary purpose behind his work, it 
can nevertheless be argued that, as a result of this approach, he was one of the first writers to 
supplement a theory of constitutions as governance with a theory of individual rights. 
94 See generally, Straumann.  See also, Grotius, p. 75 (The Preliminary Discourse, para. II). 
95 See Grotius, pp. 136-7 (Book I, Ch. I, para. III). 
96 Straumann, p. 85. 
97 Grotius, p. 137, n. 16 (Book I, Ch. I, para. III, n. 16). 
98 Grotius, Vol. III, p. 1231 (Book III, Ch. II, para. I). 
99 See ibid. and following. 
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 Following on from this development stands the theory proposed by Thomas Hobbes.  
For Hobbes, an Englishman writing slightly later than Grotius, “power is what it is all 
about.”100  It is this emphasis on the role of power in political and legal relationships that can 
help validate a view of Hobbes as a precursor to modern theories of legal positivism, where 
law itself is seen as “a specific order or organization of power.”101  Hobbes’ discussion of 
power, however, does not preclude a theoretical acknowledgment of the existence of natural 
rights.  Indeed, according to Hobbes, natural rights can be defined in relation to the power 
inherent in an individual, as 
“[t]he Right of Nature ... is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, 
as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of 
his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own 
Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto.”102 
 Following on from this account of rights as simply the inherent liberty of an 
individual “to use his own power,” Hobbes proceeds to distinguish between the concept of 
natural rights and the idea of natural law.  Instead of certain specific rights being granted by a 
normative, universal law, those rights that are innate to individuals qua individuals are seen 
as being a result of their inherent power.  Indeed, Hobbes makes this distinction explicit, 
claiming that “they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right, and Law; 
yet they ought to be distinguished; because … Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, 
and Liberty”.103  Whilst it is left open to Hobbesian theorists to concede the existence of a 
moral form of natural law in the non-coercive, Aristotelian sense, it is not necessary for them 
to acknowledge the existence of a universal natural law that is both discernible and 
enforceable. 
 At the same time as Hobbes provides this separation of natural rights and natural law, 
however, it remains possible to suggest that “the essentials of modern constitutionalism are 
100 Harrison, R., Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion's Masterpiece, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
p. 45. 
101 Kelsen, H., (trans., Wedberg, A.), General Theory of Law and State, (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University 
Press, 1946), (henceforth, Kelsen, General Theory), p. 121. 
102 Tuck, R., (ed.), Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), (henceforth, 
Hobbes), p. 91. 
103 Ibid. 
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still seen in their fundamentals in Hobbes’s political philosophy of natural rights.”104  Indeed, 
in addition to this aforementioned division, Hobbes provides an account of constitutional 
theory that is centred upon the supremacy of the sovereign, in whatever form that might take, 
and a co-ordinated system of positive law.  In contrast to Grotius, however, the 
constitutionalism of Hobbes can be described as being one of government rather than 
governance.  Whereas Grotius provides a normative account of how individual rights can 
help assess the legitimacy of a sovereign’s behaviour towards its subjects, Hobbes’ 
discussion can instead be viewed as being of a more functional character. 
 This functional nature of Hobbes’ work can be seen through the suggestion that 
“[t]hose who are the source of rules cannot themselves be held accountable to rules”105 and 
that “[t]here must ultimately be someone who is the source of law as a human artifact [sic], 
and who is, thus, above the law and cannot be held accountable to law.”106  In presenting 
such a view, the constitutionalism of Hobbes can be seen as being primarily concerned with 
discussing the legitimacy of the sovereign itself, as opposed to the legitimacy of its 
interactions with society.  Hobbes can even be seen as suggesting that legitimate sovereigns 
can never commit illegitimate acts in relation to their own subjects, arguing “that nothing the 
Soveraign Representative can doe to a subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be 
called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign 
doth”.107 
To put it another way, Hobbes’ focus is on the legitimacy of a sovereign’s authority 
as opposed to that of its behaviour.  This is not to say that Hobbes views a sovereign as being 
entirely without limit, “it is merely that limits are not imposed on the sovereign by the 
subjects or citizens.”108  This is a fine distinction, perhaps, but a distinction nonetheless and 
one which shall be discussed in greater detail later.  For the time being, however, it shall 
suffice to conclude that Hobbes’ position can be seen as an almost complete reversal from the 
constitutionalism of Grotius.  Indeed, Hobbes can be viewed as having introduced theories of 
natural rights into a perspective of constitutionalism as government in a similar manner to the 
way in which Grotius combined such theories with a view of constitutionalism as governance. 
104 McDowell, G. L., The Language of Law and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 81. 
105 Ostrom, V., ‘Hobbes, Covenant, and Constitution’, (1980) 10(4) Publius 83, p. 87. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Hobbes, p. 148. 
108 May, L., Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes on Law and International Affairs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), p. 2. 
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 Whilst there are undoubtedly many more individual theorists who could be considered 
in greater detail, such as Samuel Pufendorf or John Locke, the intention at this point is not to 
provide a thorough historical analysis of these various points of view.  Indeed, none of the 
authors considered thus far has been examined in particularly extensive or exhaustive detail, 
as the purpose of this discussion is not to assess the intricacies of rights and constitutions as 
individual concepts.  Rather, it is to provide a brief account of the historical development of 
constitutional thought, as both affecting and affected by development of the concept of rights.  
Between them, Grotius and Hobbes merely serve to highlight the differences between, 
respectively, a view of rights based in constitutionalism as governance and one based in 
constitutionalism as government.  In the former, legal rights are a reflection of that which 
exists prior to a sovereign's active intervention; in the latter, they are consequent upon it. 
 
2.4  Constitutional Revolutions 
 In acknowledging the significant contributions of such scholars as have just been 
discussed, care must be taken to avoid crediting them with knowledge they did not possess 
and theories they did not make.  To that end, recognition must also be given to Thomas Paine 
and his contemporaries in the late eighteenth century for their contributions to what has often 
been regarded as a major turning-point in the history of constitutional thought.  It has been 
suggested, for example, that “[o]nly with the late-eighteenth-century revolutions in North 
America and France ... was there a transition from a descriptive to a prescriptive concept”109 
of constitutionalism.  Whilst there would appear to be some evidence linking this particular 
divide to the Greek and Roman views discussed above, there is no denying that these political 
revolutions had a significant constitutional impact. 
 In particular, these revolutions can justifiably be seen as presenting the emergence of 
the modern, written constitution.  The relatively simple act of codification, however, was not 
necessarily as innovative as it may initially appear.  Whilst it can certainly be said that the 
various revolutionaries implemented a variety of substantive political reforms, stating these 
reforms in a single text was not entirely without precedent.  Indeed, English documents such 
as the Bill of Rights or the Magna Carta can be said to have served a similar purpose in their 
times.  Furthermore, it can be argued that once proponents of reform had succeeded in 
109 Grimm, D., ‘The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization’, (2005) 12(4) Constellations 447, 
(henceforth, Grimm), p. 448. 
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forcing the government to submit to law, writing such laws down was simply a logical next 
step.  From the perspective of constitutional history, therefore, it can be argued that the 
revolutionary documents (principally the Constitution of the United States of America and the 
Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen) are not necessarily significant simply 
because they might form ‘documentary Constitutions’.  The importance that they do carry, 
however, can be attached to their practical implementation of certain theoretical positions. 
 Whilst it regrettably remains impossible in the present discussion to fully analyse all 
the details of these events and Constitutions in anything approaching a satisfactory depth, a 
concise summary of the points that are particularly relevant to the upcoming investigations 
shall nevertheless be attempted.  Of especial significance is the consideration that these 
revolutions did not alter the course of constitutional history by formulating something new, 
but rather by implementing something old.  In North America, for example, the historical 
context of the colonists’ rebellion can certainly be said to have encouraged the vision of 
revolutionaries creating a decisive break with the past and embarking on a new, inspirational 
political project.  However, it remains equally true that these ‘new’ ideas and concepts “did 
not spring into being suddenly with the meeting of the Constitutional Convention, nor did the 
Declaration of Independence evoke them out of the void.”110  A similar statement could be 
made, mutatis mutandis, for the principles of the French revolution. 
 The ideas that these revolutions advocated, therefore, were inescapably built on the 
ideas that had gone before.  From the perspective of the present discussion, then, it might be 
argued that the American constitution can be seen as a practical attempt to implement 
theories that follow in the Greek tradition of constitutionalism as government.  Similarly the 
French Déclaration, along with the earlier English Bill of Rights, can be seen as being 
situated in the predominantly Roman tradition of constitutionalism as governance.  At first 
sight, this suggestion may appear somewhat counter-intuitive, particularly when one 
considers the traditional acceptance of the notion that “[i]n declaring a right and wrong of 
government behavior ... the American revolutionaries were the conscious heirs to a political 
theory that had been expounded in the preceding century to justify the English Revolution of 
1688-9.”111  However, what is significant for present purposes is that “the American 
110 Hockett, H. C., The Constitutional History of the United States 1776-1826, (New York, USA: Macmillan, 
1939), p. vii. 
111 Kay, R. S., ‘American Constitutionalism’, in Alexander, L. (ed.), Constitutionalism: Philosophical 
Foundations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), (henceforth, Constitutionalism), p. 17. 
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revolutionaries saw the principal vindication of these limits in the proper distribution of 
political authority.”112 
 In the American example, therefore, establishing constitutional protection of certain 
rights and liberties is subsequent to establishing the ‘correct’ formation of government.  That 
is, whether or not a government will behave in the desired manner is seen as a consequence 
of it being formed in an ‘appropriate’ way.  It could be said, for instance, that this perspective 
naturally leads to the establishment of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison,113 in which the 
question was posed as to “whether a law duly enacted by Congress and inconsistent with the 
Constitution was nonetheless valid.”114  The eventual decision was that to hold such a law 
“enforceable would undercut the very reason for having a written Constitution that places 
limits on legislative power.”115  This answer is merely indicative of the broader approach to 
constitutional issues inherent in the American system - an attempt to maintain a form of 
equilibrium between the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government is 
thought to inhibit any individual part from adversely affecting the lives of the governed.  
From this perspective, the concept of constitutionalism is seen as relating to governmental 
form and the maintenance of this system of ‘checks and balances’. 
 In contrast to this American approach, the European instances referred to above 
exhibit practical examples of an alternate understanding of constitutional thought.  The 
implication here is that it is only by protecting certain rights that a particular form of 
government may be deemed to be ‘correct’, or at least legitimate.  In other words, this 
perspective is primarily focused on the interactions between the government and society, as 
opposed to the interactions taking place within the government itself.  From this point of view, 
it would seem entirely appropriate to see this perspective of constitutionalism as being 
concerned more with governance than government, placing it within the Ciceronian, as 
opposed to Aristotelian, tradition.  It has even been observed, for instance, “that the 
‘Fraternity’ of the [French] Revolution is only a later form of Cicero’s phrase, ‘By nature we 
are disposed to love men; this is the foundation of law.’”116 
112 Ibid., p. 18. 
113 (1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137. 
114 Pollak, L. H., ‘Marbury v. Madison: What did John Marshall decide and why?’, (2004) 148(1) Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society 1, p. 10. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Carlyle, p. 9.  Footnote omitted. 
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 As has been mentioned, however, this distinction between the two approaches may 
appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive.  This would seem particularly true when one 
considers the various social and political changes that have occurred throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Nevertheless, in the American example, the 
understanding that the constitution “constitutes a superior law ... [meaning] that ordinary law 
which conflicts with the constitution is invalid or inapplicable”117 does not appear to be 
derived from a Roman-Stoic concept of a natural law that is both commanding and 
authoritative.  Instead, this approach to the American constitution is implemented as a 
derivative consequence of a theory that believes the constitution describes how different parts 
of the government should work together.  On the other hand, the practical outworking of the 
European examples appears less directive as to governmental form.  This is arguably because 
it stems from a concept that believes there is a law superior to government and, therefore, 
there are certain ways in which a government may not interact with society regardless of 
what form that government might take. 
 This distinction between constitutionalism as government and constitutionalism as 
governance is not, however, as clear and marked as it may initially appear.  For a variety of 
reasons, not least because of a shared terminology, there are many systems in the 
contemporary world which would seem to combine practical elements of both these theories.  
Furthermore, this distinction should not be taken as having been evident to all the theorists 
mentioned thus far nor should they be seen as having consciously directed their work into one 
category or another.  However, this discussion is merely intended to indicate that 
acknowledging a division between these two schools of constitutional thought is neither new 
nor revolutionary.  In fact, it could be said to be one of the oldest and most durable 
distinctions in constitutional history. 
 
2.5  Modern Constitutional Definitions 
 To progress, then, onto more contemporary discussions, it must be said that there are 
few materials which seem to take account of this apparently fundamental distinction in 
meaning.  On the contrary, even the most cursory examination of such discourse reveals a 
number of disparate conceptions of ‘constitutionalism’.  As a natural consequence of this 
117 Raz, J., ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries’, in Constitutionalism, p. 
153. 
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variety, there are also competing claims as to the meanings of related terms such as ‘a 
constitution’ and ‘constitutional’. 
 The significance of definitions can often be highlighted when one considers that, in 
intellectual discourse, the use of alternate meanings for the same words leaves open the 
possibility of various academics failing to engage either one another or the real world with 
their ideas.  For instance, in discussing Human Rights and International Constitutionalism, 
Stephen Gardbaum makes his case by “putting to one side the purely functional sense of 
constitutional law as any law containing one or more metarules for the organization and 
ordering of political authority”.118  In doing so, however, he sidelines the contributions of 
authors such as Alec Stone-Sweet, who has suggested that a constitution ought to be thought 
of as “a body of metanorms governing how lower-order norms are produced, applied and 
interpreted.”119  These contributions, whilst certainly not without merit in their own ways, are 
seemingly of little relevance to one another in the wider context of constitutional debate 
simply as a result of this definitional disagreement. 
 As has been discussed, however, this apparent dichotomy between alternate 
understandings of constitutionalism is nothing new.  Although the precise terms in use may 
vary, a distinction between differing accounts of constitutional thought continues to be borne 
out in a number of ways by a variety of authors.  Dieter Grimm, for example, suggests that 
“when we speak of constitutionalization, we always speak of the legal and not the factual 
constitution.”120  Chris Thornhill, on the other hand, has described the constitution “as a 
gradually evolving and highly variable social phenomenon, extant to different degrees in 
different societies”121 and Dicey defined constitutional law as including “all rules which 
directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the 
state.”122  Some authors, such as Neil Walker, have attempted to bridge these divides, 
describing constitutionalism as relating to “the special type of practical reason associated 
with ... the deepest and most collectively implicated questions of ‘how to decide how to 
118 Gardbaum, p. 238. 
119 Stone, A., ‘What is a suprantional constitution? An essay in international relations theory’, (1994) 56(3) 
Review of Politics 441, p. 443. 
120 Grimm, p. 448. 
121 Thornhill, C., A Sociology of Constitutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), (henceforth, 
Thornhill), p. 12. 
122 Dicey, A. V., Law of the Constitution, (9th edn.), (London: Macmillan, 1939), (henceforth, Dicey), p. 23. 
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decide’ how to act”123 and yet his analysis also “demonstrates the resilience of the division 
between incremental and holistic understandings of constitutionalism.”124 
 As useful as this relatively abstract conceptualisation of constitutionalism may appear, 
there is often a further complication which is particularly noticeable when one examines 
jurisdictions that refer to a specific document as ‘the Constitution’.  In reference to the United 
States of America, for example, it has been noted that “[t]he Constitution (the document 
called the Constitution) is not identical to the Constitution (the norms that constitute ‘the 
supreme Law’).”125  Discussing legal orders in general, Kelsen famously differentiated 
between the ‘formal’ and ‘material’ senses of a constitution, suggesting that 
“a special form for constitutional laws, a constitutional form, or constitution 
in the formal sense of the term, is not indispensable, whereas the material 
constitution, that is to say norms regulating the creation of general norms 
and ... determining the organs and procedure of legislation, is an essential 
element of every legal order.”126 
 Instead of trying to unify these competing understandings of constitutional theory, 
some authors have simply tried to clarify the distinctions.  Larry Alexander, for example, has 
attempted to “distinguish a constitution as a collection of agreed-upon symbols from a 
metaconstitution”.127  This latter construct bears some relation to Gardbaum's dismissed 
‘functional sense’ of constitutionalism in that it is seen to consist of a set of metarules that are 
agreed as determining “which particular set of symbols is the constitution, who is to interpret 
those symbols, and whose semantic intentions shall count as the authoritative meaning of the 
symbols.”128 
 It would seem, then, that the historical distinction identified above, between 
constitutionalism as government and constitutionalism as governance, could well persist 
among contemporary constitutional discussions.  This appears especially true when one 
considers that each of the apparent differences revealed in this brief summary of various 
positions can be interpreted as fitting within one or other of these more historic categories.  It 
is to be hoped, therefore, that an attempt at making a more complete outline of this bipolar 
123 Walker, N., ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’, (2008) 56(3) Political Studies 519, p. 524. 
124 Ibid., p. 537. 
125 Perry, M. J., ‘What is “the Constitution”? (and Other Fundamental Questions)’, in Constitutionalism, p. 99. 
126 Kelsen, General Theory, p. 125. 
127 Constitutionalism, p. 3. 
128 Ibid. 
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distinction in constitutional thought may help provide a framework within which to assess 
alternative understandings of constitutional thought. 
 
2.6  Constitutionalism as Government 
 As already discussed, a perspective that views constitutionalism as government can be 
associated with the philosophical approach of the ancient Greeks and is connected in many 
ways to the term politeia.  Within this view, a constitution is a simple fact - it is a term that 
describes the overarching formation of any given social grouping.  As a consequence, this 
perspective generally views constitutions as being more descriptive than normative, more 
functional than social and more positive than natural. 
 To examine the first of these distinctions, a claim that a constitution prioritises 
description over normative power does not of necessity imply that it is entirely without 
coercive force.  Instead, it is merely one manner of stating the contention that a constitution is 
not inherently imbued with such force by nature of it being a constitution.  In contrast, such 
coercive properties as it may possess are consequences of the ability of any given constitution 
to describe the political situation in the society concerned.  That is, from this perspective, the 
coercive ability of a constitution is dependent upon its descriptive accuracy.  If a constitution 
is seen as accurately describing how different aspects of government interact, then departures 
from that system may be duly regulated, controlled or penalised.  On the other hand, however, 
“[i]f in the course of time real circumstances of constitutional life gravely depart from a norm 
which originally related to such conditions, the norm will lose its general power to control 
reality.”129 
 One difficulty with this approach is that it may initiate some rather circular reasoning, 
particularly in relation to constitutional alteration.  For example, if different aspects of the 
government interact with each other in a way that contradicts the constitution, is this simply 
unconstitutional behaviour or a flaw in the description of the government provided by the 
constitution?  A potential solution to this conundrum is highlighted by the late-eighteenth-
century constitutional developments discussed earlier.  In particular, the codification of a 
constitution into documentary form would appear to greatly assist in the determination of 
which actions are unconstitutional and which are merely flaws in the description.  This is 
129 Fassbender, B., The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community, (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), p. 117. 
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particularly true when combined with a constitutional authority that is not only theoretically 
superior to other governmental actions but also directly enforceable.  It is in this way that the 
conclusions of Marbury v. Madison, discussed above,130 can be seen as a natural consequence 
of attempting to implement a view of constitutional issues that focuses on government rather 
than governance. 
 This perception of constitutionalism as government can also be described as being 
more functional than social.  This is because, from this perspective, the constitution is 
primarily concerned with interactions within the government itself (the functioning of 
government), as opposed to interactions between the government and society (the 
implementation of government).  In this manner, it can be said that the constitution 
incorporates those “rules which define the members of the sovereign power, [and] all rules 
which regulate the relation of such members to each other, or which determine the mode in 
which the sovereign power, or the members thereof, exercise their authority.”131  That is, it is 
primarily concerned with “the mode in which” authority is exercised, rather than the purpose 
for which it is so used.  To put it another way, a perspective of constitutionalism as 
government can be said to focus on the authority of the sovereign as opposed to its behaviour. 
 To say, however, that this interpretation of constitutionalism is not oriented towards 
society is not intended to imply that it views constitutions as being somehow immune from 
the influence of political ideas.  Instead, it is merely intended to indicate that this perspective 
views constitutions as prioritising concern with the way government works rather than the 
goals it pursues.  Whilst this concern with governmental function may indeed be motivated 
by an ideological belief that the ‘right’ government will necessarily pursue the ‘right’ goals, 
the ultimate outcome is a constitution that is concerned with maintaining governmental form 
rather than restraining governmental action. 
 Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, a perspective of constitutionalism as 
government can be identified as being dominated by a concentration on positive, as opposed 
to natural, law.  This concept of positive law has been described as relating to 
“a human, arbitrary order whose rules lack self-evident rightness [and which] 
necessarily requires an agency for the realization of acts of coercion and 
displays the inherent tendency to evolve from a coercive order into a 
130 See fn. 113 and accompanying text. 
131 Dicey, p. 23. 
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specific coercive ‘organization.’  This coercive order, especially when it 
becomes an organization, is identical with the State.”132 
As government, then, constitutionalism is simply the description of the way in which the 
organisation that is “the State” maintains and co-ordinates the coercive order of positive law.  
Within this school of thought, the fundamental level of constitutionalism is the “basic norm” 
beyond which a purely positive legal theory cannot progress. 
 The character of this “basic norm”, however, serves to highlight the distinction 
between a view of constitutionalism as government and an entirely positive-law perspective 
of constitutionalism.  This basic norm is, essentially, the postulation “that one ought to 
behave as the individual, or individuals, who laid down the first constitution have 
ordained”133 and, because of its origins, this norm “is not - as a positive legal norm is - valid 
because it is created in a certain way by a legal act, but it is valid because it is presupposed to 
be valid”.134  If, then, one is to engage in a discussion of the underlying validity of 
constitutional norms and principles, there is a certain extent to which one cannot avoid 
engaging with fundamental presuppositions that inevitably lie outside the scope of an 
approach grounded purely in positive law.  In recognising this to some degree, it can be said 
that viewing constitutionalism as government, whilst being centred upon a consideration of 
the sphere of positive law, is not necessarily identical to a positive law approach to 
constitutional issues. 
 By taking a primarily positivist stance, however, this perspective on the nature of 
constitutionalism can find itself directly confronted by a number of questions, such as that of 
the unconstitutional amendment.  That is, at what point does constitutional reformation 
become constitutional re-formation?135  A question such as this serves to highlight the 
distinction between understanding a constitution as the founding principle of positive law and 
a perspective of constitutionalism as government.  This is because any answer to the question 
of whether or not there can be constitutional limits to constitutional amendment must 
necessarily move outside the realm of positive law.  To insist on a purely positivist solution 
to this issue is to “put marriage, religion, and private property solemnly under the protection 
of the constitution and in one and the same constitution offer the legal means for their 
132 Kelsen, General Theory, p. 393. 
133 Ibid., p. 115. 
134 Ibid., p. 116. 
135 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Jacobson, G. J., ‘An Unconstitutional Constitution?  A 
comparative perspective’, (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 460. 
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elimination.”136  On the other hand, however, to attempt to solve this dilemma through the 
invocation of such principles as popular sovereignty, natural rights or constitutional identity 
is merely to invite natural law theories into a positive legal system in a way that expresses 
“the irrepressible tendency of knowledge toward the unity of its object.”137 
 It remains possible that an alternative approach to this predicament may be presented 
by a perspective that consistently incorporates theories of natural law throughout its 
development.  It can be argued, however, that to do so results in such fundamental variations 
to the eventual outcome as to warrant an alternate form of description and categorisation.  It 
is with that in mind, therefore, that theories of constitutionalism as governance shall now be 
examined. 
 
2.7  Constitutionalism as Governance 
 As a broad category of perspectives on constitutional theory, a view of 
constitutionalism as governance can be broadly related to theories of natural law.  As was 
discussed earlier, this has stronger connections with the judicial philosophy of ancient Rome 
than that of Greece.  Whilst it has inevitably developed over the course of time, this 
perspective can generally be viewed as relating theories of constitutionalism to the ways in 
which a government may, or does, interact with society.  That is, it incorporates those views 
whose focus is on the consideration that a constitution “creates legal conditions for the use of 
political power”138 whilst neglecting, to a greater or lesser extent, regulation of the form that 
such political power might take.  As opposed to constitutionalism as government, this 
alternative vision of constitutionalism can be seen as being primarily normative rather than 
descriptive, more social than functional and grounded more in natural than positive law. 
 A perspective of constitutionalism as governance, then, can be described as 
prioritising normative power over descriptive accuracy.  This is because a constitution comes 
to be seen as enunciating general, foundational rules for the relevant political system to 
follow instead of being concerned with the minute arcana of how that system functions.  
Consequently, from this perspective, the authority of the constitution to regulate the actions 
of government is seen as being derived from the authority of the norms on which the 
136 Schmitt, C., Legality and Legitimacy, (London: Duke University Press, 2004), p.46. 
137 Kelsen, General Theory, p. 411. 
138 Thornhill, p. 12. 
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constitution itself relies.  It is in this way, therefore, that a vision of constitutionalism as 
governance can be contrasted with one of constitutionalism as government through the terms 
‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’.  That is, these expressions are not seen as relating to the role 
which constitutions are seen to perform themselves, but rather as illustrating the supposed 
source of constitutional authority.  A perspective of constitutionalism as government sees 
such authority as being primarily dependent on the descriptive accuracy of the constitution, 
whereas a view that connects constitutionalism to governance can be said to relate the 
authority of a constitution to that of the norms which it embodies. 
 In a similar manner, these two alternate perspectives on constitutionalism can be 
contrasted through the terms ‘social’ and ‘functional’.  Whereas a view of constitutionalism 
as government can be described as being primarily functional, as examined earlier, a view of 
constitutionalism as governance can be seen as being primarily social.  Such a description is 
not intended to imply that this perspective of constitutionalism is necessarily connected to 
any specific political or social ideology.  Rather, it is simply used to highlight the fact that 
this account of constitutionalism connects to broader philosophical issues and ideas in a way 
that is not inherently required by depictions of constitutionalism as government.  This is, at 
least in part, because viewing constitutionalism as governance can be seen as placing a 
greater emphasis on interactions between government and society than on the internal 
relationships between different aspects of the government itself.  In other words, the concern 
lies with the justifications for a sovereign's behaviour as opposed to those for a sovereign’s 
authority. 
 As an indicator of this apparent focus on the external relationships of government, 
theories of constitutionalism as governance can be seen as being more concerned with the 
substantive content of governmental decisions than with the deliberative process by which 
they are generated.  When comparing these two visions of constitutionalism, however, this 
division between form and substance is not inevitably clear and distinct.  Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that, “with regard to a constitution, form and substance are inseparable.”139  When 
analysing constitutional theories in such terms, therefore, it can be said that it is a question of 
the relative levels of emphasis on, as opposed to the mere presence of, such factors. 
 A potentially more marked difference between these two perspectives can arguably be 
found in the distinction between positive and natural law.  Whilst it is arguable that theories 
139 Paulus, A. L., ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’, in Ruling the World?, pp. 87-88. 
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of constitutionalism are not inherently restricted to approaches grounded in legal philosophy, 
involving as they do the intermingling of law and politics, a certain legal element is 
nevertheless inescapable.  Broadly speaking, then, it can generally be said that approaches 
that view constitutionalism as governance can be placed more in the natural law tradition than 
that of positive law.  This is because, as has already been stated, this perspective views 
constitutional authority as being derived from certain pre-existing norms.  The nature, 
authority and even identity of these norms may vary but they are consistently viewed as being 
superior to both the government and the constitution itself. 
 Similarly, however, to the way in which constitutionalism as government relates to 
the concept of positive law, this alternative approach to establishing an understanding of 
constitutionalism is not identical to a perspective based entirely on natural law.  Whilst the 
emphasis on natural law elements from within this perspective would generally seem to be 
greater than the prominence of discussion centred upon positive law, there is nevertheless a 
certain degree of examination of more positivist issues.  This is because, if it is “[l]ooked at 
in terms of legal validity, constitutional law is the law that is highest in the validity chain.  It 
validates lower-level law.”140  Consequently, any theory concerning the status or nature of 
constitutional law must inevitably take into account the effects of this law on, as well as its 
relationship to, the domain of positive law. 
 In spite of this recognition of positive law, however, a perspective of 
constitutionalism as governance would seem to hold that the recognition of any particular 
document or set of rules as ‘the Constitution’ simply indicates that as being the most 
appropriate and currently available embodiment of whatever norms are considered to guide 
governmental behaviour.  It is in this way, for example, that a constitution can safely be 
described as being “a written document establishing the main institutions of government, 
enumerating their powers, and specifying the norms that would regulate their relations.”141  
As a consequence of this view, constitutional modification can be easily permitted provided 
that it does not violate those anterior, fundamental norms.  Difficulties may arise, however, 
when there is disagreement as to the precise identity of the norms in question or uncertainty 
regarding the relationships between them. 
 
140 Alexander, L., ‘What are constitutions, and what should (and can) they do?’, (2011) 28(1) Social Philosophy 
and Policy 1, p. 3. 
141 Loughlin, M., ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’, in Dobner, P., and Loughlin, M., (eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 48. 
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2.8  Conclusions 
 To briefly summarise the preceding discussion, it can hopefully be seen that 
constitutional theories can generally be arranged into two broad schools of thought - those 
that view constitutionalism as government and those that view constitutionalism as 
governance.  As has been considered, these perspectives can be said to have roots in ancient 
political philosophies, with the connections to government being broadly tied to Greek 
discussions of the politeia and the connections to governance containing a stronger link to the 
Roman-Stoic view of natural law.  Whilst these opinions have inevitably undergone a certain 
level of development and refinement since their initial conception, it can nevertheless be said 
that they may still assist in the provision of relevant classifications for modern-day analyses 
of constitutional thought.  Those theories which can principally be thought of as displaying a 
descriptive, functional and positivist approach to constitutionalism can be described as 
viewing the concept as being one of government.  In contrast, theories which are primarily 
normative, social and based on natural law can perhaps be better illustrated through the 
terminology of constitutionalism as governance. 
 At this point, however, there is an important aspect of this admittedly broad 
classification that ought to be taken into consideration.  This is the observation that nothing 
within the preceding examination of these two perspectives is intended as an attempt to 
establish the superiority of one school of thought over the other.  Indeed, if it is true that the 
defining features of these perspectives relate to issues of emphasis on various spectra, as 
opposed to distinct and mutually exclusive categories, then the possibility remains open that 
there is a singular, unifying perspective of constitutional thought that is capable of 
incorporating both of these points of view.  As a result, it now becomes necessary to more 
thoroughly examine certain of the distinctions and common features of these approaches to 
constitutionalism in order to more fully assess the viability of such a proposal. 
  
43 
 
Chapter 3 
Rights and Constitutions 
 
 As was discussed in the previous chapter, the history of constitutions and 
constitutionalism is a long and complex one.  Certain historical developments, however, have 
highlighted two particular approaches to constitutional thought that have proved remarkably 
resilient.  On the one hand, there is a perspective of constitutionalism as government, which 
views constitutions as being primarily descriptive and functional in character and principally 
focuses on the relationship between a constitution and the realm of positive law.  On the other 
hand, there is a perspective of constitutionalism as governance.  This alternate perspective 
primarily views constitutions as being normative, social and focused on ideas of natural law.  
As already discussed, these positions can be related, respectively, to the works of Aristotle 
and of Cicero.142 
 To attribute the fully-fledged development of such ideas to these ancient authors, 
however, would be to ignore the centuries of revision, modification and refinement that have 
been applied to these theories.  In particular, these approaches to constitutional thought can 
be said to have undergone significant development in and around the seventeenth century, 
through the work of thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes.  For Grotius, the 
development of subjective natural rights helped provide “political theory with a yardstick for 
a moral evaluation of the extent of political power.”143  Hobbes, by contrast, can be seen as 
distinguishing between natural rights and natural law and thereby contributing to a more 
government-based view of constitutionalism.  It is this concept of rights, therefore, that can 
arguably be seen as providing the clearest area of common ground between these conflicting 
schools of thought.  Simultaneously, however, it is this same concept that also presents the 
clearest distinctions and divisions between them. 
 As a result, any attempt to more fully investigate the possibility of a singular concept 
of constitutionalism must necessarily also engage with the concept of rights.  This reasoning, 
in fact, cuts both ways, with it being equally true that “[n]o understanding of rights is 
142 See supra, Chapter 2. 
143 Straumann, B., ‘Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius's Early 
Works on Natural Law’, (2009) 27 Law & History Review 55, p. 59. 
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thinkable in isolation from a broader theory of law.”144  Whilst there is undoubtedly an 
important debate to be had surrounding how to understand the origins and nature of 
individual rights as a general concept, however, the present discussion is primarily aimed at 
viewing such a concept from the perspective of constitutional thought rather than as a specific 
theoretical approach in and of itself.  With the current aim of more thoroughly examining the 
possibility of a unified approach to constitutional thought, therefore, it is these connections 
between rights and constitutions that shall now be considered in more detail and the primary 
historical and conceptual elements shall be treated as having been discussed elsewhere. 
To begin this investigation, then, this chapter considers the differing opportunities for 
analysing the concept of rights that are presented by, alternately, perspectives of 
constitutionalism as governance and as government.  At the heart of this discussion, however, 
is the enquiry as to whether or not this bipolar division within constitutional thought is truly 
insurmountable.  As a result, this chapter then proceeds with an attempt to address these 
divisions in rights-based constitutional dialogue and asks whether or not there might be a way 
in which they may be overcome.  Consequently, the final question to be addressed then 
concerns the implications for the links between rights and constitutions that are created by the 
success or failure of such an attempt. 
 
3.1  Governance:  Rights as Morality 
 Whilst both perspectives of constitutionalism may incorporate rights-based dialogue, 
it may initially appear that a view of constitutionalism as governance lends itself more easily 
to a rights-based approach than a perspective of constitutionalism as government.  This would 
be because, simply put, viewing constitutionalism as governance enables rights to be seen as 
an expression of the norms that guide the constitution itself. 
 Within this view, ‘rights’ are seen as being primarily moral standards that, in one way 
or another, have some claim to legitimacy regardless of the provisions of any positive legal 
system that might be applied.  As such, the positive-law rights that may be outlined in a 
documentary constitution or municipal statute can simply be described as being localised 
expressions of a fundamental morality.  It is then this external concept of morality that 
validates, or invalidates, the entire sphere of positive law, including the constitution itself. 
144 Heinze, E., ‘Principles for a Meta-Discourse of Liberal Rights: The Example of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, (1998-9) 9 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 319, p. 320. 
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 Whilst it may initially appear somewhat counter-intuitive, one of the consequences of 
adopting this perspective would seem to be that it places discussions about rights firmly in 
the legal, as opposed to the political, sphere.  Indeed, one can make the argument that “[i]t is 
this rights focus that gives contemporary constitutionalism its whole juridical cast, whereby a 
constitution’s task is viewed as being to embody the substance of fundamental law rather than 
to provide a fundamental structure for law-making.”145  As a result, purely moral and 
philosophical debates about rights are drained of any practical significance they may have 
had.  Instead, their place is taken by legal dialogues that are no longer restricted to some form 
of textual interpretation but also contain broader and more normative implications for the 
society as a whole.  Such developments have been witnessed recently in a number of 
jurisdictions engaged in the controversial debates surrounding the constitutional status of 
same-sex relationships.  For example, in a number of American states, such as Massachusetts, 
it was primarily judicial activism that led to the equalisation of marriage rights with political 
debate playing, at most, a subsidiary role.146 
 This is not to say that social and political debates in such an environment make no 
contribution whatsoever.  After all, to the extent that judges are “political agents within 
concrete socio-political settings, they are never fully immune to the values shared by those 
who constitute dominant social forces in their societies.”147  However, this view of rights as 
norms that govern the implementation of the constitution empowers a juridification of 
debates about rights that does not rely on legislative action.  In this way, judicial activity 
becomes the initial catalyst for decisions about rights rather than, or even as well as, the final 
arbiter. 
 From this perspective, the concept of rights is seen as a substantive account of natural 
truths that are both prior and superior to the constitution itself.  As such, rights can be seen as 
providing a framework of norms that governments can, indeed must, fit themselves around.  
Difficulties arise, however, in attempts to move beyond justificatory theories.  Whilst a 
perspective of constitutionalism as governance may indeed provide a validation of the 
restriction of sovereignty through rights-based dialogue, no prescription is yet made for the 
exact content of such limitation.  Nevertheless, although there remain unanswered questions 
145 Bellamy, R., Political Constitutionalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), (henceforth, 
Bellamy), p. 15. 
146 See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
147 Sadurski, W., Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality, (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 
(henceforth, Sadurski), p. 21. 
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concerning the precise identification and enumeration of these rights, as well as the necessary 
mechanisms for their implementation, their existence and status as anterior to the constitution 
are affirmed. 
 It is in attempting to identify these pre-existing rights that attention is drawn to more 
general theories of rights themselves.  As such rights are believed to exist regardless of the 
state of the positive legal system, it is those theories that also do not rely on legal 
enumerations of rights that are of most direct relevance.  In particular, whilst it is arguable 
that there is little direct causation between the two, there would appear to be a natural degree 
of correlation between this affirmation of constitutional inferiority to rights and an interest-
based analysis of rights as an objective concept.  Essentially, this approach argues 
“that P can be said to have a right (in a moral theory or a legal system) 
whenever the protection or advancement of some interest of his is 
recognized (by the theory or the system) as a reason for imposing duties or 
obligations on others (whether duties and obligations are actually imposed 
or not).”148  
 The mutual support between these two concepts is derived, at least in part, from their 
inherent complementarity.  Whereas a governance-based view of rights appears somewhat 
lacking in detailed prescription of the substance of normative rights, an interest-based 
approach to rights can directly assist in this endeavour.  This is the case regardless of the 
nature of the interests being examined - it does not matter whether the particular theory being 
applied is grounded in arguments of natural law, human security or some other permanent 
interest.  The fact that is significant for present purposes is not exactly what rights are 
identified, but that rights are identified.  It is this identificatory action that was lacking in a 
theory of constitutionalism as governance.  Moreover, in utilising individual interests as the 
primary identifier of the existence of a right, this understanding of rights can be seen as 
directly corresponding with the governance-based argument that rights can and do exist 
independently of the constitutional situation in any given jurisdiction. 
 This is not to say, however, that the adoption of an interest theory of rights is entirely 
without its own difficulties.  Indeed, the precise identification and delimitation of rights-
holders remains one of the greater challenges within such theories.  For the time being, 
148 Waldron, J., (ed.), Theories of Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), (henceforth, Theories of 
Rights), p. 10. 
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however, the intention is not to provide an exhaustive account of competing theories of rights 
and it shall suffice to conclude that the conjunction of an interest theory of rights with a 
perspective of constitutionalism as governance is not only possible but also plausible.149 
 On the whole, therefore, it can be suggested that a perspective of constitutionalism as 
governance generally views rights as existing outside of any specific or particular 
constitutional order.  This position then encourages the adoption of a viewpoint that holds 
rights to stem from indelible human interests which form a distinct, often universal, morality 
through which, it is argued, constitutional systems should be measured and justified.  An 
alternative understanding of this assessment is presented by a perspective of constitutionalism 
as government, and it is this position that shall now be examined. 
 
3.2  Government:  Rights as Law 
 In contrast to a governance-based approach, a perspective of constitutionalism as 
government connects with a somewhat different view of rights.  Instead of being an 
embodiment of the norms which guide and justify the constitution, rights simply become a 
mechanism by which the constitution is implemented.  From this standpoint, the enumeration 
of rights in a constitution (whatever form that might take) is simply one way in which the 
government described therein is empowered and facilitated to govern the society to which it 
relates.  Depending on the particular political construction of the government, a constitutional 
enumeration of rights might consist of nothing more than statements of vague aspirations 
designed to be politically appealing.  Alternatively, the language of rights might be used 
simply as a form of maintaining equilibrium between different branches of the government, 
thereby allowing some form of governmental self-regulation.  From within this perspective, 
however, there also exists the possibility that a government, or a constitution, might grant 
directly enforceable legal rights to its citizens, thereby enabling the subjects of government to 
hold that government to account in one way or another. 
 This particular view of rights as a subsidiary legal mechanism does not necessarily 
preclude a belief in external norms that ought to guide the constitution.  It recognises, 
however, a specific distinction between a system that ought to exist and the one that is in 
149 For a more detailed insight into the nature of the interest theory of rights, particularly concerning the problem 
of delimitation, see Kramer, M. H., ‘Refining the Interest Theory of Rights’, (2010) 55 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 31. 
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existence.  In doing so, the discussion of moral factors and philosophical justifications is set 
aside in favour of the claim that the positive legal system is “valid only on one assumption: 
that there is a basic norm which establishes the supreme, law-creating authority.”150 
 One of the effects of attempting to maintain this perspective is, ironically, the removal 
of discussion about rights from the legal sphere.  In contrast to the legal development of 
rights provided for in a governance-based view of constitutions, rights-based dialogue in a 
system of constitutionalism as government becomes a primarily political issue.  Within such a 
system, legal discourse becomes restricted to semantic interpretation and technical 
implementation of whichever philosophical viewpoint is ultimately dominant.  This is often 
justified through a deferential, almost reverential, approach to the foundational basic norm of 
the constitution.  Where this is the concept of popular sovereignty, for instance, there is “a 
commitment to democratic decisionmaking [sic] [which] may underlie judicial hesitation 
about applying the ordinary law ... in the absence of clear legislative authorization.”151 
 This relative politicisation of the concept of rights can lead to a certain perspective on 
the constitutional role of rights that once again highlights the variance between a 
government-based view of constitutionalism and one of governance.  As discussed earlier, 
viewing constitutionalism as governance supports the view of rights as substantive natural 
truths that precede the constitution in both time and authority.  In contrast, a perspective of 
constitutionalism as government views rights as the results of political processes, thereby 
remaining open to the view that “the core rights in catalogues of constitutional rights are 
principles, and that principles are demands for optimization that must be applied on the basis 
of a proportionality analysis.”152 This perspective thereby lends its weight to the support of a 
theory that suggests rights are merely moral creations without coercive force and that both 
legal and political systems are therefore able to incorporate, interpret, balance or even reject 
them entirely.  Thus the concept of ‘rights’ is seen as being concerned with general principles 
that are both subsequent and subject to the constitution itself. 
 Once again, this particular view of the relationship between rights and constitutions 
can be correlated with a particular theoretical viewpoint of the nature of rights themselves.  
150 Kelsen, H., (trans., Wedberg, A.), General Theory of Law and State, (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University 
Press, 1946), (henceforth, Kelsen, General Theory), p. 395. 
151 Jackson, V. C., ‘Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence’, (2003) 
35 George Washington International Law Review 521, p. 521. 
152 Kumm, M., ‘Constitutional rights as principles: On the structure and domain of constitutional justice’, (2004) 
2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 574, p. 576. 
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Whereas the adoption of a governance-based view of constitutionalism can be complemented 
with an interest theory of rights, a view that the existence of rights is contingent upon a 
degree of constitutional order can be correlated, to some extent, with a choice theory of rights.  
Sometimes referred to as a will-based theory, this is in essence a theory in which rights exist 
“[w]hen an individual Q has a duty to do something, ... [and] there is some 
other individual P who is in a position to control that duty in the sense that 
his say-so would be sufficient to discharge Q from the requirement.”153 
 In this scenario, P becomes the holder of the right as he has the power to choose 
whether or not to discharge Q from his or her duty.  This theory “connotes a conception of 
the right-bearer as agent and chooser rather than merely potential victim or potential recipient 
of assistance”.154  Alternatively, it is possible to suggest that the primary focus of this theory 
is not the aspect of choice but rather the claim “that having a right involves being in a 
position to control the performance of a duty.”155  In either circumstance, however, this 
theory can be seen as differing substantially from the interest theory of rights that was earlier 
correlated with a governance-based view of constitutionalism. 
 Insofar as it makes explicit connections between rights and duties, this will theory of 
rights is intimately connected to the analysis of rights presented by W. N. Hohfeld, in which 
it was highlighted that “the term ‘rights’ tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a 
given case may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest 
sense”.156  This investigation into the nature of rights, however, was originally intended to 
challenge “the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to ‘rights’ 
and ‘duties’”.157  It is a theory, therefore, that was explicitly restricted to examining the 
nature of legal rights.  Whilst a translation of this theory into the area of moral rights is 
certainly not without precedent,158 its origins would seem to suggest a more natural fit with a 
theory of post-constitutional rights.  Thus, the will theory of rights can be seen as more 
naturally aligning with a government-based view of the constitution whereas the interest 
153 Theories of Rights, p. 9. 
154 Ibid., p. 11. 
155 Graham, P., ‘The Will Theory of Rights: A Defence’, (1996) 15 Law and Philosophy 257, (henceforth, 
Graham), p. 260. 
156 Hohfeld, W. N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, (Westport, USA: 
Greenwood Press, 1919), (Reprinted, 1978), p. 36. 
157 Ibid., p. 35. 
158 See, for example, Upton, H., ‘Right-Based Morality and Hohfeld’s Relations’, (2000) 4(3) The Journal of 
Ethics 237. 
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theory, in its determination of pre-legal and pre-constitutional interests, can be seen as being 
more easily correlated with viewing constitutionalism as governance. 
 As before, however, it should not be assumed that the adoption of a particular theory 
of rights is entirely unproblematic.  Indeed, whereas one can argue that an interest theory 
risks being overly broad in its ascription of rights to particular entities, one can also suggest 
“that Will Theory is too narrow – that it cannot account for many of the items that we 
commonly identify as ‘rights’.”159  Once again, however, the purpose of the present 
discussion is not to present a fully-formed analysis either in favour of or against any 
particular theory.  Instead, this examination of these positions is merely intended to highlight 
the possible connections between particular theories of rights and potentially corresponding 
theories of constitutionalism.  To that end, it can be suggested that a choice or will theory of 
rights can more easily complement a perspective of constitutionalism as government than one 
of constitutionalism as governance.  Primarily, this would be because “it doesn’t rely upon an 
extra-legal moral theory in order to explain what it means to have a right”,160 thereby 
supporting the government-based constitutional argument that rights are dependent upon the 
constitutional order, rather than justifications of it. 
Whilst there are significant divergences and debates both within and between these 
two alternative understandings of the concept of rights, it is not the place of the present 
discussion to fully assess these differences.  Instead, it shall suffice for the moment to 
consider the possibility that this ‘choice theory’ of rights can complement a perspective of 
constitutionalism as government through a shared general rejection of first-order natural 
truths and the utilisation of arguments grounded principally in the sphere of positive law.  In 
contrast, a perspective of constitutionalism as governance can more easily be accompanied by 
an interest theory of rights that supports the notion of prior moral precepts influencing 
constitutional legitimacy. 
 
3.3  Constitutional Reconciliation 
 In formulating this correlation between two theories of rights and two theories of 
constitutionalism, no advances have yet been made in the attempt to determine the possible 
viability of establishing a singular, unitary concept of constitutionalism, at least in so far as it 
159 van Duffel, S., ‘In Defence of the Will Theory of Rights’, (2012) 18 Res Publica 321, p. 321. 
160 Graham, p. 269. 
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relates to rights.  To the extent that the correlations suggested thus far are accepted, however, 
it does become possible to suggest that investigating the possibility for reconciling these 
conceptions of rights might provide some insight into the potential reconciliation of the 
competing perspectives of constitutionalism.  Nevertheless, at the same time as such an 
investigation might prove useful, it remains true that any attempt at reconciling these theories 
of rights cannot of itself constitute a solution to the divisions present within constitutional 
thought.  At best, it would merely be indicative of potentially useful avenues of exploration.  
With that in mind, certain possibilities for overcoming this partition in theories of rights shall 
now be examined, with the hope that they may reveal a possible means of surmounting the 
bifurcation that has thus far been presented within constitutional enquiry. 
One approach to reconciling these theories would be to support the suggestion that 
“the two prominent theoretical analyses of the concept of ‘a right’ – the Will Theory and the 
Interest Theory – are both revisionary theories which, if widely adopted, would require 
people to revise their usage of the term ‘a right’.”161  Adopting this approach would equate to 
the almost complete abandonment of both theories of rights and attempting to develop a non-
revisionist theory in their place.  The aim of this newer approach to rights would be to better 
explain how concepts relating to ‘rights’ are actually used outside academic circles.  Whilst 
this might potentially be beneficial in a variety of ways, the underlying argument here is not 
that either theory is incorrect, merely that they are neither particularly useful nor influential. 
In contrast to this approach, one might suggest that “both accounts [of rights] are 
better understood as providing characterizations of different ‘kinds’ of rights."162  In doing so, 
one might attempt the establishment of a more general theory of rights that was intended to 
incorporate both elements, on the basis that the “truth about the nature of rights will not be 
found in an improved version of either Will Theory or Interest Theory.”163  In doing so, this 
more comprehensive theory would then overcome these earlier differences through 
attempting to embrace and unify them rather than through their dismissal. 
For the time being, then, whilst a definite solution is yet to be presented to the 
divisions between theories of rights, it may simply be accepted that this discussion suggests, 
at the least, two possible methods of reconciling the apparent distinction between viewing 
constitutionalism as government and viewing it as governance.  On the one hand, both 
161 Cruft, R., ‘Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?’, (2004) 23(4) Law and Philosophy 347, p. 347. 
162 van Duffel, S., ‘The Nature of Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake’, (2012) 93 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
104, p. 105. 
163 Ibid., p. 120. 
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perspectives may be abandoned in favour of a third approach that is potentially broader and 
more inclusive in its definitions.  Alternatively, certain aspects of each perspective may be 
retained and subsumed into a wider, more complete understanding of constitutionalism that 
incorporates elements of these more specific attempts at categorisation.   To put it another 
way, an outline of the potential directions of analysis would appear to proceed as follows: 
Either both distinctions in constitutional thought may be abandoned in favour of a third 
understanding of constitutionalism that gives the impression of better explaining 
constitutional phenomena, or this partition may be accepted as simply providing alternate 
visions of a more fundamental and singular object.  It is these options that shall now be 
considered. 
In attempting to establish an appropriate analysis of constitutional issues, it may 
initially be somewhat appealing to follow the first of these options outlined above.  That is, it 
may be discovered that the flaws inherent within both the governance and government based 
views of constitutionalism are simply too extensive to allow either position to be of any use.  
In endeavouring to establish a viable alternative, however, it is possible that the insights 
provided by this distinction might then become apparent.  Were this to be the case, it might 
then turn out to be plausible to suggest that the second option for reconciliation, unification 
rather than abandonment, would be preferable to the first in order that some degree of benefit 
from these insights might be retained. 
If, then, one turns first to a perspective of constitutionalism as governance, an initial 
criticism may develop from its relative emphasis on natural law, particularly regarding any 
provisions concerning the concept of rights.  Indeed, it has been claimed that sustained attack 
on the very concept of ‘natural rights’ has been so strong as to create a situation whereby 
“no-one now uses the phrase except in a disparaging sense.”164  As a consequence of this, it 
can be said that there are a number of emergent “contemporary discussions which seek to 
build theoretical foundations for rights without recourse to discredited theories of natural 
rights and natural law.”165 
Whilst an interest theory of rights is not inherently based in natural law and, therefore, 
might compensate for this criticism to some degree, the constitutional implementation of such 
a theory retains certain problematic elements.  In particular, there is the argument that the 
164 Waldron, J., ‘The Role of Rights in Practical Reasoning: “Rights” versus “Needs”’, (2000) 4(1/2) Journal of 
Ethics 115, p. 119. 
165 Curran, E., ‘Hobbes’s Theory of Rights - A Modern Interest Theory’, (2002) 6(1) Journal of Ethics 63, p. 64. 
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“incorporation of real moral rights into a constitution will undermine the settlement function 
of law unless it is understood that those rights are legally (if not morally) subordinate to some 
institution’s determination of their content.’166  Consequently, it can be argued that adopting 
a perspective of constitutionalism as governance encourages the identification and 
enumeration of rights through a particular justification that is not sustainable if it is to be 
translated into the sphere of positive law.  That is, this perspective would appear to encourage 
the adoption of a certain view of morality that seems to lack the persuasive force necessary to 
be universalizable without objection.  As a result, when examined through the prism of rights, 
viewing constitutionalism as governance would appear to be, at best, undesirable due to its 
inability to provide a universally acceptable mechanism for their identification and 
enumeration. 
If, then, governance-based constitutionalism is to be ultimately rejected as a 
prescriptive concept due to an apparent incapacity for standardising a particular moral 
conception of rights, one might consider instead a perspective of constitutionalism as 
government.  Initially, this point of view may seem to hold an immediate appeal due to its 
general rejection of natural law arguments in favour of positive law elements that are 
seemingly more difficult to reject out of hand.  Particularly when one examines the concept 
of rights, it might be considered that the more descriptive and functional character of 
government-based constitutionalism permits a certain degree of flexibility regarding the 
establishment, or otherwise, of any specific set of rights.  This flexibility would seem to lend 
support to a claim that “[h]uman rights are not immutable truths, free-standing moral 
absolutes whose contents are self-evident.  They are conventions, whose contents vary as 
circumstances and human interests vary.”167 
If accepted, this claim would appear to directly assist in the process of identifying and 
enumerating rights that was earlier taken to be problematic within a perspective of 
constitutionalism as governance.  This would be because it contains an implied degree of 
acknowledgement that an institutional delimitation of the content and scope of rights could be 
both morally acceptable and constitutionally necessary.  Whilst that may indeed be true, it 
must also be acknowledged that “reciting a list of liberties that the law should protect is just 
the beginning of an intellectual task, not its completion.”168  Once such a list is institutionally 
166 Alexander, L., ‘What are constitutions, and what should (and can) they do?’, (2011) 28(1) Social Philosophy 
and Policy 1, (henceforth, Alexander), p. 6. 
167 Gray, J., Two Faces of Liberalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), (henceforth, Gray), p. 106. 
168 Sadurski, p. 89. 
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determined, if it is to have any significance within the sphere of positive law then it must also 
be not only implemented within the particular society concerned, but also enforced in the 
case of any infraction.  It is here that the drawbacks of viewing constitutionalism as 
government can become apparent. 
If, as has been suggested, a perspective of constitutionalism as government is focused 
primarily on positive, as opposed to natural, law, then one can argue that the implementation 
and enforcement of this form of constitutionalism is valid on one primary principle: power.  
That is, a rejection of natural law arguments beyond those validating the ‘basic norm’ would 
seem to lend support to the conclusion that “[t]he State is a politically organized society 
because it is a community constituted by a coercive order, and this coercive order is the 
law.”169  Even if one subscribes to “the belief that power in modernity is not simply 
repressive of deviant behaviours or actions but positively productive in terms of 
individualities and socialities”,170 this does not directly contradict the suggestion that it is the 
coercive power of the State (that is, the very nature of positive law itself) that justifies the 
implementation and enforcement of the constitution. 
It is at this point, however, that viewing constitutionalism as government would seem 
to become somewhat problematic.  One immediate reason is that, as one develops this 
argument, an inherently circular element begins to emerge.  In other words, the position that 
is ostensibly proposed is one which holds that the implementation and enforcement of any 
particular law is justified simply because it is law.  This does not appear to be a proposition 
that is either logically or morally sustainable, as any argument that law should be obeyed is 
reduced to a self-evident tautology.  Furthermore, the acceptance of institutionally-
determined rights and the accompanying rejection of underlying natural truths deprives this 
viewpoint of the ability to convince others into its acceptance beyond that which is capable of 
being coerced. 
To proceed with the options outlined earlier, the rejection of constitutionalism as 
either governance or government would seem to suggest a need for a third account which 
more satisfactorily explains constitutional phenomena.  Within the context of an overall 
examination of the relationship between rights and constitutions it is possible to suggest that 
169 Kelsen, General Theory, p. 190. 
170 Martire, J., ‘Habermas Contra Foucault: Law, Power and the Forgotten Subject’, (2012) 23 Law and Critique 
123, p. 125. 
                                                     
55 
 
“there are three, and only three, possibilities here.  First, the constitutional 
authors might be creating rights or making certain rights more determinate 
by means of rules granting various specific liberties and immunities.  
Second, the constitutional authors might not be creating or specifying rights 
through rules but might instead be incorporating real moral rights as they 
exist in the moral realm ... Third, the constitutional authors might be 
inventing or creating rights but without translating them into determinate 
rules.”171 
The first two of these propositions can be taken to correspond with, respectively, 
constitutionalism as government and as governance.  The third of these positions, however, 
would appear to offer an alternative solution.  Nevertheless, in spite of this potential, closer 
examination reveals that, as regards its constitutional implications, it is almost identical to the 
first.  This is because even in situations where a formal, documentary constitution does not 
provide determinate rules for the rights it creates, such rules will inevitably come into 
existence within the broader material constitution, provided that the rights are expected to 
have significance beyond their simple enunciation.  In other words, the desire to both 
implement and enforce constitutional rights necessitates their specification in a determinate 
manner.  Failure to do so leaves those who are expected to see to the implementation and 
enforcement of such rights “in the position of one who is told that a nonexistent creature - say, 
a unicorn - has a horselike body and a horn on its head, but is then asked to give its height, 
weight, color, and speed.”172  Such determinations would, inevitably, be almost completely 
arbitrary. 
 
3.4  The Constitutional Process 
At this point, it would seem as though all existing possibilities for establishing a 
singular understanding of constitutionalism through an examination of the relationship 
between rights and constitutions have been rejected as being unsatisfactory in one respect or 
another.  Viewing constitutionalism as government cannot adequately justify the 
implementation and enforcement of constitutional rights beyond an argument that one must 
obey the law because it is law.  On the other hand, however, a perspective of 
171 Alexander, pp. 4-5. 
172 Ibid., p. 9. 
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constitutionalism as governance has been rejected as being unable to identify and enumerate 
an adequately universal set of rights that can reliably be translated from morality to law.  
Finally, a third possibility has been considered to be lacking clear identification and 
enumeration of constitutional rights as well as being, to all intents and purposes, entirely 
arbitrary in their implementation and enforcement.  There is, however, one further option that 
has not yet been examined.  As was discussed earlier, there may yet exist the possibility of 
unification rather than abandonment.  That is, instead of entirely rejecting both government- 
and governance-based constitutionalism in an attempt to establish a more satisfactory 
interpretation, it might instead be possible to view them as relating to smaller parts of a 
greater whole.  Consequently, by considering their potential complementarity instead of their 
potential obstacles, one might uncover a more fundamental perspective that incorporates 
elements of each. 
 An initial survey of the position this far, then, appears to reveal four particular factors 
that must be considered in any attempt to explain the practical operation of constitutional 
theory.  These are its identification, enumeration, implementation and enforcement.  To 
briefly expand on these terms, ‘identification’ can be considered as generally referring to the 
initial establishment or selection of general principles, regardless of the precise means by 
which this is achieved.  Following on from this, the concept of ‘enumeration’ can be seen as 
signifying the process by which general principles are linked to determinate rules.  
Subsequently, ‘implementation’ can refer to the institutional delimitation of such rules in a 
manner that has practical significance beyond the context of the constitution itself.  Finally, 
‘enforcement’ can indicate the responses given to infractions of these rules. 
 These four stages can be seen as combining into a singular constitutional process.  
That is, one can begin with the suggestion that any constitutional theory is initially grounded 
in the realm of normative natural law, even if the only principle taken from such law is the 
basic norm that the very first constitution is valid for historic, religious, democratic or other 
reasons.  The norms, or norm, taken from this natural law must first be identified.  Once the 
identification of normative principles has taken place, determinate rules can then be provided 
through their enumeration.  Having been enumerated, such rules can then be implemented 
and, once implemented, can then be enforced.  This being done, the result is a constitutional 
order that can then form the foundation of a positive legal system.  This is the constitutional 
process. 
57 
 
 When dissected and analysed in such a manner, there does not necessarily appear to 
be any compelling reason as to why a governance-based focus on the normative and coercive 
force of an external moral order is inherently incompatible with a government-based concern 
for distinguishing between what ‘ought’ and what ‘is’.  They can simply be seen as alternate 
operations of the same process.  Initially, it must be conceded that there is undoubtedly a 
certain level of tension in attempts to reconcile a theory which claims certain norms are 
enforceable vis-à-vis the constitution with one which claims they are, in fact, subject to it.  
From the standpoint of the constitutional process, however, some clarification can begin to be 
brought to bear on the ways in which the analytical divisions of governance- or government-
based constitutionalism could possibly be reconciled. 
 This is because this phasic analysis of the constitutional process helps separate the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of each perspective instead of requiring the imposition of a 
choice between them as if they were mutually exclusive, monolithic entities.  For instance, as 
has been discussed, a view of constitutionalism as governance is able to harness the moral 
force of natural law arguments to provide clear justification for the implementation and 
enforcement of certain rights, although it fails to clearly specify a process for their 
identification and enumeration.  Similarly, although a perspective that views 
constitutionalism as government can be said to be relatively clear about how rights are 
identified and enumerated, it lacks a normative and coercive force that can justify their 
implementation and enforcement independently of the authority of the law itself. 
 To reconcile these two perspectives, then, is not to simply try and absorb one into the 
other.  Nor is it to simply try and discredit one for the benefit of the other.  Instead, the result 
is the formation of a certain degree of middle ground, an overarching understanding that 
attempts to incorporate individual strengths.173  From this perspective, rights can be identified 
and enumerated on the theoretical basis provided for in a position of constitutionalism as 
government, but they would be implemented and enforced on the grounds allowed for in a 
view of constitutionalism as governance.  In other words, there would be an open 
acknowledgement that any rights identified and enumerated in a documentary constitution 
have been selected and delimited by the institutions described therein and are not necessarily 
indicative of fundamental, universal moral truths.  Simultaneously, however, there would be a 
recognition that 
173 For a more detailed discussion of the nature of ‘middle ground’ theory, see generally, Navari, C., ‘The 
Terrain of the Middle Ground’, in Navari, C., (ed.), Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs: Arguments from 
the Middle Ground, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
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“[f]or a constitution to come to life – to leap off the paper on which it is 
printed into the minds and hearts of the people and into the everyday 
realities of their lives – it needs to be observed, to be used, and to be 
enforced.”174 
Consequently, there would be an equal admission that to implement and enforce such 
constitutional rights without any normative and moral justifications for their existence would 
be to concede the possible legitimacy, or even existence, of arbitrary absolutism. 
 In spite of the apparent simplicity of this ‘joined-up’ constitutionalism, an immediate 
difficulty can quickly be seen to emerge.  This is the argument that there is a general lack of 
internal consistency - inherent practicality is gained at the expense of theoretical purity.  In 
contrast, perspectives of both constitutionalism as government and constitutionalism as 
governance, whilst not being without their own obstacles, can be said to have a minimal level 
of conceptual coherency.  To accept this assessment, however, would be to admit the 
presumption that a justificatory argument that might be valid for a single stage is individually 
capable of validating the entire constitutional process.  If, however, one accepts the 
proposition that there is a distinction between that which is necessary and that which is 
sufficient, then some degree of clarification may begin to emerge.  This is particularly the 
case if one considers that it is the nature of the constitutional process itself that provides 
theoretical cohesion, rather than the arguments for or against any particular operation of it. 
 To take an example, a society might insist on the absolute supremacy of a particular 
sovereign entity, be that a monarch, a parliament or some other body.  This sovereign entity 
would then be in a position to successfully identify and enumerate rights in a manner that 
utilised a view of constitutionalism as government.  That is, the sovereign’s delimitation of 
rights would be taken as constitutional not because they reflected universal moral truths but 
because this delimitation occurred within the recognised constitutional order.  If that 
constitutional order were to change, the rights delimited by it could be freely changed as well.  
The same approach could then be extended to justify the actual implementation and 
enforcement of those rights, perhaps through an insistence that the constitution, as an 
accurate depiction of the manner in which that particular positive legal system operated, was 
authoritative and therefore must be obeyed.  To do so, however, would risk eroding the 
perception of legitimacy surrounding the constitution both internally and externally.  
174 Ghai, Y., and Cottrell, J., The Millennium Declaration, Rights, and Constitutions, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 69-70. 
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Internally, as there would be, at the least, resentment from those sectors of the populace who 
did not share the sovereign entity’s understanding of how certain rights ought to be delimited.  
Externally, from sectors of the international community who also had an alternative 
understanding of what norms should be incorporated into positive law and how this should be 
achieved. 
 Less abstractly, perhaps, the Moroccan constitution of the 1960s “allowed the king 
dominance over the executive and administration, and strong authority over the legislative 
and judicial functions of the state.”175  In this way, it was the monarch, as the supreme 
sovereign entity within the state, that was able to direct the identification and enumeration of 
any rights that were to exist within the Moroccan law of the time.  Attempting to enforce and 
implement the monarch’s understanding of political life along the same lines, however, 
resulted in internal resentment that was only curtailed when “the king proclaimed a state of 
emergency and suspended the parliament.”176 
 In contrast to this approach, a sense of legitimacy could possibly be maintained if the 
constitution were to justify such implementation and enforcement through reasons grounded 
in a view of constitutionalism as governance, thereby containing a stronger appeal to the 
fundamental and universal nature of the rights concerned.  To constitutionally identify and 
enumerate such rights on the same basis, however, would be to once again risk the erosion of 
legitimacy in the eyes of those whose personal identification and enumeration of such rights 
did not match those appearing in the constitution.  By maintaining an acknowledgement of 
the role of the sovereign in identifying and enumerating these rights, such a disagreement is 
transformed from a rejection of the overall constitutional order into questions regarding the 
legitimacy of, and respect for, the authority of the sovereign. 
 Ultimately, then, it can be said that both the government-based justification for 
identification and enumeration and the governance-based justification for implementation and 
enforcement are simultaneously individually necessary and cumulatively sufficient for 
consolidating the overall legitimacy of the entire constitutional process.  As separate entities, 
however, neither perspective can maintain the overall sense of legitimacy required to justify 
the entire procedure.  Consequently, viewing the constitution as a process can provide an 
overall sense of unity between competing constitutionalisms. 
175 Brown, N. J., Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for 
Accountable Government, (New York, USA: State University of New York Press, 2002), (henceforth, Brown), p. 
52. 
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 At this point, however, there would seem to be a certain number of significant 
questions that remain to be answered.  In particular, one such point of enquiry relates to the 
observation that the development of all law can be seen as occurring in a similar manner to 
the process described above.  The question then arises as to what it is that makes this process 
specifically constitutional, as opposed to being a general legal process.  To conflate the legal 
and the constitutional in this way, however, is simply to confuse product and process.  
Inasmuch as they are identified, enumerated, implemented and enforced, laws are the end 
result, the final product, of this procedure.  The constitution, on the other hand, is this 
procedure.  To label the process ‘constitutional’ is perhaps somewhat misleading, as it is the 
process itself that comprises the constitution.  To put it another way, it can be said that a 
“society does not have a constitution.  A society is a constituting, an unceasing process of 
self-creating.”177  More simply, perhaps, the constitutional process can be seen as “the 
process of the constitution” rather than the more general interpretation of “the process that is 
in accordance with the constitution”. 
 Once seen in such a light, it becomes clearer how the legal can be distinguished from 
the constitutional and how laws might be described as being unconstitutional.  That is, laws 
can be depicted as being in conflict with the constitution when they fail to progress through 
each distinct phase of the constitutional process.  For example, when attempting to adjudicate 
on the potential constitutionality of any particular law, one must first attempt to discover 
“what substantive constitutional principles define restrictions on governmental discretion”.178  
Similarly, a law that is consistent with the principles of the constitution and yet has not been 
adequately enumerated can also be declared unconstitutional.179  Likewise, attempts to 
enforce a law which has not been appropriately implemented, perhaps through a lack of 
suitable promulgation, could reasonably be described as being unconstitutional.180  Finally, 
and in a similar vein, a law that is not enforced can also be regarded as being constitutionally 
unacceptable, in addition to the inherently redundant nature of such a provision.  Thus, whilst 
it is entirely possible for laws to exist outside of this process, such laws cannot reasonably be 
referred to as being ‘constitutional’. 
177 Allott, P., The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p. 79. 
178 Chang, D., ‘Structuring Constitutional Doctrine: Principles, Proof, and the Functions of Judicial Review’, 58 
Rutgers Law Review 777, p. 780.  Emphasis in original. 
179 See, for instance, the British case of R(Alvi) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2012] UKSC 33, 
in which certain immigration provisions were held to be unconstitutional as they had not undergone an 
appropriate level of scrutiny and, therefore, enumeration, by parliament. 
180 See, for example, Art. 1 of the French Code Civil.  Many other jurisdictions have similar provisions. 
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 This process-based depiction of the constitution, therefore, can be seen as facilitating 
an analysis of the constitutionality of legal provisions that is independent of the nature or 
status of “the constitution” within a given jurisdiction.  In other words, it can be seen as 
assisting in the development of a form of constitutionalism that is neither tied to any specific 
philosophical viewpoint nor beholden to the bidding of any particular sovereign entity.  It is, 
therefore, a unitary form of constitutionalism.  Nevertheless, it remains unclear as to exactly 
how, and if, this constitutional process is capable of incorporating the rights-based dialogue 
that has already been considered as being present in both constitutionalism as governance and 
as government.  For the time being, however, it shall suffice to note that this constitutional 
process is distinct, both from alternative understandings of the constitution and from a broad 
characterisation of the nature of legal development in general. 
 
3.5  Understanding Constitutionalism 
 If, as has been suggested, the totality of this process can be viewed as forming the 
constitution of any given jurisdiction, questions may still remain over what is then meant by 
the terms ‘constitutional’ and ‘constitutionalism’.  As already referred to, the term 
‘constitutional’ would seem to have two distinct meanings and it would appear to be 
relatively simple to distinguish one from the other.  In one sense, this term can refer to those 
things which form part of, or somehow relate to, the constitution itself, as is meant by the 
phrase ‘constitutional process’ or ‘constitutional law’.  Alternatively, it can indicate those 
actions or provisions which are deemed to be in accordance with the constitution, such as 
when a particular enactment is described as being ‘constitutional’.  Whilst the context being 
used might usually help distinguish the intended meaning of this particular term, the question 
still stands as to precisely what might be meant by the term ‘constitutionalism’. 
 From the preceding discussions, a number of diverse interpretations can be discerned.  
On the one hand, constitutionalism can be viewed as a form of ‘constitutionology’, in that it 
can simply relate to the study and examination of constitutions and related issues.  
Additionally, there is the definition arrived at above whereby constitutionalism can be seen as 
a neutral term that refers to the way in which the constitutional process is operated, regardless 
of the manner in which this is carried out.  It is in this sense that “constitutionalism is a 
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generic framework of universal application”.181  In contrast, however, constitutionalism may 
also be understood as a particular theoretical or political ideal, leading to claims that, amongst 
other things, “constitutionalism has one essential quality: it is a legal limitation on 
government”.182 
 When constitutionalism is understood as referring to a particular, idealised means of 
operating the constitutional process, an additional signification of the term ‘constitutional’ 
can be revealed.  This is the consideration that a provision might only be considered 
constitutional when it has progressed through the stages of the constitutional process in a way 
which is in accordance with the ideals held to by the particular vision of constitutionalism 
concerned.  It is in this way, for example, that it becomes possible to have non-constitutional 
constitutions.183 
 The possibility of labelling some constitutions as being non- or unconstitutional can 
only achieve significance, however, within the context of an established and predominant 
vision of constitutionalism that overshadows most others.  Whilst there are potentially as 
many different ideological forms of constitutionalism as there are theories of politics and 
society, it is arguable that current discussions of constitutionalism are dominated by a liberal, 
democratic vision that is often treated as being synonymous with the more fundamental 
concept of constitutionalism as a process.  Indeed, one could argue that “[t]he increasingly 
dominant view is that constitutions enshrine and secure the rights central to a democratic 
society.”184  This is a normative perception of constitutionalism that is not without its 
challengers, such as theocratic constitutionalism,185 yet these alternatives remain understood 
in contrast to “[t]he conventional view [which] was that constitutionalism aimed primarily at 
limiting the powers of rulers and protecting individuals and groups against the arbitrary and 
despotic exercise of authority by government.”186 
 The strength of this link between constitutionalism and a liberal political ideology is 
highlighted by John Rawls when he states that “a reasonably just constitutional democratic 
181 Deng, F. M., Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa, (Washington, USA: US Institute of Peace 
Press, 2008), (henceforth, Deng), p. 12. 
182 McIlwain, C. H., Constitutionalism: Ancient and modern, (Revised edn.), (New York, USA: Cornell 
University Press, 1947), p. 21. 
183 For example, see generally, Brown. 
184 Bellamy, p.1. 
185 Theocratic constitutionalism being that which has “argued that one or another of the current crop of 
universalist religions ought to serve as the foundation of normative disciplining of constitution making.”  Backer, 
L. C., ‘Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering’, (2009) 16 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 85, p. 91. 
186 Deng, p. 13. 
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society ... [is] sometimes referred to simply as a liberal society”.187  Although conflating 
these ideas in this way suggests a lack of appreciation for the nuances inherent in these very 
different terms, this particular combination of concepts does go some way towards indicating 
why such a conflation can occur.  In essence, this liberal form of constitutionalism can be 
seen as seeking to maintain certain fundamental principles regarding what it sees as the ideal 
way in which to operate the constitutional process.  In this regard, the argument has been 
presented that “[d]ignity, liberty, and equality are cornerstones of constitutionalism.”188  As 
examined, however, such values can be seen simply as cornerstones of liberal 
constitutionalism, as distinct from the constitutional process in and of itself. 
A thorough exploration of the nature and status of the exact values that underpin 
liberal thought is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present discussion.  Two principles 
that are particularly relevant, however, are the desire for liberty and a belief in the importance 
of equality, as expressed through the ideals of popular sovereignty inherent in a democratic 
system.  To some extent, these values can be seen as the ‘constitutive norms’ of a liberal 
approach to the constitutional process.  Such norms are those which exist “within a practice, 
[and] adherence to which is required of anyone wishing to be considered an actor in good 
standing within that practice.”189  In other words, support for liberty and support for equality 
can be seen as the basic elements required of any actor wishing to retain good standing within 
the practice of liberal constitutionalism.  Whilst not yet directly addressing the question of 
how rights and constitutions relate to one another, this combination of liberty and equality 
with a general approval of constitutional mechanisms does highlight two particular aspects of 
the constitutional process that have thus far remained unaddressed.  This is particularly the 
case when the somewhat vague and nebulous terms of liberty and equality are translated into 
more practical, and arguably more constitutional, ideas regarding a separation of powers and 
the rule of law.  The questions that these ideas raise concern the matters of who operates the 
process and how they go about it and the answers to these questions can be considered as 
defining the nature of the constitutionalism that is being discussed. 
 
 
187 Rawls, J., The Law of Peoples, (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 12. 
188 Baer, S., ‘Dignity, Liberty, Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism’, (2009) 59 
University of Toronto Law Journal 417, p. 467. 
189 Frost, M., Constituting Human Rights: Global civil society and the society of democratic states, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 14.  Emphasis removed. 
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3.6  Operating the Process 
 As considered above, in order to more fully appreciate the ways in which the 
constitutional process relates to theories of constitutionalism, it becomes necessary to 
examine the more practical dimensions of who operates the constitutional process and how 
they go about it.  From within the dominant ideology of liberal constitutionalism, the two 
principles which have been considered particularly important in this regard are those of 
liberty and equality.  At a more practical level, these principles can be interpreted as being 
expressed as a desire for both a separation of powers and the rule of law.  It has been 
suggested, for example, that a government, to be properly called as such, must “have 
legislative power, executive power and judicial power”190 and “[t]he modern constitutional 
state ... is one which has developed a very definite set of rules and regulations for the working 
of these three functions of government.”191  The possibility has also been raised that, in some 
jurisdictions at least, the rule of law should be seen as a constitutional principle of 
fundamental importance.192  Whilst these various concepts are not without definitional and 
theoretical issues of their own, it shall suffice for present purposes to understand such terms 
as referring to broad groupings of theories that can be seen as indicating the answers of 
liberal constitutionalism to the questions of how the constitutional process is operated and by 
whom. 
 The concept of the separation of powers can be seen as referring to who, or what 
institution, is expected to conduct the operation of any given stage of the constitutional 
process.  In a ‘pure’ or ‘strict’ sense, albeit a slightly simplistic one, the “separation of 
powers holds that the legislative, executive and judicial arms [of government] should be 
separate of each other, in respect of both their functions and their personnel.”193  When 
transposed into a theory of the constitutional process, this can essentially be viewed as an 
argument in favour of having each phase of the process being conducted by an institution that 
is fully independent of those institutions that are carrying out other stages of the same process.  
Thus, the executive might identify principles to be enshrined in law, a legislature might 
enumerate such a law, an independent bureaucracy might implement the law and then an 
190 Strong, C. F., Modern Political Constitutions, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1930), p. 7. 
191 Ibid., p. 10. 
192 See generally, McCorkindale, C., and McKerrell, N., ‘Assessing the Relationship between Legislative and 
Judicial Supremacy in the UK: Parliament and the Rule of Law after Jackson’, (2012) 101(4) The Round Table 
341. 
193 Masterman, R., The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial Competence and 
Independence in the United Kingdom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 11. 
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independent judiciary would enforce it.  The nature of the constitutional process, however, 
does not dictate that dividing the functions of government in this way is necessary; it is 
merely desirable from within the context of liberal constitutionalism as a political ideology. 
 In a similar manner, the concept of the rule of law can be seen as referring to how 
separate and independent institutions are expected to operate the stage, or stages, of the 
constitutional process for which they have been given responsibility.  Whilst the notion of the 
rule of law is potentially as ambiguous and malleable as that of the separation of powers, it 
can generally be understood as a means “to affect the state-individual relationship by 
introducing (‘legal’) curbs on sovereign power to the individual’s benefit.”194  Whilst not 
entirely neglecting the identification and enumeration stages of the constitutional process, this 
theory of the rule of law can arguably be said to focus on the means by which laws are to be 
implemented and enforced, at least in so far as it emphasises principles such as the imposition 
of “meaningful limits on the state and state actors, ... the supremacy of law, and equality of 
all before the law.”195  Consequently, this particular vision of constitutionalism can then be 
further supplemented with other political ideas, such as strongly democratic theories, that 
seemingly prioritise the methods behind the identification and enumeration aspects of the 
constitution. 
 This artificial division, however, into democratic theories being used to justify the 
stages of identification and enumeration and rule of law theories underpinning the 
implementation and enforcement phases can often lead to a degree of tension between the 
two concepts.  A clear example of this tension can be found in the ‘strong’ form of judicial 
review, expressed in the United States through the case of Marbury v. Madison,196 as was 
discussed earlier.  Through judicial review, the linear nature of the constitutional process 
becomes supplemented with an internal loop whereby judges, at the final stage of the process, 
are able to resubmit legislation to the earlier stages before it becomes finalised as an 
acceptable, and therefore constitutional, act.  Compromising a pure separation of powers in 
this way so that the judiciary becomes able to enforce certain values on those responsible for 
identification and enumeration is one method by which consistency of values can be 
maintained across the entire constitutional process. 
194 Costa, P., ‘The Rule of Law: A Historical Introduction’, in Costa, P., and Zolo, D., (eds.), The Rule of Law: 
History, Theory, Criticism, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 74. 
195 Zurn, M., et al, ‘Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of International and Transnational Governance’, in Zurn, 
M., et al, Rule of Law Dynamics in an Era of International and Transnational Governance, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 1, fn. 1. 
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 It is only at this point, after establishing the who and how of its operation, that liberal 
constitutionalism is capable of introducing concepts of rights into the constitutional process.  
It must be conceded, therefore, that other forms of constitutionalism, such as an autocratic or 
communist constitutionalism, might conceive of and integrate rights in very different ways, if 
at all.  There are, however, four, and only four, ways in which rights can relate to the 
constitutional process.  Firstly, rights might be pre-constitutional, in that they exist prior to 
the constitution and thus inform its development, or they might be seen as being post-
constitutional, in that they are subject to the constitution and are thus controlled by its 
development.  Alternatively, rights might be extra-constitutional, in that they exist 
independently of the constitution and relate to it in the same way as any other field of human 
activity, or they might be intra-constitutional, in that they are integral to the very concept of a 
constitution and thus the two ideas are inseparable. 
In attempting to make a determination between these various possible relationships, 
an understanding of a constitution as a process would seem to indicate the lack of any 
necessary causal link.  Instead, each of these options is simply an alternate means of 
operating the process and the operator of that process is free to decide between them.  At the 
present time, however, it is unfortunately impossible to fully account for every theoretical 
proposal regarding politics and society, their relationships to the constitutional process and 
their attendant treatment of the concept of rights.  Instead, the concept of liberal democracy 
shall be taken as the dominant vision of constitutional thought and assessed accordingly, as 
discussed above.  Whether or not such dominance is justifiable, appropriate or beneficial are 
assessments that must, however, be made elsewhere. 
To work through the possibilities, then, it is not inconceivable that one could adopt a 
position that supports both liberal constitutionalism and a pre-constitutional vision of rights.  
Such a position “fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on the 
answer to complex moral problems, like the problem of whether a particular statute respects 
the inherent equality of all men.”197  This position becomes difficult to sustain, however, as 
the support for pre-existing and pre-eminent moral values implies that all governmental forms 
would be subject to the same constraints.  In this way, the need for a separation of powers is 
negated, with the sole solution being to absorb such a separation into the realm of pre-
existing, and potentially self-evident, moral requirements.  As a result, a situation may arise 
197 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 2009), (henceforth, Dworkin), p. 185. 
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in which “[l]iberal societies claim to be the only legitimate embodiment of universal 
values … [and a]ll others are judged as approximations to themselves.”198 
If such a scenario is to be avoided, a different relationship model must be considered.  
There is, for example, an argument “that no rights or duties of any sort can exist except by 
virtue of a uniform social practice of recognizing these rights and duties.”199  In essence, this 
position centres upon the establishment of a ‘rule of recognition’ which “will specify some 
feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive 
affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social pressure it 
exerts.”200  In this way, rights become necessarily post-constitutional as there is a general 
rejection of first-order natural truths in favour of deference towards “a person or body of 
persons whose orders the great majority of the society habitually obey and who does not 
habitually obey any other person or persons.”201 Whilst this is, in and of itself, an entirely 
plausible mechanism by which to operate the constitutional process, it would appear to be 
incompatible with the liberal democratic constitutionalism outlined above.  This is because it 
contains an inherent threat to the separation of powers on the basis that the institution 
responsible for the identificatory stage of the process, the would-be recipient of the majority’s 
habitual obedience, becomes able to dictate what values are to operate every other stage. 
If, then, a separation between the institutions conducting each phase of the process is 
to be maintained, an alternative means of operating the constitutional process must be sought.  
Attempting to understand rights as being extra-constitutional, however, is similarly fraught 
with difficulty.  For instance, it is entirely possible to argue “that not everything that can 
somehow be brought within the scope of a right guaranteed without limits is actually 
constitutionally protected.”202  When a lawsuit is brought from within such a perspective, 
however, the judge has the 
“‘discretion’ to decide the case either way.  His opinion is written in 
language that seems to assume that one or the other party had a pre-existing 
right to win the suit, but that idea is only a fiction.  In reality he has 
198 Gray, p. 22. 
199 Dworkin, p. 48. 
200 Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law, (3rd edn.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 94. 
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202 Alexy, R., A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 72. 
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legislated new legal rights, and then applied them retrospectively to the case 
at hand.”203 
Such a perspective, therefore, gives preference to the judicial enforcement phase of the 
constitutional process in a manner similar to the preference given to the identificatory stage 
by a post-constitutional view of rights. 
 As a consequence of these difficulties, then, the adoption of liberal constitutionalism 
necessitates the development of an intra-constitutional view of rights.  In this way, rights 
become viewed as a mechanism by which the constitutional process can itself be operated, 
thereby enabling them to assist in balancing the tensions between democracy, equality and 
the rule of law by acting as a unifying construct that can underpin the operation of all aspects 
of the constitutional process.  In this manner, one can perceive democracy to be “not merely a 
matter of collective choice, but the expression of ‘rights’ to an equal voice in the 
determination of those collective choices.”204  Similarly, the determination of rights can be 
seen as central to the authority of judicial review, in that “ambitious schemes of judicial 
review that ignore, unduly minimise or somehow seek to trump ... disagreements over the 
meaning and bearing of rights prove hubristic ... [and] risk making judicial decisions appear 
arbitrary”.205  Thus the language of rights becomes integral to the operation of the entire 
constitutional process. 
 This level of integration at the foundational level differentiates this connection 
between rights and constitutions from the alternatives that were discussed previously.  By 
being a fundamental means by which the constitution itself is developed, rights are neither an 
independent set of values that the constitution should be formulated to protect nor a result 
purely born out of political bargaining and compromise.  Instead, rights become seen as an 
essential and integral part of any interaction at the constitutional level. 
 
3.7  Conclusion 
Up to this point, then, this idea of a phase-based constitutional process, as discussed 
above, seems to encourage the adoption of a viewpoint on constitutionalism which contains 
elements from, and can therefore give rise to, both constitutionalism as governance and as 
203 Dworkin, p. 81. 
204 Nedelsky, J., ‘Reconceiving Rights and Constitutionalism’, (2008) 7(2) Journal of Human Rights 139, p. 144. 
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government.  Shared with each of these perspectives is a position which appears to be 
grounded simultaneously in both natural and positive law.  Indeed, the idea of 
constitutionalism as a process would seem to reject a view of ‘a constitution’ as a monolithic 
singularity that must fit neatly within one sphere of legal philosophy or the other.  Instead, it 
reveals the possibility for constitutions to be seen as occupying the grey space in between the 
two, in some respects acting as the mechanism whereby one is actually converted into the 
other. 
 If accepted, this understanding of a constitution as a process highlights alternative 
means by which theories of rights can be linked to theories of constitutionalism.  By 
providing the initial value base from which the operation begins, different values and 
principles can develop into different mechanisms for conducting the overall process.  For 
instance, combining this understanding of a constitution as a process with visions of 
liberalism and democracy as politically desirable constructs, reveals the necessity of 
integrating rights throughout the operation of the constitutional process.  What must not be 
forgotten, however, is that the acceptance of such a link is tied to the acceptance of a 
particular ideological form of constitutionalism that seeks to uphold political liberalism 
through the establishment and maintenance of both democracy and the rule of law.  As a 
result, it is only through an acceptance of the basic, and incommensurable, norms of liberty 
and equality that rights become an integral part of the constitutional process. 
 To put this in other words, the constitutional process can be seen as being completely 
neutral and void of any preconceived social or political directives or ideologies.  Changes to 
the fundamental values that are used to determine who operates the process and how this is 
done result in changes to the products of the process.  The process itself, however, remains 
constant.  It is only through the abandonment of this process that governmental actions can 
accurately be described as being unconstitutional. 
Having established, then, what is understood by ‘a constitution’ and similar terms, the 
present discussion may now progress onto an examination of whether or not such a concept 
can be translated to the international realm.  This is a matter that shall be considered in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Global Constitutionalism 
 
 Over the course of the previous chapters, an examination has been conducted into the 
nature of a constitution and the attendant conceptual relationships between rights and 
constitutions.  Having examined this matter at a theoretical level, this position can now be 
utilised to examine this relationship at the global level.  If the same analytical process is to be 
followed, this investigation must first begin with an examination of global constitutionalism 
before a determination can be made as to the level of integration, or lack thereof, of concepts 
of rights.  As might be expected, however, the very concept of global constitutionalism is at 
least as indeterminate as the concept of constitutionalism in general.  Arguably, it is an even 
more debatable term as there is the added adjective of ‘global’ to be taken into consideration.  
Any attempt to examine ‘global constitutionalism’ is, therefore, immediately faced by two 
primary concerns - what is ‘constitutionalism’ and how can it be ‘global’? 
 Initially, it must be considered that discussions in previous chapters have already 
attempted to examine the nature of constitutionalism, concluding that it can be thought of 
simply as the operation of the constitutional process.206  As a result, the discussion that is to 
follow here is not intended to examine such claims in any great detail.  Instead, the focus 
shall be on the particular difficulties, objections and alternatives that can arise specifically 
from an attempt to translate such a theory into the global, or at least international, arena. 
 Before engaging with such an endeavour, however, it is first necessary to revisit some 
of the more historical aspects of the discussion.  This is principally with the aim of 
connecting more contemporary analyses with their historical precedents.  Whilst the primary 
concern is to show the historical development of global constitutionalism as a constitutional 
process, a further consideration that has thus far remained unexamined is the possibility that 
global constitutionalism has already been developed historically in a way which is 
incompatible with, or at least significantly divergent from, domestic constitutionalism.  A 
slightly broader view of history is taken, therefore, in an attempt to reveal some of the 
historical reasons underlying the difficulties faced by contemporary efforts to analyse global 
206 See supra, Chapter 3. 
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constitutionalism.  It is only then that the viability of the constitutional process as a means of 
examining global constitutionalism can be more fully addressed. 
In addition to this aim of uncovering important factors to be considered regarding the 
nature of any constitutional process operating at the global level, this brief historical 
investigation also goes some way towards addressing the allegedly ‘global’ nature of this 
discussion.  Specifically, this is the consideration that, to some extent, it is all rather 
European.  The earlier discussion on constitutionalism, for instance, examined Plato, Grotius, 
Hobbes and others, all of whom were European.207  As a result, this upcoming look at the 
historical development of global constitutional thought will also attempt to consider ideas and 
systems from a broader range of geographical areas. 
 Following on from this historical discussion is an examination of some of the 
contemporary debates surrounding global constitutionalism.  This is done with the aim of 
assessing the potential utility of the constitutional process as a means of analysing global 
constitutionalism.  In order to adequately complete such an assessment, however, there are a 
number of further questions that must be addressed.  In particular, there are issues 
surrounding how such a process is being operated at the global level, what values are being 
used to instigate it and what actors are involved in its operation.  In attempting to answer 
some of these questions, the discussion then moves on to enquire as to whether or not there 
already exist theories of international relations that might present possible explanations or 
solutions. 
 In conducting this brief enquiry into international relations, particular attention is paid 
to theories of international society, as these would seem to present possible solutions to the 
dilemmas presented by many of the contemporary, and even historic, analyses of global 
constitutionalism.  In particular, it reveals the necessity of more closely considering the 
underlying values and principles that may determine who operates a global constitutional 
process and on what basis.  In doing so, the concept of sovereignty is identified as meriting a 
more detailed examination and thus this part concludes with an examination of sovereignty as 
it can or does relate to any existing constitutional process at the global level. 
 
207 See supra, Chapter 2.  It might also be pertinent to point out that these were also all men.  As interesting and 
revealing as it might be, however, a gender-based analysis of these issues is unfortunately outwith the scope of 
the present discussion. 
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4.1  Historical Global Systems 
 The concept of global constitutionalism involves a perception of the international 
system whose history can be as contested as the idea itself.  In particular, the historical 
development of global constitutional ideas can often be conflated with a history of 
international law.  This is, perhaps, to be particularly expected from within a point of view 
that understands constitutionalism as relating to the initial formulation of law, transforming 
normative principles into legal rules.  Such a view is, in some ways, at the core of the 
constitutional process that has previously been examined and, as already stated, it is this 
understanding of constitutions that shall form the basis of the upcoming discussion.208  
Consequently, whilst the present intention is to trace the development of global 
constitutionalism, there is an inevitable degree to which this will converge with a discussion 
of certain historical aspects of international law. 
 The examination of such legal elements, however, is undertaken from a constitutional 
perspective and it is these constitutional factors that are of principal interest for the time 
being. At the same time, it is arguable that ideas of global constitutionalism and international 
law are as synonymous as ideas of constitutionalism and law in a domestic context.  That is, 
there are a number of connections and relationships that can be seen as existing between them 
and yet they are also distinctly separate concepts.  It is with this in mind, therefore, that the 
following discussion is to proceed.  In a similar manner to the earlier historical discussion of 
constitutional thought, the aim of this discussion is not to provide a detached and discrete 
analysis of the entire history of global constitutionalism.  Instead, as has been suggested, it is 
presented with a view to revealing some of the connections between certain historical 
developments and the more contemporary analyses which are to follow. 
 Attempting to outline an understanding of the early foundations of global 
constitutionalism is, however, not without controversy.  After all, 
“[w]hat does a treaty, in which one party declares itself as ‘the sun’ to the 
other party, or whose parties curse themselves by swearing oaths to their 
gods for the event of breach of contract, have in common with a treaty 
208 See supra, Chapter 3. 
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drawn up in accordance with the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
of 1969?”209 
One possible solution, it would seem, might be to focus on issues of subject matter rather 
than those of content and form.  In other words, there may indeed be certain enunciations and 
formulations of historical international law that appear to be particularly anachronistic to the 
modern mind.  From within these somewhat archaic points of view, however, it may 
nevertheless remain possible to identify attempts at articulating practical solutions to 
common issues that might currently be categorised as issues of ‘global constitutionalism’. 
 An oft-cited example in this regard is the Roman concept of the ius gentium, or ‘law 
of peoples’.  In essence, this was regarded as the law as it related to Roman dealings with 
non-Romans, being “imposed by Roman magistrates on foreigners ... who were in no sense 
the equals of Romans.”210  Whilst it may be entirely plausible to consider this legal regulation 
of relations between members of different societies as an early form of international law, it 
was nevertheless an aspect of Roman law.  That is, it consisted of law that was produced by, 
understood within and limited to the specific context of Roman politics and its sphere of 
influence.  Similar criticisms can be levelled at other systems which might be considered as 
candidates for revealing historical developments in international law.  Indeed, despite 
political claims of universality, one can make the argument that systems as varied as “the 
Islamocentric siyar, the Sinocentric tribute system or Eurocentric law of nations ... were 
nothing other than regional normative systems which were applied in only a limited area of 
the earth and lasted for a limited period of time.”211 
 Whilst the use of any of these systems as a demonstration of the universality of 
certain aspects of international law might indeed be flawed, there is nevertheless potential for 
them to prove useful in charting the development of global constitutionalism, or at least one 
particular understanding of it.  That is, despite numerous variations and differences, these 
systems all seem to present a similar understanding of overall global dynamics.  They depict 
a particular structure of human society wherein “there is always a centre around which the 
209 Steiger, H., ‘From the International Law of Christianity to the International Law of the World Citizen’, (2001) 
3 Journal of the History of International Law 180, p. 181. 
210 Remer, G., ‘Ciceronian Ius Gentium and World Legislation’, (2011) 8 International Organizations Law 
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211 Yasuaki, O., ‘When was the Law of International Society Born? - An Inquiry of the History of International 
Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective’, (2000) 2 Journal of the History of International Law 1, p. 7. 
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whole world revolves and a hierarchy that places the centre at the top.”212  This is a 
perception of the world that is predicated upon a monolithic and hierarchical construction of 
international orders, thereby implying a significant degree of divergence from the more 
modern concept of the sovereign equality of independent states. 
 It is possible, however, to identify aspects indicative of an alternate trend within 
historical conceptions of the international system.  In Greece, for example, the development 
of early cosmopolitan ideas can be attributed to the Cynics, who in doing so “adopted a 
different cognitive perspective from the ego-, ethno-, and geo-centric perspective of 
Aristotle”.213  Similarly, a sense of interdependent, non-hierarchical relationships can be 
drawn from within the African concept of ubuntu, which can be loosely translated as 
signifying “that each individual’s humanity is ideally expressed in relationship with others 
and in relationships individuality is truly expressed.”214 
 These alternative ways of perceiving inter- and intra-society relationships, however, 
can arguably be said to have been considerably less influential on the development of the 
international sphere than their more centralised, hierarchical counterparts.  This can, at least 
in part, be attributed simply to the nature of historical events rather than for any principled 
philosophical justifications.  For instance, it has been observed that 
“[i]n India and China, there were sporadic ... cynics, sceptics, democrats and 
cosmopolitans in various forms of manifestation, but hierarchical agrarian-
military empires tended to adopt and enforce ideologies that were in 
important ways similar to the world-views of Plato, Aristotle and/or 
Stoics.”215 
The competition between these ideas is perhaps particularly evident in the example of Japan, 
where the more communally-organised peasant federations, or ikki, were eventually subdued 
by the hierarchically-ordered military forces of Oda Nobunaga.216  In this way, then, it is 
possible to discern two competing visions for the operation of an international, or possibly 
212 Patomäki, H., ‘Cosmological sources of critical cosmopolitanism’, (2010) 36 (S1) Review of International 
Studies 181, (henceforth, Patomäki), p. 188. 
213 Ibid., p. 186. 
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43-45. 
                                                     
75 
 
inter-national, system.  One view presents a hierarchical system with a dominant centre and 
marginalised peripheries.  The other exhibits a more complex web of interdependent and 
decentralised relationships. 
 Despite the potential utility of this somewhat dualistic interpretation of the 
international sphere, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that these positions are rather 
broad generalisations.  Within each point of view there is plenty of room for divergence and 
disagreement regarding both fine details and general principles.  For now, however, this 
overall categorisation can still prove useful for understanding the gradual clarification of 
ideas relating to global constitutionalism.  This is particularly the case if one examines the 
tension and competition between these two visions and uses this as a lens through which to 
view the historical development of what might later be viewed as global constitutionalism. 
 It is in this regard that one might consider more closely the specific case of certain 
European developments.  This would not be because European history is more significant 
than that of other regions of the world, but simply due to the fact that Europe provides a clear, 
well-documented example of the issues currently being discussed.  Of particular interest is 
the point at which Europeans started to traverse the Atlantic and begin to interact with 
societies which had not previously been incorporated into a European understanding of the 
international system.  Around this time, Europe was being “shaped in complex ways by the 
events of the Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation, by the growth of 
Habsburg power and by resistance to it”217 and it is from within such a seemingly chaotic 
environment that questions needed to be raised, and answered, regarding the nature and status 
of these newly encountered peoples. 218 
 On one side of the debate was the position that 
“Spanish title over the Indies was conventionally accounted for by applying 
the jurisprudence developed by the [Roman Catholic] Church out of the 
several centuries of interaction between the Christian and heathen worlds.  
217 Tuck, R., Philosophy and Government 1572 - 1651, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 1. 
218 By this same logic, the incorporation of European societies into indigenous American approaches to the 
international system would provide an equally interesting and informative account of similar issues.  An 
interpretation of the European engagement with these events has been chosen simply for reasons of accessibility 
to the historical record. 
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Within this framework, the Indians could be characterized as Saracens, as 
heathens, and their rights and duties determined accordingly.”219 
In other words, one option was the seemingly simple incorporation of the indigenous 
populations into the pre-existing hierarchy of a legal and moral framework centred upon the 
authority of Rome.  At the other extreme, however, was an outlook that viewed 
autochthonous groups as being fully equal to their European counterparts and thereby 
deserving of treatment that reflected this fact.  Various permutations of this latter view have 
often been ascribed to thinkers such as Francisco de Vítoria and Bartolomé de las Casas, 
although the precise views of these scholars are complex and disputed.220 
 Nevertheless, even this more cosmopolitan, or potentially egalitarian, view can be 
described as being predominantly Eurocentric.  In Vítoria’s work, for instance, rights were 
“guaranteed to all persons according to the precepts of the ‘law of nations’ or ius gentium.”221  
As mentioned earlier, this ius gentium was grounded in Roman history and practice.  
Consequently, it was not a system of international engagement with which aboriginal 
populations of the Americas could have been expected to be familiar.  As a result, this 
dependence upon European norms and principles leaves even this attempt to justify peaceful 
diplomatic relations open to the accusation that it “finally legitimizes endless Spanish 
incursions into Indian society ... [as] any Indian attempt to resist penetration amounts to an 
act of war that justifies retaliation.”222 
 In spite of these more cosmopolitan efforts, therefore, it is possible to view the history 
of the initial European engagements with the Americas as the development and exportation of 
a hierarchical political structure that placed Europe itself at the centre.  At this time, however, 
Europe was far from being a single, unified force that was ready to assert its dominance over 
external territories.  Indeed, it can be argued that “[w]hile new empires (Spain and Germany), 
powerful monarchies (France and England), and a supremacy-claiming papal state [had] 
emerged, the struggle for pre-eminence among the unequal polities of Europe remained 
219 Anghie, A., ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’, (henceforth Anghie), in 
Darian-Smith, E., and Fitzpatrick, P., (eds.), Laws of the Postcolonial, (Ann Arbor, USA: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999), (henceforth Laws of the Postcolonial), p. 91. 
220 For a more detailed account of the views of these authors, as well as an overview of the debates surrounding 
them, see Boast, R. P., ‘The “Spanish” Origins of International Law: A Historiographical Review’, (2010) 41 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 235. 
221 Salas, V. M., ‘Francisco de Vitoria on the Ius Gentium and the American Indios’, (2011-12) 10(2) Ave Maria 
Law Review 331, p. 332. 
222 Anghie, p. 95. 
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undecided.”223  Positioning Europe at the centre of an intercontinental hierarchy, therefore, 
can be seen as simply increasing the stakes for whoever was to prove victorious in Europe's 
internal political and religious struggles. 
 These struggles, however, proved indecisive.  Instead of resulting in the emergence of 
a single, dominant power that could anchor a Eurocentric hierarchy, agreements were reached 
whereby a multiplicity of actors were recognised as having equal, albeit territorially-bound, 
status.  These agreements were the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 and they can be seen as 
having “symbolized a transformation from a system of political rule based in the hierarchical 
structures of medieval Christianity to one ordered in terms of independent sovereign states: a 
transition from hierarchy to anarchy.”224  Whilst the significance of the Westphalian system 
as regards the internal character of states remains disputable,225 it can nevertheless be seen as 
at least promoting, if not establishing, a non-hierarchical political structure within the 
confines of Europe.  It can be argued, therefore, that by the early modern period an 
international order was beginning to emerge that was both hierarchical and Eurocentric.  
Simultaneously, however, the European centre was itself non-hierarchical and primarily 
founded upon notions of territorially-restricted sovereign equality.226 
The potential for such developments can also be seen in the history of other regions of 
the world.  Indeed, it can be argued that, 
“[s]imilar to the early modern European system, the ancient Chinese system 
experienced disintegration of feudal hierarchy, prevalence of war, 
conditions of international anarchy, emergence of sovereign territorial states, 
configuration of the balance of power, and attempts at universal 
domination. … However, unlike [European leaders] … the state of Qin 
overcame such countervailing forces by self-strengthening reforms, divide-
and-conquer strategies, and cunning and brutish stratagems.”227 
223 Teschke, B., The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations, 
(London: Verso, 2009), p. 110. 
224 Larkins, J., From Hierarchy to Anarchy, (New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 3. 
225 See, for example, ibid. and fn. 223. 
226 See, for example, Little, R., The Balance of Power in International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), (henceforth, Little), Figure 8.4, p. 273. 
227 Hui, V. T., ‘The Triumph of Domination in the Ancient Chinese System’, in Kaufman, S. J., et al, (eds.), The 
Balance of Power in World History, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 122. 
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It can be argued, therefore, that it was the uniquely indecisive nature of the internal conflicts 
of Europe that led to the particular juxtaposition of a hierarchical intercontinental system with 
an anarchic system of state sovereignty. 
 It was not until much later, however, that this Westphalian system of exclusive 
territorial sovereignty was exported to other parts of the globe.  In the meantime, these 
newly-defined states can be seen as having attempted to maintain a system of hierarchical 
domination both internally within their own territories and externally in their relations with 
those areas which were, from a Eurocentric perspective, peripheral.  Nevertheless, this was 
not a completely unobstructed process.  England’s ‘Glorious Revolution’, the American War 
of Independence and the French revolution of 1789 can all be seen as attempts to oppose the 
internal hierarchies of participants in the Westphalian system.  The relationship between such 
events and domestic concepts of constitutionalism has, however, been discussed 
elsewhere.228  Nevertheless, contemporaneous to these developments were a number of 
attempts to conceptualise opposition to the external hierarchy that was proving increasingly 
dominant. 
 One early example from within a fairly specific context is closely associated with the 
figure of Hugo Grotius.229  Regarding the more generalised aspects of his theories, it has been 
observed that “Vitoria had presented the outlines of an international moral community, and 
Grotius repeatedly referred to him, stressing that the Spaniard was right.”230  In addition to 
building upon this idea, however, Grotius also made some more specific contributions to the 
development of an international doctrine regarding the freedom of the high seas.  In essence, 
Grotius helped advance an “argument that by the Law of Nations navigation is free to all 
persons whatsoever”.231  Whilst arguably being of somewhat restricted significance, a general 
international acceptance of maritime freedom can be seen as a practical means of countering 
efforts to impose a hierarchical domination of the marine environment. 
 These attempts are arguably highlighted still further when one considers the law on 
piracy.  It is in this regard, for instance, that the Italian Alberico “Gentili may be seen to posit 
the principle of ‘international punishment’ based on the idea of the world community, and 
228 See supra, Chapter 2. 
229 For an admittedly brief discussion of some of Grotius’ contributions to theories of individual rights and 
constitutionalism in general, see supra, Chapter 2. 
230 Cavallar, G., ‘Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European Colonialism and 
Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?’, (2008) 10 Journal of the History of International Law 181, p. 193. 
231 Butler, W. E., ‘Grotius and the Law of the Sea’, in Bull, H., et al, (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International 
Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 213. 
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designed to support the ‘common law of mankind’.”232  Care should naturally be taken, 
however, with attempts to interpret hierarchical, anarchical or cosmopolitan elements into the 
work of writers who did not present their arguments in such terms.  Indeed, to take Grotius as 
an example, it can be said that there is arguably a certain degree of flexibility inherent in 
much of his work and “[o]ne consequence of this ambiguity is that Grotius can be 
posthumously all things to all men; he is interpretable in various ways.”233 
 As discussed, however, the inherent tension between hierarchical and non-hierarchical 
methods of structuring and understanding the international system is still visible in such 
works despite this apparent degree of ambiguity.  Indeed, for present purposes, the exact 
views and conclusions of such authors could perhaps be seen as less important than the 
simple fact that rudimentary forms of these ideas can be identified within their works. 
 A later author who can arguably be seen as more clearly expressing some of these 
ideas is the philosopher Immanuel Kant.  Spending almost the entirety of his life and career 
in and around the Prussian city of Königsberg, Kant was arguably “the first truly important 
modern philosopher to spend his career almost exclusively as a university teacher, indeed as a 
teacher in a single university in the town of his birth.”234  Given this somewhat sedentary 
background, it is perhaps a little surprising to consider Kant as having developed significant 
principles regarding the international system.  It is not without reason, therefore, that Kant is 
arguably better known for his contributions to issues of ethics, metaphysics and philosophy 
than to theories of international relations.235 
 In spite of this initial scepticism, however, the political aspects of Kant's works can be 
seen as laying important foundations in the development of non-hierarchical, associational 
methods of international interaction.  Of particular relevance is his advancement of 
cosmopolitanism as “[a]n alternative way of dissolving international relations ... not by 
hoping for uniformity and harmony between states, but by dissolving them into component 
human beings.”236  To put it another way, Kant can be seen as opposing the hierarchical 
domination that would flow from the existence of a singular ‘global state’ and as suggesting 
instead the development of an “association [that] is noncoercive and does not have a 
232 Panizza, D., ‘The “Freedom of the Sea” and the “Modern Cosmopolis” in Alberico Gentili’s De Iure Belli’, 
(2009) 30 Grotiana 88, p. 102. 
233 Wight, M., Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), (henceforth, Wight, Four Seminal Thinkers), p. 32. 
234 Guyer, P., Kant, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 15. 
235 See, for example, ibid.. 
236 Wight, Four Seminal Thinkers, p. 74. 
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centralized executive coercive power.”237  Nevertheless, in attempting to promote a more 
cosmopolitan understanding, even reformation, of the international system, “Kant does not 
specifically advocate the creation of a cosmopolitan constitution.  For Kant, constitutionalism 
seems to refer mainly to a condition of right under a mutually recognized collection of 
laws.”238  That is, it can be argued that Kant promotes the development of one particular 
operation of the constitutional process on a global scale, but one that is not restricted by the 
international adoption of a specific documentary constitution. 
 In specifically connecting the constitutional and the international in this way, Kant 
can legitimately be seen as a direct precursor to modern debates surrounding notions of 
global constitutionalism.  As has been discussed, however, this is predicated upon a 
seemingly inherent tension within the international system between processes of hierarchical 
domination and methods of more egalitarian co-operation.  This tension is arguably one that 
remains unresolved.  It has been suggested, for instance, that contemporary “world politics is 
properly seen as a realm of variegated hierarchy [where s]ome states do interact with one 
another under anarchy, but many have ceded at least partial authority ... to the United States 
or other states.”239  It is from within this context that more recent discussions of global 
constitutionalism shall now be examined. 
 
4.2  Contemporary Global Constitutionalism 
 As was noted earlier, there is a large variety of definitions available when one 
considers issues of constitutions and constitutionalism.240  It is perhaps not altogether 
surprising, then, that this variety is often continued, or even extended, at the global level.  
Indeed, there seem to be a large number of understandings of global constitutionalism within 
contemporary academic literature, not all of which appear mutually compatible.  As might be 
expected, many of these divisions can be traced back to the more fundamental divisions in 
understanding the concept of constitutionalism itself, which have already been discussed.  
Introduction of the global dimension, however, does appear to contribute a number of 
difficulties of its own. 
237 Capps, P., and Rivers, J., ‘Kant’s Concept of International Law’, (2010) 16(4) Legal Theory 229, p. 245. 
238 Brown, G. W., ‘Kantian Cosmopolitan Law and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution’, (2006) 27(4) 
History of Political Thought 661, p. 673. 
239 Lake, D., Hierarchy in International Relations, (London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 175. 
240 See supra, Chapter 2. 
                                                     
81 
 
 One initial interpretation of global constitutionalism that can be dispensed with at this 
point relates to the studying of “changes in the content of the world’s written 
constitutions”.241  In other words, the term can be legitimately used to refer to the potential, 
or possibly ongoing, globalization of constitutional law within the domestic environment.  
Generally speaking, this position concerns the observation that “globalization has fostered ... 
[a] type of constitutional comparativism by lowering both natural and man-made barriers to 
cross-border interaction.”242  This position, however, is inherently restricted to examining the 
international arena only in so far as it affects the national context.  Consequently, whilst this 
interpretation may indeed be termed global constitutionalism, it may be more accurate, and 
more helpful, to consider it as a form of large-scale comparative constitutionalism instead. 
 Even if, however, the scope of enquiry is limited to those definitions concerning 
constitutionalism at an international level, there remains a significant degree of divergence 
within existing discussions of the field.  It has even been suggested that “[w]hen the need to 
define global constitutionalization arises, any attempt at a common definition causes 
disagreement”,243 and as has been mentioned, there is a certain extent to which one can trace 
the origins of these divisions back to disagreement surrounding the concept of 
constitutionalism itself. 
 For instance, in advocating for an interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations 
as a global constitution, Bardo Fassbender has argued that “a constitution almost universally 
presents itself as a complex of fundamental norms governing the organization and 
performance of governmental functions in a given state (‘frame of government’), and the 
relationship between the government (broadly understood) and the citizens.”244  Whilst 
recognising both the functional and social aspects of constitutionalism, however, Fassbender 
argues that the Charter’s “rules must remain in line with the basic actual conditions of the 
international system.”245  This account, therefore, can be seen as an example of government-
based constitutionalism since any normative element of the constitution becomes dependent 
upon its descriptive accuracy. 
241 Law, D. S., and Versteeg, M., ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’, (2011) 99 
California Law Review 1163, p. 1172. 
242 Ibid., p. 1166. 
243 Milewicz, K., ‘Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a Conceptual Framework’, (2009) 
16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 413, (henceforth, Milewicz), p. 413. 
244 Fassbender, B., The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community, (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), (henceforth, Fassbender), pp. 22-3. 
245 Ibid., p. 117. 
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 On the other hand, advocates of alternative visions of global constitutionalism can be 
seen as grounding their arguments in an understanding of constitutionalism as governance.  In 
proposing a form of ‘organic global constitutionalism’, for example, Christine Schwöbel 
attempts “to reorient the debate away from its current trajectories towards a more flexible, 
participation-centred model.”246  In doing so, there is an explicit rejection of predetermined 
political forms in favour of “a participatory and discursive methodology of specifying which 
issues are viewed as ‘constitutional’.”247  Simultaneously, there is an argument in favour of 
flexibility as this “leaves room for the recognition of diversity and plurality.”248  However, 
participation, diversity and plurality are themselves both normative values and centred around 
the relationship between government and society.  Organic global constitutionalism can 
therefore be seen as presenting a social and normative approach in a similar manner to other 
governance-based understandings of constitutionalism. 
 In addition to the distinction between governance- and government-based 
constitutionalism, contemporary efforts to define global constitutionalism are faced with the 
tension between hierarchy and cosmopolitanism.  As discussed above, this tension is revealed 
when attempting to examine historical developments in theories of global constitutionalism 
and, as yet, it would appear to remain unresolved.  At one end of the spectrum, is the 
suggestion that global constitutionalism is an attempt, or a collection of attempts, “to justify 
different models of a world state (or other supranational amalgamation)”.249  This 
hierarchical view of global constitutionalism can be considered analogous to a certain view of 
domestic constitutionalism, wherein the constitution is “a superior law ... [meaning] that 
ordinary law which conflicts with the constitution is invalid or inapplicable.”250 
 This hierarchical view of global constitutionalism stands in marked contrast to more 
cosmopolitan perspectives.  In discussing the increasing interdependence of international 
regulation, for instance, Jürgen Habermas has suggested that “the first addressees for this 
‘project’ are not governments.  They are social movements and non-governmental 
organizations; the active members of a civil society that stretches beyond national 
246 Schwöbel, C. E. J., ‘Organic Global Constitutionalism’, (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 529, 
p.538. 
247 Ibid., p. 543. 
248 Ibid., p. 542 
249 Maus, I., ‘From Nation-State to Global State, or the Decline of Democracy’, (2006) 13(4) Constellations 465, 
p. 465. 
250 Raz, J., ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries’, in Alexander, L., (ed.), 
Constitutionalism: philosophical foundations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 153. 
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borders.”251  Similarly, Mattias Kumm has argued that “[t]he statist paradigm of 
constitutionalism needs to be replaced by a cosmopolitan paradigm of constitutionalism.”252 
 However useful these distinctions might be, this is clearly not an exhaustive list of the 
ways in which discussions of global constitutionalism might be divided.  One could, for 
example, focus “on the idealized distinction between unity and plurality of international 
law, ... [or] on societal versus state-based constitutionalization.”253  Indeed, the potential for 
divergence is so extensive that almost every writer who attempts to address issues of global 
constitutionalism appears to feel obligated “to survey various understandings of these terms 
[‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalism’] in order to situate ... [their] claims”.254 
 Perhaps as a result of this substantial variation, there have been some attempts at 
simply organising or systematising these debates without necessarily providing a possible 
solution.  It has been suggested, for instance, that it might be possible to categorise 
discussions “according to their respective answer to the question of whether they consider 
mapping or shaping the central activity of global constitutionalism.”255  In this context, 
‘mapping’ “means identifying and explaining the processes of constitutionalism at the global 
level, while ‘shaping’ means contributing to the actual processes of constitutionalism through 
concrete proposals for legal or political innovation.”256  Alternatively, discussions might be 
grouped together on the basis “of the four dimensions of social, institutional, normative, and 
analogical constitutionalism”.257  Another option might be to categorise discussions based on 
251 Habermas, J., (trans., Pensky, M.), The Postnational Constellation, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 57. 
252 Kumm, M., ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in 
and beyond the State’, in Dunoff, J. L., and Trachtman, J. P., (eds.), Ruling the World?: constitutionalism, 
international law and global governance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), (henceforth, Ruling 
the World?), p. 263. 
253 Milewicz, p. 425. 
254 Stone-Sweet, A., ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism and International Regimes’, (2009) 16(2) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 621, p. 623.  For a selection of other examples, see: Volk, C., ‘Why Global 
Constitutionalism Does not Live up to its Promises’, (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of International Law 551, p. 
554; Brown, G. W., ‘The constitutionalization of what?’, (2012) 1(2) Global Constitutionalism 201, p. 203; van 
Mulligen, J. G., ‘Global Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order’, (2011) 
24 Leiden Journal of International Law 277, p. 278, fn. 5; Peters, A., and Armingeon, K., ‘Global 
Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective’, (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
385, p. 386. 
255 Wiener, A., et al, ‘Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, (2012) 1(1) 
Global Constitutionalism 1, p. 8. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Schwöbel, C., ‘Situating the Debate’, (2010) 8(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 611, p. 612. 
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their relation to one or more of the “three important functions that international constitutional 
norms play”.258 
 This apparent multiplicity of attempts to circumvent the need for a precise definition 
could be seen as simply lending support to a position that “global constitutionalism is an 
umbrella concept uniting many different authors”.259  If the definition stops there, however, 
the term ‘global constitutionalism’ is left as nothing more than a reference point for a 
generalised field of study with no clear or distinct boundaries.  As potentially useful as these 
distinctions, categorisations and generalisations might be, there remains the underlying 
question as to what, if anything, unites this wide variety of perspectives.  Even if the term 
merely provides a common reference point for wildly divergent views, the inherent 
implication is that there is a certain degree of commonality.  In spite of the apparently 
mutually exclusive perspectives that can be contained within the expression, the label ‘global 
constitutionalism’ would still seem to bear some degree of identificatory utility. 
 One attempt at examining this commonality has outlined three apparently 
fundamental elements.  These are “the formal principle of the international rule of law, the 
substantive dimension representing human rights provisions, and the time factor allowing for 
gradual emergence of a global constitutional order.”260  Even this attempt, however, is not 
without its difficulties and divisions.  In promoting a formalised understanding of substantive 
content, for instance, it exhibits a certain degree of hierarchical tendencies which are at odds 
with more flexible, cosmopolitan-oriented perspectives.  Similarly, in insisting on a gradual 
temporal element, it can be seen as being at odds with theories that stress the significance of 
specific constitutional moments.261  It would seem to be possible, then, for some discussions 
of global constitutionalism to succumb to the very divisions which they are attempting to 
overcome. 
 In order to avoid this possibility, it is perhaps necessary to leave behind “Western 
thought [which] has always revolved around juxtaposing antagonistic bipolar opposites, such 
258 These three functions being “(1) enabling the formation of international law (i.e., enabling 
constitutionalization), (2) constraining the formation of international law (i.e., constraining constitutionalization), 
and (3) filling gaps in domestic constitutional law that arise as a result of globalization (i.e., supplemental 
constitutionalization).”  See Dunoff, J. L., and Trachtman, J. P., ‘A Functional Approach to International 
Constitutionalization’, in Ruling the World?, p. 10. 
259 Volk, C., ‘Why Global Constitutionalism Does not Live up to its Promises’, (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law 551, p. 554. 
260 Milewicz, p. 433. 
261 See, for example, Slaughter, A-M., and Burke-White, W., ‘An International Constitutional Moment’, (2002) 
43 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
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as order/chaos, good/evil, or just/unjust.”262  In contrast to this analytical, and somewhat 
artificial, bifurcation of ideas, 
“Taoist philosophy is among the traditions of thought that explicitly 
questioned such dualistic conceptualizing.  Instead of thinking in the form 
of dichotomies, opposites are considered complementary because neither 
side can exist by itself.  Since order, for instance, can only exist and be 
appreciated by virtue of its opposite - disorder - both form an inseparable 
and interdependent unit in which one element is absolutely necessary for the 
articulation of the other.”263 
When seen in this manner, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a position of global 
constitutionalism as either hierarchical or cosmopolitan, unitary or pluralist, societal or state-
based.  Instead of being seen as a specific product on one particular side of these, and other, 
divisions, global constitutionalism becomes a description of the tension itself.  From this 
position, global constitutionalism does not equate to the promotion of a singular ‘world state’, 
though that is one possible conception.  Likewise, the term does not automatically signify a 
project of utopian cosmopolitanism, though such a conception is also possible.  It is neither 
inherently hierarchical nor egalitarian, though both extremes fall within its purview. 
 Instead of being a specific product or outcome of these seemingly synthetic 
categorisations, global constitutionalism can be seen as referring to the underlying process 
which gives rise to such a diverse range of possibilities.  That is, in its most fundamental 
form, global constitutionalism can be seen as nothing more than a description of the operation 
of the constitutional process at a global level.  In other words, it is an investigation into the 
identification, enumeration, implementation and enforcement of norms within the 
international sphere.264  When seen in such a way, discussions about the hierarchical nature 
of the international system, for example, are not debating the existence of a global 
constitution, merely investigating what form it takes.  Likewise, conclusions about the unitary 
or fragmented nature of international law do not prove or disprove global constitutionalism, 
they only reveal its current composition.  If, however, global constitutionalism is simply an 
account of the constitutional process at an international level, questions still remain as to 
262 Bleiker, R., ‘Order and Disorder in World Politics’, in Bellamy, A. J., (ed.), International Society and its 
Critics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), (henceforth, International Society), p. 188. 
263 Ibid., pp. 188-9. 
264 See supra, Chapter 3. 
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what form this process currently takes, who operates this process and how they do so.  It is 
this line of enquiry that shall now be addressed. 
 
4.3  International Society 
 If, as discussed above, global constitutionalism can be seen as referring to the 
operation of the constitutional process at the global level, what does such operation look like?  
As has been mentioned, there are certain difficulties inherent in any attempt to restrict the 
answer to an exclusive description of either a singular, hierarchical model of a particular form 
of government or of a more anarchic, cosmopolitan and egalitarian worldview.  It is perhaps 
more useful, therefore, to focus on the tension between these competing ideas. 
 Nevertheless, traditional approaches to understanding international relations have 
tended to focus on one or other of these extremes.  On the one hand, for example, is “[t]he 
conventional view [which] holds that in the period since 1648 European, and subsequently 
world, politics can be characterized as an anarchical system comprising the interactions of 
like units (states)”.265  Conversely, there is also a claim that there are “at least two well-
established schools that examine various forms of hierarchy”.266  As has been suggested, 
however, an examination of global constitutionalism does not seem to necessitate a tendency 
in favour of either one of these positions.  On the contrary, the nature of global 
constitutionalism would seem to support a view that this particular dichotomy is “a 
conceptual error that significantly impedes understanding the nature of international 
inequalities.”267 
 It would appear, then, that an attempt to examine the constitution of the contemporary 
international system cannot assume either hierarchical or anarchical relationships as a 
predetermined starting point.  As an alternative, it is perhaps useful to consider the contention 
that “these categories are not watertight, with an abrupt transition from one to another.  The 
range of states systems is rather a continuum, like wavelengths of light in a rainbow, which 
265 Hobson, J. M., and Sharman, J. C., ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social 
Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change’, (2005) 11(1) European Journal of International Relations 63, pp. 63-
64. 
266 These being the ‘hegemonic stability school’ and the ‘preponderance of power school’.  Kang, D. C., 
‘Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations’, (2003/4) 28(3) International 
Security 165, p. 169. 
267 Donnelly, J., ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International Society’, 
(2006) 12(2) European Journal of International Relations 139, p. 141. 
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we find it convenient to divide into different colours.”268  Viewing these categorisations 
simply as different points along a continuous spectrum highlights the possibility that, 
between the two extremes, “states [can] form an international society shaped by ideas, values, 
identities, and norms that are - to a greater or lesser extent - common to all.”269  This view of 
an ‘international society’ would seem to incorporate both hierarchical and anarchical views, 
at least to some degree.  For instance, there is an acknowledgement that there are interactions 
between states that are often unequal and prevent the system from being truly anarchical.  At 
the same time, however, there is a recognition of states as independent entities, thereby 
rejecting the model of a singular, monolithic hierarchy.  Consequently, there is an acceptance 
that whilst hierarchy is not “incompatible with an anarchical society ... [w]hat would be 
incompatible with international society is any unchecked primacy.”270 
 It is through this theory of international society that the underlying concerns of global 
constitutionalism can be more easily revealed.  This can be attributed, at least in part, to the 
rejection of “an assumed preeminence [sic] of state actors over international structures”.271  
Viewing a global constitution as an ‘international structure’ that can exist independently of 
the will or behaviour of specific states facilitates an investigation into the operation of this 
global constitutional process.  This is because, in an international society, concerns such as 
the hierarchical or anarchical nature of the international system, or the unitary or fragmentary 
nature of international law, cease to be seen as preeminent and foundational issues.  Instead, 
these issues, and others like them, can be seen as being consequent upon, rather than 
determinative of, the nature of the global constitution.  Through a viewpoint based on the 
idea of an international society, each one of these issues can be seen as being dependent on 
the constitutionalisation of pre-existing ‘ideas, values, identities and norms’ rather than 
encapsulating the entirety of global constitutionalism in and of themselves.  That is, they 
must first pass through the process of the constitution before they can be considered as 
fundamental to the conduct of international society. 
 This is not to say, however, that theories of international society are entirely without 
their own problems, nor should they be accepted uncritically.  To that end, certain claims of 
such theories must be more closely examined, at least to the extent that they can be 
268 Watson, A., ‘Systems of States’, (1990) 16(2) Review of International Studies 99, p. 104. 
269 Bellamy, A. J., ‘Introduction: International Society and the English School’, in International Society, p. 2. 
270 Clark, I., ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?’, (2009) 23 International Relations 464, p. 476. 
271 Christov, T., ‘Liberal Internationalism Revisited: Grotius, Vattel, and the International Order of States’, 
(2005) 10(6) The European Legacy 561, p. 572. 
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interpreted as claims regarding who operates the constitutional process at the global level and 
how they go about doing so.  In particular, it must be noted that “the idea of an international 
society has traditionally presupposed the existence of states that share common interests and 
values”.272  In other words, having divorced global constitutionalism from the primacy of 
state actors, it can then be claimed that “it is states themselves that are the principal 
institutions of the society of states.”273  In order to clarify this matter, a distinction must be 
made that, whilst subtle, is not entirely circular.  Specifically, it can be argued that although a 
global constitution can legitimately be seen as an entity in itself, independent of sovereign 
states, it can also be simultaneously agreed that such a constitution is, in fact, operated by 
state actors and, as a result, their pre-eminence is retained.  Whilst the nature and existence of 
the state is accepted and retained within this theory, therefore, it is not pre-supposed as either 
a necessary requirement or inevitable consequence of the operation of a global constitutional 
process. 
 This primacy of the state is not unique to theories of international society.  Indeed, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, it was considered, at least by some theorists, that “a 
necessary precondition of international law ... [was] that there exist independent States of 
approximately equal power that owing to common culture and interests engage in frequent 
contacts on a secular basis.”274  Even earlier, and perhaps more famously, Emerich de Vattel 
suggested that “[o]f all the rights possessed by a Nation that of sovereignty is doubtless the 
most important, and the one which others should most carefully respect”.275  To the extent, 
then, that the very existence of multiple, independent states is conceptually dependent upon a 
system of exclusive territorial sovereignty, this notion of sovereignty could be considered to 
be a foundational principle of international society.  This is because its maintenance would be 
essential to the continuing operation of the constitutional process as an institution of that 
society as it currently stands. 
 At this point, then, it can be said that the current operation of a global constitutional 
process is founded upon the idea of an international society of sovereign states.  
272 Little, p. 269. 
273 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (4th edn.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), p. 68. 
274 Koskenniemi, M., The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), (henceforth, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations), p. 102.  In this 
regard, Koskenniemi is specifically discussing the work of Franz von Liszt in Das Völkerrecht Systematisch 
dargestellt, (5th edn.), (Berlin: Häring, 1907), pp. 15-38. 
275 de Vattel, E., (trans. Fenwick, C. G.), The Law of Nations or The Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the 
Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, (Washington, USA: Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, 1916), Vol. III, p. 131, or Book II, Ch. IV, para. 54. 
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Consequently, it now becomes necessary to more fully examine this idea of sovereignty in 
order to attempt an assessment of the way, or ways, in which it relates to this global 
constitutional process.  Primarily, the underlying aim of such an examination is to more 
thoroughly consider whether or not values of sovereignty are indeed maintained throughout 
the operation of such a process.  In particular, the question arises as to whether or not this 
concept of sovereignty is a constitutionalised product of a particular process operating at a 
global level, or whether it is in fact a fundamental principle on which such a process depends.  
In other words, a brief consideration of whether or not, and in what ways, exclusive territorial 
sovereignty has been enforced, implemented, enumerated and identified may prove beneficial 
to an attempt to determine the underlying values being applied to the constitutional process in 
a global arena. 
 
4.4  Sovereignty as a Constitutional Value 
 When one considers the relationship between exclusive territorial sovereignty and the 
constitutional process, even a cursory examination of the available evidence would seem to 
indicate that it is a principle that is, at best, only intermittently enforced.  For instance, the 
1978 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam was generally opposed “[f]or the sake of ideals 
emanating from a fundamental concern with protecting state sovereignty”.276  In contrast, 
however, when the United Nations Security Council was debating intervention in Libya in 
2011, “no state chose to vote against the resolution authorizing military intervention in the 
affairs of a non-consenting sovereign state.”277  Whilst the timings of these examples might 
be indicative of an ongoing trend within the international system, this would be a trend 
towards enforcing sovereignty less, not more.  Furthermore, this potential trend would seem 
to be belied by the debates over Syria in 2013, during which the Security Council chose to 
reaffirm “its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
the Syrian Arab Republic.”278 
 Insomuch as it is still invoked as a concept worth protecting, it might be argued that 
the idea of exclusive territorial sovereignty still retains some level of significance within the 
276 Narine, S., ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Question of Sovereignty: The Case of ASEAN’, (2005) 4(3/4) 
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 465, p. 477. 
277 Glanville, L., ‘Intervention in Libya: From Sovereign Consent to Regional Consent’, (2013) 14 International 
Studies Perspectives 325, p. 335. 
278 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013), S/RES/2118 (2013), (27/09/2013), Preamble. 
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international sphere.  Having such an intermittent level of enforcement, however, would seem 
to indicate that, in and of itself, this principle does not exist as a fundamental value that 
shapes the entire domain of international interaction.  Nevertheless, the question remains as 
to whether or not there is an underlying value that can be seen as determining when such 
enforcement might or might not occur.   One natural explanation might be that it is only 
enforced to the extent that it has already been implemented.  Consequently, this examination 
must regress a step further into the constitutional process and consider the level of 
international implementation of exclusive territorial sovereignty. 
 Upon doing so, it can be seen that this concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty has 
been accepted, at least in rhetoric if not in practice, almost universally.  Indeed, as stated 
earlier, an understanding of international politics being constructed around a system of 
sovereign states, whether anarchic or not, has often formed a core part, or even core 
assumption, of many theories of international relations.279  As a purely factual observation 
this position would seem fairly accurate since, with a few possible exceptions, a large 
proportion of the surface of the earth has been politically divided into areas that fall under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a single sovereign state.280  This observation, however, presents a 
constitutional dilemma as the near-universal implementation of the principle of exclusive 
territorial sovereignty would appear to be at odds with an apparently selective and partial 
level of enforcement.  This partial enforcement, therefore, cannot be said to derive from 
equally partial implementation.  As a result, the next question is whether or not it is a 
principle that has been enumerated in such a way as to allow for selective enforcement, if 
indeed it has been specifically enumerated at all. 
 If, as was discussed in the earlier historical analysis, a system of exclusive territorial 
sovereignty can be derived from the Peace of Westphalia, then it might be expected that an 
appropriate enumeration of this idea could be found therein.  Indeed, it has been suggested 
that this peace 
279 There are numerous examples of this being either directly stated or simply assumed.  Some of the most well-
known include Morgenthau, H. J., Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and peace, (7th edn.), 
(Boston, USA: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006); Waltz, K. N., Theory of International Politics, (London: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979) and Wendt, A., ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the social construction of power 
politics’, (1992) 46(2) International Organization 391. 
280 Potential exceptions include those areas deemed to be “the common heritage of mankind” (see, for example, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10/12/1982), United Nations Treaty Series I-31363, Art. 
136 and 137) and areas subject to a special regime of condominium (see Brownlie, I., Principles of Public 
International Law, (6th edn.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 113). 
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“marked man's abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical structure of 
society and his option for a new system characterized by the coexistence of 
a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one 
another, and free from any external earthly authority.”281 
A point that has already been made, however, is that this system was only applied within the 
confines of Europe.  Furthermore, the significance of the actual treaties of Westphalia for the 
development of this system is somewhat disputable.282  Consequently, an appropriate source 
for a possible enumeration of the concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty, at least as it 
applies to those territories outside Europe, must be sought elsewhere. 
 In attempting to discover a source for such enumeration, an appropriate line of 
enquiry has already been revealed.  This relates to the historical observation that the 
Westphalian system was both European and co-existent with a system of intercontinental 
hierarchy.  Thus, any near-universal system currently in operation has been developed after 
the Peace of Westphalia in the mid-seventeenth century.  Furthermore, if one accepts the 
suggestion that a system of exclusive territorial sovereignty has indeed been implemented 
almost universally, there is a natural question as to what became of the intercontinental 
hierarchy that co-existed with the European anarchy represented by Westphalia. 
 There are, arguably, some ways in which it could be said that remnants of this 
hierarchical system still exist and continue to influence the operation of the international 
system to a greater or lesser extent.283  As an officially recognised method of conducting the 
overtly political aspects of international affairs, however, the political discussions 
surrounding issues of enforcement would seem to suggest that notions of formalised 
hierarchy have been replaced by official adherence to a particular concept of sovereignty.284  
To uncover a possible enumeration of this concept, then, the question must be asked as to 
when this particular transition took place. 
 Such a transition, however, has been relatively recent.  It can be considered, for 
instance, that “the nineteenth century had closed with imperial domination, methodological 
281 Gross, L., ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948’, (1948) 42(1) American Journal of International Law 20, pp. 
28-9. 
282 See, for example, Glanville, L., ‘The Myth of “Traditional” Sovereignty’, (2013) 57 International Studies 
Quarterly 79 and Stirk, P. M. R., ‘The Westphalian model and sovereign equality’, (2012) 38 Review of 
International Studies 641. 
283 For example, see supra, fn. 239. 
284 For example, see supra, fn. 278. 
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enslavement of populations, and war.”285  The universality of exclusive territorial sovereignty 
can, in fact, be considered not to have taken shape until the hierarchies of this ‘imperial 
domination’ began to break down.  Indeed, it can be argued that 
“[d]ecolonization effectively universalized the European State as the only 
form of government that would provide equal status in the organized 
international community ... it had thoroughly integrated Western ideas about 
the State form as the only viable shell within which to develop into 
modernity.”286 
This connection can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that “[t]he prewar framework of 
international law and legitimacy drew a sharp distinction between Europeans … and non-
Europeans: only the former were unquestionably entitled to sovereign statehood.”287  In this 
way, a noticeable link can be established between decolonization and the near-
universalization of the previously European concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty 
expressed in the form of statehood. 
 The process of decolonization, however, was not a singular event that occurred 
simultaneously in all parts of the world.  Events as divergent as the independence of Brazil in 
1822 and that of East Timor in 2002, as well as a host of others before, after and between, can 
all be considered as examples of decolonization.  Consequently, in order to uncover a specific 
enumeration of the concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty that accounts for a near-
universal implementation of this principle, it becomes necessary to consider what, if 
anything, might unify such a great variety of attempts at decolonisation. 
 Whilst it may not always have been expressed in such terms, this commonality is 
often drawn from the language of self-determination.  That is, notwithstanding complexities 
surrounding distinctions between ‘indigenous’ and ‘national’,288 this process of 
decolonization can be connected to dialogues of national self-determination.  It was arguably 
this “distinctive norm of self-determination that propelled decolonization in the 1950s and 
285 The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, p. 98.  This is given as an observation by Enrico Catellani in ‘Le droit 
international au commencement du XXe siècle’, (1901) VIII Revue générale de droit international public at p. 
585. 
286 The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, p. 175. 
287 Jackson, R. H., Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), (henceforth, Jackson), p. 16. 
288 See, for example, Perrin, C., ‘Approaching Anxiety: The Insistence of the Postcolonial in the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, in Laws of the Postcolonial, p. 19, particularly at pp. 20-21. 
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1960s”289 and, whilst not necessarily originating with these developments, this “idea of self-
determination underpinned by international law was enshrined in the charter of the United 
Nations”.290  In the search for an enumeration of the principle of exclusive territorial 
sovereignty, therefore, it is possible that one might be found within the charter of the United 
Nations (UN). 
 The UN Charter, however, is not considered because it possesses constitutional 
significance in and of itself, as that is a different debate.291  Nevertheless, it can be seen as a 
document which lays out what its members consider to be important foundations for the 
operation of the international community in which they participate.  These foundations are 
directly expressed in Chapter I of the Charter, which states the purposes the UN desires to 
achieve and the principles on which the organisation is based.  To the extent, then, that ideas 
of self-determination and exclusive territorial sovereignty can be found therein, this may be 
considered as a suitable enumeration of the principles that have been examined thus far. 
 Upon examining Chapter I of the UN Charter, however, a number of conceptual 
distinctions are brought to light that are not immediately apparent from an investigation into 
the enforcement or implementation of the idea of exclusive territorial sovereignty.  To begin 
with, a brief survey of the extent of implementation that this concept has received revealed a 
connection, at least at the theoretical level, between exclusive territorial sovereignty and 
national self-determination.  The UN Charter, however, states that “The Purposes of the 
United Nations are ... [inter alia, t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.292  In this way, 
the concept of self-determination is not linked to sovereignty, but rather to pursuing peaceful 
and friendly diplomatic relations.  Thus, while the near-universal implementation of 
exclusive territorial sovereignty may have derived a great deal of political impetus from 
dialogues of national self-determination, this would not seem to be a principle on which the 
idea itself is grounded. 
 This marking of a distinction between sovereignty and self-determination is only 
exacerbated once it is noted that “[t]he new doctrine [of sovereignty] explicitly denies self-
289 Scott, D., ‘Norms of Self-Determination: Thinking Sovereignty Through’, (2012) 4 Middle East Law and 
Governance 195, p. 202.  Emphasis in original. 
290 Deng, F. M., Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa, (Washington, USA: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2008), pp. 46-47. 
291 See, for example, Fassbender. 
292 Charter of the United Nations, 26/6/1945, (UN Charter), Art. 1 and 1(2). 
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determination to ethnonationalities since if it were granted most existing ex-colonial states 
would be broken up”.293  Furthermore, the UN Charter goes on to state that the United 
Nations “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”294 and 
requires that these members “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.295  Thus, whilst 
the Charter purports to uphold them all, it specifically distinguishes between the concepts of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.  At the same time, while 
explicitly embracing ‘sovereign equality’, the Charter refuses to “authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state”,296 thereby implying a distinction between sovereignty, which is to be held equally by 
all members, and domestic jurisdiction, which is not to be interfered with. 
 The idea of exclusive territorial sovereignty, therefore, is one whose direct and 
specific enumeration appears to be lacking in the Charter of the United Nations.  Indeed, 
sovereignty is differentiated from territorial, even domestic, jurisdiction and a connection is 
made instead between sovereignty and equality.  This apparent absence of enumeration, as 
well as the somewhat intermittent level of enforcement, would seem to indicate that the 
concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty cannot be seen as a constitutional element of the 
international community.  A less restrictive concept of sovereignty, however, would seem to 
remain a contender as it is one which all members of the United Nations purport to both 
possess and uphold. 
 In particular, abandoning the adjectives of ‘exclusive’ and ‘territorial’ allows for a 
broader conception of sovereignty that is neither distinctly monolithic nor explicitly 
hierarchical.  It is this broader conceptualisation of sovereignty that allows for the 
development of circumstances in which, “[i]nstead of being a threat to sovereignty and 
perhaps even statehood, political weakness and economic underdevelopment are now 
considered reasons for exemption from the more strenuous classical international competition 
between states.”297  Through this departure from a monolithic, present-or-absent 
293 Jackson, p. 78. 
294 UN Charter, Art. 2(1). 
295 Ibid., Art. 2(4). 
296 Ibid., Art. 2(7). 
297 Jackson, p. 24. 
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understanding of sovereignty, it becomes possible to recognise that entities may “possess 
juridical statehood while as yet disclosing little evidence of empirical statehood.”298 
 In attempting to establish what values this broader understanding of sovereignty is 
intended to embody, however, it becomes necessary to examine the identificatory stage of the 
constitutional process.  In this instance, however, the mere act of identification is less 
revealing than an examination of who can be seen as having completed this stage of the 
process.  As the UN Charter is, technically, a treaty between independent States, it can be 
seen as having derived from the negotiations that were conducted prior to the formulation and 
creation of the Charter itself.  Those who conducted these negotiations were, to all intents and 
purposes, representatives of sovereign States.  In this way, sovereignty can be seen as a 
precursor to the operation of the constitutional process at an international level as it is a value 
which is used to determine who operates the process, rather than being a value that is 
somehow incorporated into the operation of that process.  Consequently, it is possible to 
suggest that, insofar as it precedes the operation of a global constitutional process, the 
concept of sovereignty forms one of the founding principles of such a process. 
 This centrality of sovereignty to the international community is highlighted yet further 
when one revisits the content of the UN Charter.  In particular, as was mentioned above, it 
centres the UN “on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”299  
Significantly, however, the sovereignty that forms this foundational principle is not the 
sovereignty of political independence and autonomy, as that is enumerated separately.300  
Likewise, it is not the sovereignty of supremacy, authority and control, as that is also to be 
protected as a distinct concept.301  It cannot be a vague notion of sovereignty that is restricted 
to cross-border interactions, as such sovereignty would of necessity create interdependence 
between states, thereby negating a commitment to non-interference.302  Finally, it is also not 
recognised as a formalised, monolithic entity that is either present or absent, as this would 
construct the phrase ‘sovereign equality’ as a meaningless tautology.303  Instead, this 
combination suggests that the sovereignty that forms a foundational element of the 
298 Ibid., p. 25. 
299 UN Charter, Art. 2(1). 
300 Ibid., Art. 2(4). 
301 Ibid., Art. 2(7). 
302 Ibid. 
303 These forms of sovereignty can be related, respectively, to the models of Westphalian sovereignty, domestic 
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty and international legal sovereignty as presented by Stephen Krasner in 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999) at pp. 3-4. 
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international community can be seen as a principle that is desired in tandem with equality and 
is not inherently indicative of it. 
 It can be argued, therefore, that this foundational form of sovereignty is neither the 
sovereignty of autonomy nor that of authority.  It is, rather, the sovereignty of autarchy, of 
self-government.  Despite the close similarities, however, to describe sovereignty as autarchy 
is not coterminous with its description as relating to political independence, legal supremacy 
or any of the other factors that have already been discussed.  Instead, these factors can be 
seen as natural, if not necessary, outworkings of the theoretical contradictions inherent in the 
communal autarchy that is statehood.  If, then, each separate and distinct autarchic 
community, also known as states, are seen as sovereign, this concept of sovereignty can itself 
be seen as nothing other than the freedom of these units to act as they see fit.  To put it 
another way, sovereignty at the international level can be seen as synonymous with liberty at 
a domestic level.  Insofar as it is founded upon ideals of ‘sovereign equality’, therefore, the 
international community which has formed, and formed around, the UN system can be seen 
as having two foundational principles - liberty and equality.  This is, however, the liberty and 
equality of the autarchic units that comprise that system, not that of the individuals within 
such communities.  The implications arising from this particular insight shall be investigated 
further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Global Human Rights 
 
 In the previous chapter, theories of international society were adopted in order to 
better comprehend the distinction between hierarchical and anarchical interpretations of a 
global constitution.  As was discussed, this particular school of thought encourages 
perception of the global constitution as a process that exists independently of sovereign states 
and yet is also operated by them.  This relationship of sovereign states to the constitutional 
process highlights the importance of sovereignty as a foundational value upon which the 
contemporary operation of the global constitutional process currently depends.  This 
particular concept of sovereignty was then related to individual liberty at the national level.  
Consequently, to the extent that the international states system is operated on the basis of the 
sovereign equality of its members, it can be seen as a system that is founded on ideals of 
liberty and equality.  It can be described, therefore, as a system of liberal constitutionalism. 
 As has been examined, however, liberal constitutionalism is frequently made manifest 
through concepts such as democracy, the separation of powers and the rule of law.  In 
particular, it was suggested that this form of liberal constitutionalism necessitates the 
development of an intra-constitutional view of rights that is integral to the operation of the 
entire constitutional process.304  As a result, any attempt to apply such a perspective to the 
international system creates a number of difficulties that ought to be addressed.  These 
difficulties are principally centred around the observation that “modern democratic theory is 
incompatible with robust global governance.”305  In other words, the manifestations of liberal 
constitutionalism within the state do not appear to be evident, or perhaps are not even 
possible, at the global level. 
 One potential explanation for this apparent disparity could be the somewhat simplistic 
response that it is actually erroneous to talk of global constitutionalism at all, at least in the 
form of global liberal constitutionalism.  The conclusions of the previous chapter, however, 
304 See supra, Chapter 3. 
305 Goodhart, M., and Taninchev, S. B., ‘The New Sovereigntist Challenge for Global Governance: Democracy 
without Sovereignty’, (2011) 55 International Studies Quarterly 1047, p. 1048.  Emphasis removed. 
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would seem to suggest that this is not the case.306  Instead of this, it is possible that the 
introduction of the ‘global’ element creates radically different factors that cause the same 
underlying values and principles to be made manifest in very different ways.  The primary 
difference in this regard relates to the observation that was made at the end of the previous 
chapter.  This is the contention that the global constitutional process is founded on the liberty 
and equality of states and not that of individuals.  Consequently, it becomes necessary to 
further examine the nature of the existing global constitutional process in order to more fully 
assess if and how such a process is operated. 
 Nevertheless, having examined the details of a global constitutional process, there 
remain questions as to the ways in which this process interacts with concepts of rights.  As 
stated above, it has previously been concluded that liberal constitutionalism results in the 
integration of rights into the operation of the constitutional process.307  If the global 
constitutional process does indeed follow principles of liberal constitutionalism, it might be 
expected that such integration also takes place at the global level.  It is in examining the 
possible development of such integration, however, that two particular possibilities come to 
light.  These are the development of a stronger separation of powers within a state-centred 
global constitution or a decline in the state-centred nature of the global constitutional process.  
It is these possibilities that the following discussion proceeds to consider.  
 
5.1  State-Centred Global Constitutionalism 
 At the end of the previous chapter, it was concluded that the contemporary global 
constitutional process is founded upon ideals of the liberty and equality of the autarchic 
communities that are states.308  On this basis, it could reasonably be expected that certain 
expressions of liberal constitutionalism would be visible within the international realm.  
However, it has been argued that “it is neither plausible nor adequate to apply theories of 
democracy, legitimation, and self-legislation which were designed against the backdrop of 
the nation State constellation par for par to structures, institutions, and processes of global 
governance.”309  The possibility must be considered, therefore, that the introduction of a 
global element to theories of constitutionalism has an effect so significant as to render 
306 See supra, Chapter 4. 
307 See supra, Chapter 3. 
308 See supra, Chapter 4. 
309 Volk, C., ‘Why Global Constitutionalism Does not Live up to its Promises’, (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law 551, p. 564. 
                                                     
99 
 
ineffectual any attempt to formulate a transition of such concepts between the national and 
international spheres. 
 To a certain extent, such criticism appears reasonably justifiable.  There is no world 
government, much less one subject to a separation of powers, and there remains “no 
immediate prospect whatever of [global] federal union being carried out.”310  Furthermore, it 
can also be said that global political institutions such as the United Nations “Security Council 
cannot be subject to the rule of law in any meaningful way”.311  To critique the global 
constitutional process in such a way, however, is to forget that which has been established as 
being its contemporary subject.  To the extent that principles such as a separation of powers 
and the rule of law have been developed in the context of individual liberty and equality, they 
cannot be expected to be made manifest in the same way once transferred to a system that is 
based upon the liberty and equality of states.  Inasmuch as the global constitutional process is 
founded upon the liberty of states, therefore, it is state practices and state behaviours that 
must be considered.  A deficit of protection for individual liberty and equality cannot form a 
basis for legitimate criticism of this process so long as it is the society of states that forms its 
primary subject. 
 The question naturally arises, then, as to how the liberty of states can be seen to be 
made manifest in the operation of a global constitutional process, if at all.  The idea that 
states are generally free to act as they see fit is, however, clearly evident within much of 
international law.  For instance, the principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt 
embodies the notion that states cannot be bound by an international treaty without their 
consent.  Whilst there may well be exceptions to this, such as in response to the application of 
customary international law or as a result of erga omnes obligations, the initial presumption 
is one in favour of a state’s sovereignty.312  States are presumed to have the legal freedom to 
act as they see fit unless other principles can be shown to take effect.  The international legal 
system can therefore be described as being based upon a presumption in favour of the 
negative liberty of states.  This position was declared clearly in the Lotus case, where the 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated that “[i]nternational law governs relations 
between independent States.  The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from 
310 Ewing, A. C., The Individual, The State and World Government, (New York, USA: Macmillan, 1947), 
(henceforth, Ewing), p. 277. 
311 Gray, C., ‘The Security Council and the Rule of Law: An Overview’ in Chesterman, S., et al, ‘The Security 
Council and the Rule of Law’, (2009) 103 American Society of International Law Proceedings 245, p. 246. 
312 For more detail on the pacta tertiis principle, see Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, (6th 
edn.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), (henceforth, Brownlie), p. 598. 
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their own free will ... Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be 
presumed.”313 
 An immediate critique of this position, however, stems from the same arguments as a 
general critique directed at much of international law.  This is the suggestion that 
international law, in its position as “a specific order or organization of power”,314 is 
somewhat lacking in coercive force.  There is, in fact, a “very wide discrepancy existing 
between the law as they [states] pronounce it to be and the reality of state practice.”315  
However, the relative efficacy of international law, or absence thereof, does not negate an 
argument that the international legal system is based upon the liberty of states.  In contrast, 
the contention that international law is weak and ineffective actually strengthens the 
suggestion that the global constitutional process prioritises the freedom of states to act as they 
see fit.  
 This particular criticism, however, does raise a further point that ought to be 
addressed.  Whilst it may well be conceded that the international society of states operates 
according to a constitutionalised precept regarding the liberty of its members, perhaps the 
same cannot be said for their equality.  After all, it could be argued that “[t]he history of the 
international system is a history of inequality par excellence. ... In their physical extent, 
population, natural resources, and geographic position, states are, as it were, born 
unequal”.316  This apparent inequality, however, is not restricted to the various resources 
states may have at their disposal.  A classic example of political inequality within the 
international system is often drawn from “[t]he Charter of the United Nations [which] confers 
upon five great powers the privilege of the so-called veto right”.317  This privileged position, 
however, coexists with the statement that the United Nations “is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members.”318  This apparent tension can be reconciled through 
recognising that the equality upon which the global constitutional process is based 
“is evidently not equality in the law, but equality before the law ... Equality 
before the law means that the law-applying organs, in applying the law, 
313 The Case of the S.S. “Lotus”, (1927) Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, No. 10, p. 18. 
314 Kelsen, H., (trans., Wedberg, A.), General Theory of Law and State, (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University 
Press, 1946), p. 121. 
315 Watson, J. S., ‘Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in 
International Law’, [1979] (3) University of Illinois Law Forum 609, p. 610. 
316 Tucker, R., The Inequality of Nations, (London: Martin Robertson, 1977), p. 3. 
317 Kelsen, H., Principles of International Law, (New York, USA: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952), 
(henceforth, Kelsen, International Law), p. 155. 
318 Charter of the United Nations, 26/6/1945, (henceforth, UN Charter), Art. 2(1). 
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must not make a difference which is not recognized by the law, that the law 
shall be applied as the law intends to be applied.  Equality before the law 
means application of the law in conformity with the law”.319 
It can be said, therefore, that the global constitutional process is founded upon a formalised, 
legal conception of equality.  Variations and disparities in the military, economic and cultural 
influence of states do not negate the recognition of an equalised distribution of formal legal 
liberty. 
 At this point, then, it can be determined that the global constitutional process is 
operated on the basis of the liberty and equality of states.  This state-centred approach, 
however, causes such principles to manifest themselves in ways which are distinct from their 
manifestations within individual-centred national constitutional processes.  Such distinctions, 
however, do not prohibit a conclusion that “[t]he sovereignty and equality of states represent 
the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations”.320  It has previously been concluded, 
however, that the acceptance of liberty and equality as basic norms leads to the integration of 
rights throughout the operation of the constitutional process.321  Whether or not such a 
proposition remains true within state-centred global constitutionalism is a possibility that 
must now be examined. 
 
5.2  Rights of States in the Global Constitution 
 It has been suggested that “just as within a nation the juridical and political equality of 
all citizens ... is the basis of a democratic order, so the equality of all nations ... [is] the only 
sound basis for an international order.”322  The question that now arises, however, relates to 
the political and legal consequences of such equality.  As was discussed above, the liberty 
and equality of states would seem to result in political and legal manifestations of these 
principles in ways that differ sharply from such manifestations at the national level.  The 
question must now be asked, therefore, as to whether or not the same differences appear 
regarding the integration of rights into the global constitution. 
319 Kelsen, International Law, p. 155. 
320 Brownlie, p. 287. 
321 See supra, Chapter 3. 
322 Poznanski, C., The Rights of Nations, (London: Routledge, 1942), p. 3. 
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 It was established earlier that a constitutional process founded on ideals of liberty and 
equality can result in the development of an intra-constitutional view of rights that integrates 
individual rights into the various stages of operation of the constitutional process.323  If such a 
proposition holds true, then it ought it to be expected that a process founded upon the liberty 
and equality of states would similarly integrate the rights of those states into its stages of 
operation.  This suggestion, however, is immediately confronted with a number of difficulties.  
In particular, there is the contention that sovereignty and equality 
“are moral or political principles, and not legal principles, and consequently 
cannot impose legal duties or confer legal rights upon men or states as long 
as these principles are not stipulated by legislation, custom, or treaties.  As 
legal principles they are not the source or basis of the legal order by which 
they are stipulated; on the contrary, the positive legal order is their basis or 
source.”324 
In other words, there is an argument that any rights of states that might exist within the 
international society of states are necessarily post-constitutional rights.  That is, they are 
consequent upon the global constitutional order rather than determinative of it. 
 At the national level, however, such a position has previously been identified as being 
unsustainable.325  This was attributed to the threat that such an arrangement poses to the 
separation of powers within a national government.  Post-constitutional rights, it was argued, 
grant an excess of power to those responsible for the identificatory stage of the constitutional 
process, as any rights that do exist can simply be altered or removed by the identification of 
alternative principles of government.  Within international society, however, there are 
significant difficulties in ascribing a clear separation of powers to a global governmental 
institution.  Instead, it is states themselves that can be seen as fulfilling the various functions 
of the global constitutional process. 
 This presence of states within all phases of the global constitutional process, and the 
attendant absence of a separation of powers, results in a view of state rights that differs 
significantly from the position of individual rights within national constitutions.  An initial 
consequence of this absence of a separation of powers is the absence of any counterpoint to a 
post-constitutional view of rights.  Whereas checks and balances within a national 
323 See supra, Chapter 3. 
324 Kelsen, International Law, p. 151. 
325 See supra, Chapter 3. 
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constitutional process are able to prevent the accumulation of power within any individual 
stage, such a possibility does not exist where there is no separation of powers.  Consequently, 
at the global level, it is those states which are most able to influence others regarding their 
identification of preliminary principles that have the power to determine what rights exist 
within the international states system.  As a result, the operation, and even existence, of the 
global constitutional process becomes dependent upon the power and influence of the states 
involved. 
 Because of this dependence on state power, the development and preservation of 
rights within international society is only sustainable as long as the states responsible for the 
identificatory phase can maintain order and stability, both internally within themselves and 
externally in regards to their privileged position within the global constitution.  As long as 
these ‘great powers’ are “exploiting their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree 
of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole”326 then the liberty and 
equality of states upon which the contemporary global constitution is founded are able to be 
preserved.  In contrast, however, should these states choose to direct international society 
away from liberty and equality and towards authority, ethnocentrism or some other principle, 
then there would be no possibility, legal or otherwise, of preventing such a move. 
 Whilst its continuation cannot therefore be presumed, a post-constitutional 
understanding of rights can be seen as a result of the absence of a separation of powers at the 
global level.  As was suggested earlier, this idea of a separation of powers can be seen simply 
as a manifestation of the desire to protect a constitutional focus on liberty.  Within 
international society, however, the need for such protection is often considered unnecessary 
due to the adoption of a position that sees liberty, in the form of state sovereignty, as a pre-
constitutional right.  That is, whilst all other rights of states can be seen as being post-
constitutional, “[s]overeignty in this sense is not the right of a state, for it is a condition under 
which a community is a state and has the rights of a state under international law.”327  In 
other words, as long as the very nature of statehood is seen as imbuing an autarchic 
community with liberty as sovereignty, there is not seen to be any need for a global 
separation of powers that would preserve such sovereignty.  The absence of this separation of 
powers then creates the circumstances by which all other rights of states are seen as being 
post-constitutional.  The very existence of such rights is, consequently, subjected to the 
326 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (4th edn.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), (henceforth, The Anarchical Society), p. 200. 
327 Kelsen, International Law, p. 157. 
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vagaries of international politics and the potentially conflicting desires of powerful states.  As 
a result, the foundational principle of liberty is itself left vulnerable to disruption and 
abandonment, thereby disproving the original assumption that sovereignty is a pre-
constitutional right, an automatic inheritance of the quality of statehood.  States seeking to 
preserve their liberty, therefore, cannot and should not insist on a pre-constitutional ‘right’ to 
sovereignty. 
 In order to preserve their own liberty, then, states are left with three distinct 
opportunities.  Firstly, there is the possibility of viewing all rights of states, including a right 
to sovereignty, as being extra-constitutional.  If, however, state rights are seen as being 
disconnected from processes of global constitutionalism, or potentially non-existent, then this 
leaves the equality of international society in a particularly vulnerable position as weaker 
states have no basis on which to challenge the demands of more powerful states.  
Accordingly, in order to preserve both the liberty and equality, or the sovereign equality, of 
states, an intra-constitutional view of rights must be adopted.  Following the reasoning 
already outlined, a desire to protect the liberty of states, and the intra-constitutional rights it 
implies, would appear to leave open only two options.  The first of these possibilities would 
be to introduce a separation of powers at the global level, thereby reducing the influence of 
states conducting the identificatory phase of the constitutional process.  The alternative would 
be to allow for a decline in the role of the state.  If it is the state-centred nature of global 
constitutionalism that is threatening the preservation of state sovereignty, then perhaps a 
smaller role for the state within the global constitutional process would actually help preserve 
its liberty.  It is these two possibilities that shall now be considered. 
 
5.3  Global Separation of Powers 
 In a like manner to developments at a national level, a global separation of powers 
provides a potential solution to the question of who is to operate the constitutional process.  
Whilst, as already suggested, it is states that are responsible for operating the global 
constitutional process, there does not currently appear to be any distinction between different 
phases of this process.  Thus, states that are able to identify peremptory norms are also able to 
take responsibility for their enumeration, implementation and enforcement.  As a 
consequence, the existence or otherwise of such norms, or even much of general international 
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law, is not a question of constitutionality but rather a question of power.  A global separation 
of powers challenges this reality. 
 Such a proposition, however, is not synonymous with the introduction of a global 
government.  Instead, it refers to the possibility of retaining the role of the state within the 
global constitutional process and yet simultaneously withdrawing from a situation in which 
all states are responsible for all phases of the process at all times.  In some ways, it is 
connected to theories regarding the balance of power, although 
“[m]ost discussions of balance of power in international affairs focus on 
states balancing each other in order to protect their interests.  A balance of 
power, however, can also function in a constitutional way when it prevents 
any one actor from being more powerful than any other.”328 
In order to achieve this, polycentric legal and political systems are developed that overlap and 
compete, thereby preventing any single system, or any single state, from achieving overall 
control.  It is centred on an understanding that, “in an increasingly interdependent world, 
different legal orders will have to try to accommodate each other’s jurisdictional claims.”329  
In this way, power becomes dispersed and the influence of both systems and states is 
restrained by the conflicting and competing influence of other systems and states. 
 In certain areas, the beginnings of a transition towards such a situation can potentially 
be identified.  It has been observed, for example, that 
“[a]t present we are living through a curious combination of the technology 
of the late twentieth century, the free trade of the nineteenth, and the rebirth 
of the sort of interstitial centres characteristic of world trade in the Middle 
Ages.  City states like Hong Kong and Singapore revive, extraterritorial 
'industrial zones' multiply inside technically sovereign nation-states like 
Hanseatic Steelyards, and so do offshore tax-havens in otherwise valueless 
islands”.330 
328 Lang Jr., A., ‘Global Constitutionalism as a Middle-Ground Ethic’, in Navari, C., (ed.), Ethical Reasoning in 
International Affairs: Arguments from the Middle Ground, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 108. 
329 Cohen, J. L., Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), (henceforth, Cohen), p. 75. 
330 Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: programme, myth, reality, (2nd edn.), (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 182. 
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This ‘curious combination’ has led some to suggest “that the states system may be giving 
place to a secular reincarnation of the system of overlapping or segmented authority that 
characterised mediaeval Christendom”.331 
 At first, it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive to suggest that this polycentric and 
neomedieval approach may help preserve the sovereignty of the state.  Indeed, it is possible 
to suggest that it is because of these ideas that “the very notion of the ‘public interest’ and the 
viability of the national state as a form of political community are being questioned.”332  
What this approach challenges, however, is not the sovereignty of the state per se.  Rather, 
the challenge is issued to the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the state.  It is centred around 
the possibility that “the idea of geography as a basis for the organization of politics and 
economics may be losing meaning.”333  However, when sovereignty is understood as the 
liberty of the autarchic communities that we call states, upon which the global constitutional 
process is founded, it is not directly threatened. 
 In fact, as mentioned above, sovereignty-as-liberty can actually be preserved and 
maintained through the development of polycentric international legal and political systems.  
This is because such systems begin to occupy the same role that is fulfilled by a separation of 
powers at the national level.  Due to a retention of a focus on the state, however, the 
comparison is not exact.  Within such an environment, for example, states retain the ability to 
participate in multiple phases of the constitutional process.  Nevertheless, the competition 
between legal and political systems that is introduced by such polycentricity prevents the 
dominance of any single vision for the overall society in an analogous manner to that 
achieved by a strict separation of powers at the national level.  For instance, the European 
Court of Justice has been able to indirectly balance the supremacy of the United Nations 
Security Council, noting that 
“the Courts of the European Union must, in accordance with the powers 
conferred on them by the Treaties, ensure the review ... of such measures as 
331 The Anarchical Society, p. 254. 
332 Cerny, P. G., ‘Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: Globalisation as Durable 
Disorder’, (1998) 1(1) Civil Wars 36, p. 37. 
333 Kobrin, S. J., ‘Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy’, (1998) 
51(2) Journal of International Affairs 361, p. 369. 
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are designed to give effect to resolutions adopted by the Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”.334 
In a similar manner, there is an increasing level of direct interaction between the different 
international legal regimes of Europe, with decisions of the European Union becoming 
subject to review by the European Court of Human Rights.335 
 At this point, the argument could be raised that the maintenance and preservation of 
this polycentric society necessitates the inevitable development of a global state - a centre to 
run all centres.  This is particularly the case from a perspective which considers that “[f]ormal 
legal rules should be devised to regulate these new practices and understandings of 
competences and jurisdiction.”336  The formal regulation of these potentially overlapping 
jurisdictions would seem to imply a need for a specific body to be invested with the 
competence to adjudicate any cross-jurisdictional conflicts, thus negating the polycentric 
nature of the system.  This would put these developments into the same category as other 
hierarchical and hegemonic conceptions of global constitutionalism. 
Conversely, however, such a progression would not be inevitable.  Hedley Bull is 
among those writers who have “denied that it was only the existence of central state power 
which could make possible the emergence of a society, or could prevent its collapse or 
disintegration; anarchy is compatible with society, because the state is not the only reason for 
obeying rules in society.”337  The management of this polycentricity would not be inherently 
dependent on the authority of a powerful super-state, rather it would depend on the will of 
independent states to freely and voluntarily associate themselves with the systems and 
institutions of the polycentric society. 
 Such a voluntary association, however, does necessitate a certain degree of 
maintenance.  To the extent that enforcement procedures comprise a distinct phase of the 
constitutional process, a system that makes no provision for such enforcement cannot rightly 
be called constitutional.  Consequently, a system whereby states are able to disassociate 
themselves at will in order to avoid enforcement-related sanctions and prohibitions is not a 
334 European Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, C-584/10 P, European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber), 18/7/2013, para. 97. 
335 See, for example, Craig, P., ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Competence, Procedure and Substance’, (2013) 36 
Fordham International Law Journal 1114; Eckes, C., ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and 
Adaptation’, (2013) 76(2) Modern Law Review 254. 
336 Cohen, p. 76. 
337 Hoffmann, S., ‘International Society’, in Miller, J. D. B., and Vincent, R. J., Order and Violence: Hedley 
Bull and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 23.  Emphasis in original. 
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constitutional system.  In order, therefore, for a polycentric society to maintain a certain 
degree of constitutionality, there must exist a mechanism of association and disassociation 
that acts independently from the regular enforcement mechanisms that occur within the 
society. 
This form of voluntary association can be said to occur when states come “to perceive 
common interests in a structure of coexistence and co-operation, and tacitly or explicitly to 
consent to common rules and institutions.”338  In this way, the preservation of liberal global 
constitutionalism through polycentric social systems is accompanied by an inherent level of 
tension as the dispersal of power brought about by increased polycentricity must be balanced 
by an acceptance of common rules and institutions.  To some extent, this position can be seen 
as a natural consequence of an analysis developed from theories of international society, as 
“the idea of an international society has traditionally presupposed the existence of states that 
share common interests and values and are willing to be bound by agreed rules and to operate 
on the basis of common institutions.”339 
 As has been stated, this apparent tension does not necessarily compel the development 
of a singular global state.  However, a willingness of states ‘to operate on the basis of 
common institutions’ would certainly imply that the potential for such a development does 
exist.  Within the contemporary international sphere, increasing polycentricity can be 
correlated with the development of the United Nations “as a single, universal international 
organisation, and thus as a symbol of a sense of common interests and values that underlies 
the discord of the present international system.”340  Whilst the United Nations has been 
criticised for representing “little more than good intentions”,341 it has also been suggested that, 
through it, “we have real international government”.342  Following the arguments that have 
been discussed, however, a desire to preserve liberal global constitutionalism through the 
operation of a polycentric system would seem to require the maintenance of the United 
Nations as an embodiment of common interests and values and yet simultaneously look to 
balance its direct legal and political influence through the operation of alternative 
mechanisms in these areas. 
338 Bull, H., ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, in Bull, H., and Watson, A., (eds.), The 
Expansion of International Society, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 120. 
339 Little, R., The Balance of Power in International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 269. 
340 The Anarchical Society, p. 250. 
341 Yunker, J. A., The Idea of World Government, (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), (henceforth, Yunker), p. 101. 
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Acknowledging this perspective, however, is not to deny that alternative routes to 
developing and preserving international polycentricity may yet exist.  Particularly from the 
point of view of physical security, it has been suggested that, “given the specter [sic] of a 
hierarchical world state, and the statelike architectures of the United Nations, the path to a 
[global] nuclear union of restraint is around, not through, the United Nations.”343  
Nevertheless, the very existence of the United Nations warrants a certain degree of 
consideration, if only as an attempt to analyse present realities rather than succumbing to the 
abstract conceptualisation of ideal theories.  As a consequence, an examination of 
contemporary global constitutionalism cannot evade consideration of the United Nations as 
an international organisation.  What must be considered, however, is the relative ability, or 
otherwise, of the organisation to establish and maintain common values and interests amongst 
its members whilst simultaneously refraining from the development of formal legal and 
enforcement-based cohesion.  With the United Nations possessing a near-global 
membership,344 it is reasonable to refer to such common values as being global norms. 
 At this point, then, it would seem that one mechanism by which the liberal character 
of the global constitutional process can be preserved is through a global separation of powers.  
However, this is not identical to a separation of powers at the national level and is instead 
centred on the development of a plurality of legal, political and social centres so that the 
whole society can be deemed to be polycentric.  Such polycentricity is in turn dependent on 
the maintenance of common values within and across the society.  This must be achieved, 
however, without negatively impacting on the preservation of the polycentricity itself.  
Consequently, whilst the United Nations can be considered as a symbol of global values, it is 
not its role as a political and legal centre that must be examined.  The aspect that must be 
assessed is, rather, its role in establishing, preserving and disseminating global norms. 
 
5.4  Individual Human Rights 
 When it comes to an assessment of the globally normative role of the United Nations, 
there initially appear to be a number of options that could be considered.  These norms relate 
to “what may be called the institutions of international society: the balance of power, 
343 Deudney, D. H., Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village, 
(Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 263. 
344 At the time of writing, there are 193 member states of the United Nations - see 
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international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of the great powers, and 
war.”345  All such institutions, however, presuppose a certain level of political and legal 
cohesion.  If the maintenance of a polycentric society is dependent on the continuation of 
normative conformity without legal unity, such institutions cannot form the basis for the 
normative order that underlies the society.  Requiring the participants in society to conform to 
specific legal and political institutions usurps the role of the polycentricity upon which the 
society is founded.  Consequently, the norms to which the members of society are asked to 
conform cannot be norms which directly affect the operation of relationships between 
members of that society.  As a result, the maintenance of cohesion within a polycentric 
society becomes dependent on the preservation of norms which directly relate to objects other 
than the society’s members.  These norms act independently of the relationships between 
members of the society, leaving such relationships to be regulated by the multiple, and 
competing, centres. 
 With this in mind, therefore, it can be said that attempting to preserve the sovereign 
equality of states by way of a global separation of powers leads to the development of a 
polycentric international society.  In turn, this polycentricity necessitates a shift in focus in 
the development of global norms.  This shift is one in which emphasis is transferred away 
from interstate behaviour, allowing this to be regulated by the polycentric nature of the 
society, and towards the interactions between states and non-state actors.  Within the context 
of the United Nations, the distinct set of norms that achieve this position can be said to be 
those which relate to its purpose “in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.346 
 Within contemporary international society, however, there are two alternative 
domains which could potentially fulfil this requirement at least as effectively, or potentially 
more so, than the field of human rights.  These concern the development of international 
trade, principally through the regulation of trans- and multi-national corporations, and 
protection of the physical environment.  Both the environment itself and international 
corporations are not participants within the international society of states and, therefore, 
regulation of these areas can potentially be seen as fulfilling the requirement of establishing 
norms which do not directly affect the relationships between states themselves. 
345 The Anarchical Society, p. 71. 
346 UN Charter, Art. 1(3). 
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 To focus initially on international trade, it does appear as though this could act as a 
suitable alternative to human rights regarding the maintenance of a polycentric international 
society.  In particular, it has been suggested that the World Trade Organisation (WTO) “helps 
promote a structure of limited government like that espoused in the U.S. Constitution because 
it replicates the idea of federalism on the international level.”347  This idea begins to gain 
strength once it is noted “that theoretically the WTO is fair and democratic indeed.  No 
agreement is settled without each member agreeing.  This seems to give even smaller and 
poorer countries a significant capability to have their say in the negotiations.”348  This 
apparent protection for the liberty and equality of states, combined with the promotion of 
controlled government, does give the impression that recognition of, and participation in, the 
WTO system of governance is as equally capable of maintaining a polycentric international 
society as participation within the United Nations’ human rights mechanisms. 
 When considered more closely, however, such a position becomes inherently 
problematic.  For example, it must be noted that, despite the apparent equality within the 
WTO, “a number of [other] organizations in the field of economic governance have 
developed weighted voting to account for the economic size and power of their members.”349  
Additionally, it can be also be said that from within the economic context there is currently “a 
trend in global governance away from formal institutional structures towards looser 
networks ... [which] allows states, primarily the powerful players, to remain in control of 
developments.”350  In essence, consideration must be given to the fact that states are 
themselves participants in the international economy, with their own interests and 
relationships.  States have economic connections with other states and, consequently, it 
cannot be seen as an area that is sufficiently independent of inter-state relationships to act as 
the basis for the common norms and values necessary for the maintenance of a polycentric 
international society. 
 In contrast, however, protection of the physical environment does not appear to 
present the same drawbacks.  For instance, there is a view “that man’s excessive worldwide 
cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases ... are significantly changing the chemical 
347 McGinnis, J. O., ‘The World Trade Organization As A Structure of Liberty’, (2004) 1(28) Harvard Journal of 
Law & Public Policy 81, p. 81. 
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composition of the planet’s atmosphere”351 and yet, simultaneously, “not one country on its 
own releases enough emissions to cause dangerous climate change by itself.”352  At least 
partly as a result of this, “it has been argued that initial targets for an environmental regime 
must be weak in their stringency but wide in their participation”.353  In such a way, 
environmental protection can be seen as a prime candidate for a domain in which states can 
pursue normative consistency without directly affecting the political and legal relationships 
between them. 
 This position is only reinforced once it is also noted that “[m]ultilateral environmental 
agreements addressing climate change, ozone depletion, hazardous chemicals, or endangered 
species are still very much state-driven.”354  That is, the realm of environmental protection 
remains one whose management is very much within state control.  Additionally, within the 
“complex international system for environmental governance, no single organisation ... 
possesses the authority or political strength to effectively coordinate all international 
environmental efforts”.355  This combination of factors would seem to suggest that 
environmental protection could indeed be a subject area capable of supporting a polycentric 
global constitutional process. 
 Before abandoning the examination of human rights, however, it must also be 
considered that 
“there is a general consensus that the IEG [international environmental 
governance] system is not adequate to deal with the many environmental 
problems in this world ... [and] factors contributing to such inefficiency 
include ... the lack of enforcement, implementation and effectiveness of 
IEG”.356 
This lack of effective implementation and enforcement highlights the fact that the 
international environmental system is not, or at least not yet, a constitutional system.  
Furthermore, in an environmental context, states “remain far from developing the sense of 
351 Cox, R. H. J., ‘The Liability of European States for Climate Change’, (2014) 30(78) Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 125, p. 125. 
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community that underlies constitutional governance.”357  In an examination of the present 
international framework, therefore, environmental protection cannot be considered as a 
suitable alternative to human rights in its ability to provide normative integration without 
legal conformity.  Whilst there does not appear to be any inherent quality relating to 
environmental protection that would prevent this from changing in the future, the 
contemporary situation does not seem to support the environmental governance regime as a 
viable contender for the fulfilment of this role. 
 As a consequence, then, it falls to an examination of human rights to assess the 
ongoing development, or otherwise, of a global constitutional process.  It is these notions of 
human rights that can be seen as providing an arena that does not compel interference in 
inter-state relationships and yet simultaneously allows for the development of normative 
cohesion through the provision of common international standards and values.  Due to this 
role in providing cohesion to a polycentric society, these human rights norms retain a focus 
on the nature, role and position of the state.  As their name suggests, however, they also deal 
with human beings at a more fragmented level than that of the state itself.  As discussed, this 
duality is a consequence of the unique, perhaps contradictory, position of human rights norms 
within international society.  This is a position which seeks to maintain inter-state normative 
cohesion whilst simultaneously avoiding direct interference in inter-state relationships.  As 
can be seen, however, this dualistic nature creates a number of issues of its own. 
 
5.5  Human Rights and A Polycentric Society 
 A particular question that warrants further investigation at this point relates to the 
connections, if any, between human rights and the concept of polycentricity itself.  
Specifically, questions are raised as to whether and how these norms of human rights support 
or undermine the maintenance of international polycentricity.  If, as discussed above, the 
concern is with human rights as produced and expressed through the United Nations system, 
this centralisation could perhaps be seen as counteracting the polycentricity that such norms 
allegedly help maintain.  In essence, there is an inherent tension “stemming from the fact that 
while international human rights law can provide an impetus for legal pluralism, it can also 
357 Bodansky, p. 584. 
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act as a constraint on its existence or manner of operation.”358  This tension is reflected in the 
long-running debates surrounding the universal or culturally relative nature of human rights.  
However, the “conflicting accounts of the use and potential abuse of the cultural relativism 
argument are now well rehearsed.”359  For present purposes, what is potentially more 
revealing is the relationship between these norms of human rights and notions of state 
sovereignty. 
 Initially, of course, there is a certain degree of overlap between arguments for cultural 
relativism and support for state sovereignty.  Both positions, for instance, posit the view that 
human rights are best expressed and interpreted at a local, or at least non-global, level.  The 
belief that the current human rights regime is too Westernised, and potentially imperialist, is 
only reinforced by instances of Western powers appearing to violate accepted standards of 
sovereignty and impose their views on non-Western states in one way or another.360  This 
perception poses a number of difficulties for the present suggestion that a globalisation of 
human rights norms is a potential route to preserving state sovereignty.  Indeed, it can be said 
that “[t]he traditional international human rights law narrative poses a conflict between 
sovereignty represented by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and the supervisory mechanisms in 
the UN human rights declarations, covenants and treaties.”361  It has even been suggested that 
the very concept of human rights “is the most subversive of the early ideas emanating from 
the UN system”.362 
 This conflict between state sovereignty and international oversight can be mitigated to 
some extent by an acknowledgement that “[i]n the first instance, it is for the state to decide on 
the necessary measures to bring domestic law into line with its international obligations.”363  
Whilst this position might not lead to an immediately perfect implementation of human rights 
norms, it does allow for an approach that is more respectful of local customs and 
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traditions.364  Additionally, this response does hint at a potential resolution to the issue 
presently at hand.  This is the idea that such norms do not challenge state sovereignty as long 
as they are established by the states themselves and not an outside force.  In this way, they 
can be said to represent the states’ “choice to bind themselves, the sovereign choice to accept 
limits to sovereignty.  The overall logic of the phenomenon does not, therefore, appear to be 
that of expropriation, but rather that of assignment, transfer, or delegation.”365  Consequently, 
it can be said that the centralisation of norm creation within the United Nations human rights 
mechanisms does not contradict the polycentric nature of international society to the extent 
that it is the members of this society that determine the nature and content of such norms. 
 Furthermore, the argument can also be put forward that 
“although the international legal norms and rules regarding the prerogatives 
of sovereign states have changed, sovereignty has not been displaced by 
human rights as the basic principle of the international legal order.  
International human rights treaties are not designed to abolish state 
sovereignty or to replace it with global governance and global law but to 
prod states to erect and commit to a common international standard”.366 
It is this provision of a ‘common international standard’ that can be seen as providing the 
framework of norms necessary for the maintenance of a polycentric society.  As stated, 
however, this maintenance is only possible to the extent that such norms and standards do not 
interfere with state-to-state interaction and concentrate instead on the relationships between 
states and non-state actors. 
 Following this logic, then, the United Nations cannot act as an external force that 
imposes human rights obligations on states from outside their own determinations.  To do so 
would be to undermine the coherence of a polycentric international society and allow the 
societal nature of the international system to be overridden by the influence of particular legal 
and political centres.  It would, therefore, be inimical to the liberty of states.  Simultaneously, 
however, states that wish to preserve their sovereignty must engage with a normative system 
of human rights, participation in which governs association with international society.  
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Failure to engage with this system results in a state positioning itself outside the polycentric 
society.  This type of realignment would enable other states to view the departing state as a 
pariah, rogue or enemy, without the entitlements to liberty or equality that are afforded to 
states continuing to share in the common norms and values of the polycentric society.  It is 
also for this reason that regional and national declarations of human rights protection must be 
considered as subsidiary to universal norms in cases of conflict. 
 So far, then, it can be said that a global constitutionalism that is both state-centred and 
liberal in its operation can be preserved through the development of a global separation of 
powers as expressed in a polycentric international society.  In turn, maintenance of this 
polycentricity requires members of this society to share in the development of human rights 
norms, leaving inter-state relationships to be regulated by the polycentric society itself.  This 
approach, however, is distinctly not intended as a form of prescriptive edict or prophecy, nor 
could it function as such.  Instead, it is to be “operated much more as a critical standpoint 
from which to attack any present (functional) architecture for falling short of the ideal of 
freedom than a constructive platform on which to impose any particular blueprint on the 
world.”367  Consequently, it is not an abstract, theoretical proposal that must be considered in 
this regard, but rather the actual, observable international systems that are presently in 
operation. 
 This combination of a focus on state-developed human rights norms with an 
examination of contemporary international institutions necessitates an inquiry into the United 
Nations Human Rights Council.  The precise details of such an investigation, however, shall 
be considered later.368  For the time being, there remains an alternative route by which liberal 
global constitutionalism might be maintained that has, as yet, been left unexplored.  This is 
the possibility that, as it is the state-centred nature of global constitutionalism that is 
threatening state sovereignty, such sovereignty may yet be preserved through a decline in the 
constitutional role of the state at the global level. 
 
5.6  Global Cosmopolitanism 
 Having appraised the potential for, and nature of, a global separation of powers, there 
remains an alternative consideration that must now be examined.  This is the possibility that 
367 Koskenniemi, M., ‘The Subjective Dangers of Projects of World Community’, in Realizing Utopia, p. 12. 
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the sovereign equality of states, and the attendant intra-constitutional rights implied by the 
resulting liberal form of global constitutionalism, is only unsustainable to the extent that the 
global constitutional process is centred upon the autarchic communities that are states.  In 
shifting the focus from the state to the individual, it can be argued that a situation might be 
created which actually assists in the preservation of liberal global constitutionalism.  The 
logic behind this view is far simpler and less convoluted than that behind the global 
separation of powers outlined above. 
 In essence, this cosmopolitan tradition suggests that “[t]he traditional linear model of 
the individual having a political relationship with the world at large only via his state as the 
required intermediary is breaking down”.369  As a consequence, the appropriate source of 
political and legal authority within the international realm gradually ceases to be seen as the 
autarchic communities of states.  This then leads to a crisis of legitimacy within international 
law and politics, with the argument being put forward that “[t]he heart of the problem is the 
continued adherence to state consent as the exclusive indispensable source of legitimacy”.370 
 In response, the contention is made “that sovereignty can have no other source but the 
minds of men and women”.371  In other words, the emphasis shifts from considering a series 
of autarchic communities to an examination of the individuals who comprise those 
communities.  Once this shift is made, however, this cosmopolitan line of thought can 
become manifest in a variety of different ways.  These can range from attempts to establish 
“a universal political order encompassing the entire world”372 to the more abstract arguments 
urging “that all humanity embrace a ‘new way of thinking’ and develop a sense of global 
community, of brotherhood transcending national boundaries and embracing the entire 
human family.”373  In amongst this diversity, however, there remains a common idea that, 
when it comes to matters of international governance, the individual is at least as important as 
the state itself. 
 It would be misleading, however, to create the impression that there exists a necessary 
conflict between the individual and the state, with cosmopolitan thought giving preference to 
the former over the latter.  Instead, this perspective can be seen as maintaining the argument 
that “the state exists only for the purpose of enabling the individuals who comprise the state 
369 Heater, D., World Citizenship and Government, (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 180. 
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to live their lives relatively peacefully, and for no other purpose”.374  In turn, this position 
then leads to placing greater emphasis on the argument that 
“what individuals value ... are their civilian rights enjoyed in global civil 
society and their citizenship rights enjoyed in sovereign states.  The 
practices are not rivals, but must be understood as complementing one 
another.  The way in which the two practices are made to cohere is through 
the provision that states must respect the civilian rights people enjoy in GCS 
[global civil society].”375 
From within this perspective, therefore, protecting the sovereignty of states necessitates 
protecting the liberty and equality of the individuals that comprise those states. 
As a consequence of this position, this more cosmopolitan point of view “imagines a 
global order in which the idea of human rights is an operative principle of justice, with 
mechanisms of global governance established specifically for their protection.”376  As such, it 
is not only a position which advocates for an increased role of the individual within 
international affairs, but also one in which human rights are accepted as being universalized, 
or at least capable of becoming so.  To put it another way, this position argues for an 
“increased significance for legitimacy of the normative substance of the law relative to 
formal acts of state consent”.377 
 At this point, however, it must be acknowledged that “[c]osmopolitan thought has 
come under attack for all manner of alleged deficiencies.”378  Many of these criticisms centre 
around “the cosmopolitan project for a ‘state of peoples’ (or ‘cosmopolitan state’) that limits 
and ultimately fully absorbs the sovereignty of the nation states.”379  Indeed, it has even been 
“argued that a world state will emerge whether or not anyone intends to bring it about.”380  
As discussed in the earlier examination of polycentricity, such a hierarchical ordering of the 
world is not restricted to cosmopolitan theories.  However, to the extent that the aim of the 
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present analysis is to examine the potential for preserving the liberty of states through an 
exploration of cosmopolitan thought, it can safely be assumed that the complete abolition of 
the state would not be conducive to achieving this goal. 
Other criticisms of cosmopolitan thought highlight “the cosmopolitan requirement of 
a universal ground of legitimacy, one that does not depend on political agreement or on 
compromise between diverse multivariate political and moral claims.”381  As referred to 
above, this ‘universal ground of legitimacy’ is often expressed through human rights as ‘an 
operative principle of justice’ and, when taken on a purely moral basis, there may well be 
genuine reasons as to why human rights cannot be adequately universal.382  Whether or not 
this is the case, however, is not as relevant to the present discussion as it may initially appear.  
This is because, as examined elsewhere, a desire to preserve individual liberty and equality 
within a constitutional process cannot easily coexist with a pre-constitutional view of rights 
as universal moral entities.  Instead, such a desire leads to the development of the intra-
constitutional rights of individuals.383  From a cosmopolitan perspective, therefore, the 
argument cannot depend on the universality of human rights, but rather on the neutrality of 
the constitutional process. 
This position can then be seen as acting in combination with the cosmopolitan 
suggestion that preserving the liberty and equality of states means preserving the liberty and 
equality of the individuals within them.  However, this comparison should not be taken as 
being synonymous with an insistence “that all normative attributes of states ought to be 
reducible to the normative attributes of individual persons.”384  Instead, the cosmopolitan 
focus on the nature and status of the individual can simply be seen as containing an inherent 
continuation of the concept of human rights into the international sphere.  Significantly, 
however, this is not an internationalisation of a single list of ‘universal’ rights.  It is, rather, 
the extension of the individual, intra-constitutional view of rights established within liberal 
constitutionalism into the realm of liberal global constitutionalism. 
 As a result, the appropriate question to ask of a cosmopolitan approach to liberal 
global constitutionalism does not concern how this position might incorporate individual 
381 Teitel, p. 167. 
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human rights into a state-based international system.  Instead, the question is how it might 
envisage the incorporation of state rights into a person-based international system.  In 
attempting to address such a question, however, it must be remembered that this cannot be 
achieved through the somewhat simplistic abolition of numerous autarchic communities and 
their replacement with a singular, global state. It has already been established that such a 
utopian, or dystopian, project would not be compatible with the preservation of liberal global 
constitutionalism in its contemporary form.  As an alternative, this approach takes a position 
which supports an argument “that focusing on states as moral agents must in no way depart 
from traditional liberal values or abandon ethical individualism.”385 
Consequently, a cosmopolitan approach to the global constitutional process 
necessarily involves the maintenance of a degree of respect for the concept of statehood 
whilst simultaneously recognising the significance of individual personhood at the 
international level.  In doing so, however, care must be taken to avoid purely theoretical 
idealism.  Instead, the aspect of cosmopolitanism that is most relevant is the points at which, 
“[i]nstead of calling human beings to begin from scratch, with an ideal 
institutional project, it directs attention to the more humble (yet more 
realistic) avenue of working with institutions we have now - not because 
they are good, or because they already represent a utopian design, but 
because they are what real humans have to deal with when we try to make 
reality of our freedom now.”386 
 This cosmopolitan approach, then, highlights two aspects to be considered when 
examining the maintenance of liberal global constitutionalism through reducing the 
constitutional role of the state.  These are the importance of individual human rights, as a 
means of protecting the liberty and equality of the individuals who constitute the states, and 
the role of contemporary international institutions, as opposed to abstract utopianism.  Taken 
together, these two factors principally result in a need to consider the United Nations as it is 
“[t]he institutions of the UN, and the basic principles of international law 
expressed in the UN charter, [that] embody what Hegel would have called a 
piece of ‘existential reason’ - a small portion of the idea [of a just and 
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peaceful cosmopolitan order] that Kant had already clearly formulated two 
hundred years ago.”387 
 Similarly to the earlier focus on the UN, it is once again the human rights work of the 
organisation that needs to be taken into account.  In contrast to the earlier discussion, 
however, it is not the Human Rights Council that ought to be considered.  This is because it is 
“necessary to distinguish between the two identities of the UN ... The First 
UN is constituted by its staff, an international secretariat or bureaucracy 
located in New York, Geneva, and other regional headquarters. ... The 
Second UN is a collectivity formed by almost all the states of the world; it 
consists of its member states, who employ an international secretariat to 
support their joint deliberations and activities.”388 
To the extent that the Human Rights Council contributes to the preservation of an 
international society that is both coherent and polycentric, it can be seen as forming part of 
this ‘Second UN’.  If the reason for pursuing a more cosmopolitan approach, however, is to 
reduce the constitutional role of the state within liberal global constitutionalism, then it would 
be illogical to seek such an approach within a state-centred organ such as the Human Rights 
Council.  Consequently, an alternative must be sought for within the ‘First UN’. 
 This alternative option is the UN’s Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR).  Forming part of the ‘First UN’, the OHCHR is not explicitly dominated by any 
particular state or states and would seem more able, therefore, to focus on the individuality 
within human rights-related activities than the state-centred work of the Human Rights 
Council.  A more detailed examination of the work of the OHCHR in this regard shall, 
however, proceed later.389  For the time being, it shall suffice to conclude that the 
individualisation of the global constitutional process presents one option for preserving the 
sovereign equality of participating states through a globalisation of the conditions that 
contribute to a preservation of liberal constitutionalism at the national level. 
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Chapter 6 
The United Nations Human Rights Council 
 
 Up to this point, it has been suggested that the contemporary global constitutional 
process is founded upon ideals of the liberty and equality of states.  Three distinct 
mechanisms have also been noted as having the capacity to maintain this focus on liberty and 
equality.  Firstly, there is the ‘great power’ mechanism, by which powerful states direct the 
operation of the global constitutional process along the paths they desire.  Secondly, there is 
the polycentric mechanism, in which a polycentric international social system is fostered in 
order to replicate the effects of a separation of powers.  Finally, there is the cosmopolitan 
mechanism, which allows for an increased role for individuals and non-state actors within the 
international community.390 
 In the course of the previous chapter, it was noted that there is nothing inherent to an 
approach based on great powers that necessitates the development of a liberal and equal 
society.  By its very nature, therefore, such an approach is ultimately self-defeating, or at 
least unsustainable.  The alternative approaches, however, both remain viable options, albeit 
in need of more detailed consideration.  The polycentric mechanism requires the development 
and implementation of common values and norms to which all members of international 
society are able to subscribe without negating the polycentricity itself.  Whilst not necessarily 
succumbing to this particular difficulty, it remains unclear how the cosmopolitan approach 
might assist in the preservation of state-based sovereignty whilst simultaneously increasing 
the role of the individual within international affairs. 
 In order to assess these, and other, aspects, both of these latter approaches have 
identified a need to consider the work of the United Nations (UN) in the field of human rights.  
The polycentric approach highlights the role of the Human Rights Council whilst the 
cosmopolitan perspective places greater emphasis on the Office of High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.  It falls to the following chapter to more thoroughly investigate this 
390 For more detail on these perspectives, see supra, Chapter 5. 
                                                     
123 
 
cosmopolitan approach.391  For the time being, it is the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, or HRC, that must be examined. 
 In order to conduct this more complete assessment into the overall contributions of 
the HRC towards the global constitutional process, two further questions must be addressed.  
Firstly, there is a need to establish the extent to which the HRC is able to, or actually does, 
provide a level of normative integration across international society.  Secondly, there is a 
need to assess the extent to which attempts to standardise or centralise such provision 
interferes with the polycentric nature of a global separation of powers.  Once these issues are 
examined, it becomes possible to consider more fully the nature of the HRC’s contributions, 
or potential contributions, to the processes of global constitutionalism.  Consequently, it is 
these matters that this chapter shall proceed to discuss. 
 Before doing so, however, the first matter to be addressed in such an undertaking 
concerns the initial development of the HRC itself.  Despite the focus on the HRC that was 
established in the previous chapter, there remain questions as to both its origins and its 
practices.  In order to accurately gauge the contributions of the HRC in the areas already 
outlined, it becomes necessary to more fully understand the HRC itself.  Consequently, a 
brief examination of its history may well serve to highlight appropriate lines of enquiry for 
the more detailed exploration that shall proceed later.  It is with this historical dimension, 
therefore, that this discussion begins. 
 
6.1  Developing the Human Rights Council 
 At its creation, signatories to the Charter of the United Nations agreed that “[t]he 
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions ... for the promotion of human 
rights”.392  Doing precisely this, a Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was established, 
with it being decided that it 
“would be composed of representatives of governments following 
instructions rather than independent experts on human rights; individual 
petitions complaining about human rights abuses by governments would not 
be openly received or acted upon; and its work be confined to general 
391 See infra, Chapter 7.  For more detail on the reasoning that led to the adoption of these approaches, see supra, 
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statements of principle rather than any binding commitments or enforcement 
mechanisms”.393 
From its inception, then, the CHR was a state-based body whose work focused on the 
adoption of normative standards and principles rather than their direct implementation and 
enforcement. 
 At least partly as a result of these limitations, the CHR attracted significant criticism 
throughout its lifetime.  In particular, “the Commission became a magnet for criticism as 
states with questionable human rights records gained seats.”394  Ultimately, however, it has 
also been suggested that “[w]hen these constraints ... are considered fully, what is remarkable 
is not that the Commission on Human Rights would eventually fall short of the dreams of its 
most ardent supporters, but that it would accomplish anything at all.”395  Nevertheless, the 
CHR was not entirely unresponsive to its critics and some reforms were attempted, including 
the development of an ability to investigate those complaints “which appear to reveal a 
consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights”.396  In spite of 
some such innovations in its capacity to investigate allegations of human rights abuses, 
however, it remained predominantly the case that “the changes that were agreed by the CHR 
were piecemeal and procedural rather than revolutionary.”397 
 As a result, a situation developed in which “[m]any in the human rights field ... came 
to be highly critical of the political energy invested by States at the CHR in order to avoid 
criticism rather than defend human rights.”398  This negative view of the CHR was eventually 
voiced by actors within the UN system itself, with the publication of a report stating that “the 
Commission’s capacity to perform ... [its] tasks has been undermined by eroding credibility 
and professionalism. ... The Commission cannot be credible if it is seen to be maintaining 
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double standards in addressing human rights concerns.”399  Gradually, such criticism gained 
momentum and ultimately led to a “decision to replace the ... [CHR] with a new UN Human 
Rights Council ... [which] was taken by governments at the September 2005 World Summit 
and adopted as a General Assembly ... resolution on 15 March 2006.”400 
 As a result of these developments, there is little that could be gleaned by considering 
the relative accuracy of criticism of the CHR that would be beneficial within the context of 
the present discussion.  For present purposes, the extent and accuracy of such criticism is less 
significant than the fact of the CHR’s replacement by the HRC.  Consequently, it becomes 
necessary to focus on the construction and operation of the HRC and the extent to which it 
has attempted to address the perceived criticisms of the CHR, whether or not such criticism 
was actually justified. 
 The first aspect to be noted in this regard is the consideration that “the most difficult 
and sensitive issue relating to the Commission on Human Rights is that of membership.”401  
This issue of membership is particularly significant to the discussion currently at hand.  This 
is because the extent to which the HRC is capable of providing normative integration and 
cohesion across international society can be directly related to the level at which that society 
participates in the activities and decisions of the HRC.  However, if the focus is to be on the 
capacity of the HRC to assist in the normative integration of international society, its 
membership and composition is not the only factor that needs to be taken into account.  This 
is particularly the case once it is noted that, as regards the CHR, “the ex post effectiveness of 
the institution seems to have been driven by perverse ex ante incentives regarding 
membership.”402  Consequently, it cannot be assumed that formal membership alone is 
naturally indicative of agreement with the decisions of the HRC, nor is it necessarily a sign of 
participation in its deliberations.  As a result, attention must also be paid to the methods by 
which the HRC formulates and adopts its opinions in order to provide a more complete 
assessment of the extent to which the HRC infuses international society with a common 
normative framework. 
 An additional element that is revealed by considering the criticism of the CHR is the 
extent to which “[t]he founders of the [Human Rights C]ouncil have sought to diffuse the 
399 Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, (United Nations, 2004), (henceforth, A More Secure World), p. 89, para. 283. 
400 Ghanea, p. 695. 
401 A More Secure World, p. 89, para. 285. 
402 Edwards, et al, p. 392. 
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rising tide of politicization ... by instituting a system that is intended to ... work with, not 
against, states under review.”403  This relationship between the HRC and states is, therefore, a 
further aspect that ought to be considered.  This is particularly the case in an assessment of 
the HRC’s ability to influence the maintenance and development of international 
polycentricity as limitations and restrictions on the freedom of action to which states are 
entitled could be seen as unduly inhibiting the polycentric nature of the international system. 
 In this regard, however, the relationship between the HRC and states is not the only 
factor that warrants consideration.  When first establishing the HRC, the General Assembly 
of the UN agreed that this new body should “[w]ork in close cooperation in the field of 
human rights with Governments, regional organizations, national human rights institutions 
and civil society”.404  Prior to this, there was also a proposal put forward which suggested 
that, when reforming the CHR, the UN “Member States should consider upgrading the 
Commission to become a ‘Human Rights Council’ that is no longer subsidiary to the 
Economic and Social Council but a Charter body standing alongside it and the Security 
Council”.405  Combined with the decision to ask the HRC to cooperate with regional 
organizations and national human rights institutions, it would consequently seem appropriate 
to also examine the status of the HRC in relation to a broader framework of institutional 
organs and systems than simply states and national governments. 
 There is a final sector, mentioned above, whose connection to the HRC must also be 
considered.  This is the role of ‘civil society’.  This is particularly relevant to a discussion on 
international polycentricity, as there exists “a mode of argument that projects the idea of a 
global civil society as the societal accompaniment to the supposedly inexorable and 
unalterable processes of economic and cultural globalization”.406  The question must be asked, 
therefore, as to whether or not the HRC is capable of maintaining an international polycentric 
system when faced with the ‘inexorable and unalterable’ advance of a global civil society.  
 A brief foray into the history of the HRC, then, can be seen to reveal a number of 
lines of enquiry that are particularly pertinent to the discussion at hand.  Specifically, and in 
relation to the provision of normative integration across international society, the membership 
403 Davies, M., ‘Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations’, (2010) 
35(4) Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 449, (henceforth, Davies), p. 450. 
404 Human Rights Council, United Nations General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/60/251, (15/03/2006), 
(henceforth, UNGA Res. 60/251), Art. 5(h). 
405 A More Secure World, p. 90, para. 291. 
406 Kenny, M., and Germain, R., ‘The idea(l) of global civil society’ in Germain, R., and Kenny, M., (eds.), The 
Idea of Global Civil Society: Politics and ethics in a globalizing era, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 2. 
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and procedures of the HRC must both be considered.  Additionally, the association between 
the HRC and international polycentricity must be examined through a consideration of the 
relationships between the HRC and states, as well as an examination of the way the HRC 
relates to other institutional bodies.  Finally, there is also a need to consider the relationship 
between the HRC and civil society.  It is, therefore, these areas that shall now be discussed. 
 
6.2  Normative Integration 
 As discussed above, when conducting an assessment of the degree to which the HRC 
is capable of providing normative integration across international society, there are two 
principal factors that ought to be considered.  These are the membership of the HRC as well 
as its internal operations and proceedings.  If proposals of the HRC are to be considered as 
providing integration and cohesion across international society, then it ought to be expected 
that all members of that society participate in, or are at least represented in, its proceedings.  
In contrast, if the HRC cannot be considered as being broadly representative of the 
international society to which it relates, it will struggle to integrate the different members into 
a singular, cohesive society.  This would particularly be the case where such members 
possessed competing visions for the norms and values they considered as necessary to 
provide direction to the international society as a whole. 
 In addition to the membership of the HRC, the nature and status of any decisions, 
opinions and resolutions developed within its proceedings must also come under scrutiny.  
Whilst membership may indeed be sufficiently representative as to incorporate the entirety of 
international society, the HRC cannot profess to espouse common standards and values 
unless all members are able to have their views considered and accommodated in some way.  
There is a natural overlap between this facet of the HRC’s work and the degree to which 
members might or might not comply with its decisions.  Before that particular aspect of the 
HRC can be examined, however, it is the initial development and formulation of its decisions 
that must be considered. 
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6.2.1  Membership of the HRC 
 To begin by considering its membership, then, it must first be considered as to 
whether or not participation within the HRC can be seen as being broadly representative of 
the international society within which it claims to be centred.  As an organ of the United 
Nations system, it is appropriate to consider the members of that system as forming the 
society to which the HRC relates.  At the time of writing, there are currently 193 member 
states participating in this broader UN system.407  Given the relatively broad spectrum of this 
membership, it appears reasonable to view this system as encompassing a large portion of the 
globe.  As a result, and with the caveat that the term ‘global’ refers only to those areas 
already incorporated into this United Nations system, it is therefore possible to consider the 
HRC as a vehicle for the creation and promulgation of genuinely global values.  Such a view, 
however, is only viable to the extent that membership of the HRC is identical to, or suitably 
representative of, membership of this larger organisation. 
 When examining possible reforms to the United Nations’ previous human rights 
system, it was suggested “that, given the highly difficult and sensitive issue of who should be 
included or excluded from serving as members of the Commission on Human Rights, the 
membership should become universal and include all states”.408  Had this proposal been taken 
forward, this universality of membership would certainly have been sufficient as to provide 
for a global level of normative integration.  Instead, however, when debating the composition 
of the HRC the United Nations’ 
“General Assembly ultimately chose a membership of 47, with the 
following regional distribution: 13 African states; 13 Asian states; six 
Eastern European states; eight Latin American and Caribbean states; and 
seven Western European and other states.  The assembly also determined 
that the HRC's members would serve for a period of three years and would 
not be eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms.”409 
Representing a slight reduction in the number of members as compared to the former, and 
now defunct, Commission on Human Rights, this smaller level of membership translates to 
approximately 24% of all UN member states directly participating in the activities of the 
407 See http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml (last accessed 06/05/15). 
408 Lauren, p. 331.  See also, A More Secure World, p. 89, para. 285. 
409 Ramcharan, B. G., The UN Human Rights Council, (London: Routledge, 2011), (henceforth, Ramcharan), p. 
35.  See also, UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 7. 
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HRC.  Additionally, the proportion of membership attributed to each of the regional groups 
within the HRC is directly comparable to membership of the relevant groups within the wider 
UN system.410  This acts in combination with regular elections and limits on terms of service 
to produce a result that could be considered broadly representative of the full range of UN 
members. 
 On a related but somewhat tangential note, this is one reason as to why it must be the 
HRC that is considered, as opposed to any of the various bodies established under treaties 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.411  The membership of 
such bodies being restricted to states that have ratified the relevant treaty, the range and scope 
of actions available to these treaty bodies is naturally more restricted than those open to the 
HRC.  Additionally, such bodies are generally restricted to the norms already enumerated in 
the relevant treaty and, consequently, are much more limited in their capacity to develop and 
promulgate completely new and original normative standards.  It must also be acknowledged 
that “[t]he treaty bodies have nothing resembling the Human Rights Council’s public 
discussion procedures or confidential procedures for looking at situations of consistent 
patterns of gross violations of human rights.”412  As a result, an attempt to assess the degree 
of normative integration available at a global level, must naturally consider the body with a 
larger membership and broader remit. 
 In spite of it having a broader membership and remit than these treaty bodies, 
however, neither the electoral processes nor the possibility of compulsory rotation of 
membership of the HRC were entirely without controversy.  For instance, it was at one point 
“argued that the United States and the other permanent members of the Security Council were 
entitled to automatically possess ‘guaranteed seating’ on the new Human Rights Council (and 
thus never be barred from membership)”.413  Whilst this proposal was not adopted, it was 
410 A list of the membership of these regional groups is available here: 
http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml (last accessed, 06/05/15).  The proportion of members 
attributed to each regional group varies by less than a single percentage point between membership of the HRC 
and membership of the wider UN system. 
411 See, for instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (16/12/1966), United Nations 
Treaty Series I-14668, Part IV, or the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, (21/12/1965), United Nations Treaty Series I-9464, Part II.  A more complete list of such 
international instruments and their associated monitoring bodies is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last accessed, 06/05/15). 
412 Rodley, N., ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council, Its Special Procedures, and Its Relationship with 
the Treaty Bodies: Complementarity or Competition?’, (henceforth, Rodley), in Boyle, K., (ed.), New 
Institutions for Human Rights Protection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 71. 
413 Lauren, pp. 333-4. 
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decided that election to the new body would be by a majority vote of the UN’s General 
Assembly.  Whilst not as demanding as some had hoped, this requirement “represents a much 
higher threshold of an affirmative vote [than for the former Commission on Human Rights] 
and thus an opportunity for human rights supporters to block the election of states that 
severely violate human rights.”414  In addition, the General Assembly specified that, “when 
electing members of the [Human Rights] Council, Member States shall take into account the 
contribution of candidates to the promotion and protection of human rights and their 
voluntary pledges and commitments made thereto”.415  Despite the innovation behind such a 
requirement, the demand for states to ‘take into account’ a candidate’s human rights record 
remains relatively weak.  Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that, “[i]n practice, 
regional slates have continued. ... [I]f there are vacancies on the council in a particular region 
and the same number of candidates is presented from that region, in all likelihood the 
candidates presented will be elected.”416 
 Given the apparent continuation of these regional slates, and combined with a 
distribution of seats that is based almost entirely on geographic criteria, a conclusion that the 
HRC can be seen as being broadly representative may appear somewhat unlikely.  This is 
especially so when the existing arrangements are compared to the more radical proposal for 
universal membership of the HRC.  Furthermore, this is only exacerbated when it is 
considered that “[a]s discontent with the performance of the Commission [on Human Rights] 
grew ... the issue of its composition became both the lightning rod that attracted much of the 
criticism and a convenient explanation for its inability to function effectively.”417  In spite of 
the relatively minor modifications and alterations, however, “the possibility of any 
meaningful restrictions on member states fell by the wayside during the negotiation 
process.”418  As a result, the primary factor within the selection process for membership of 
the HRC remains an attempt to achieve the “representation of different cultures and legal 
systems through a geographical balance.”419 
 However, this implied connection between cultures, legal systems and geography is 
never explored or explained.  Consequently, whilst membership of the HRC can be 
414 Lauren, p. 335. 
415 UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 8. 
416 Ramcharan, p. 35. 
417 Alston, P., ‘Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN Human 
Rights Council’, (2006) 7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 185, (henceforth, Alston), pp. 188-9. 
418 Cox, E., ‘State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations Human Rights Council’, 
(2010) 6(1) Journal of International Law and International Relations 87, (henceforth, Cox), p. 107. 
419 Alston, p. 191. 
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considered broadly representative of international society, this must be restricted to 
representation of a purely geographic distribution of UN member states.  It remains to be seen, 
therefore, whether such geographic representation is capable of producing genuine normative 
integration through the adoption and promulgation of global standards and values.  This is 
especially the case when it is considered that the entire concept of polycentric international 
governance is intimately linked to the notion that “the idea of geography as a basis for the 
organization of politics and economics may be losing meaning.”420  Consequently, to more 
fully assess the HRC’s ability to provide normative integration and cohesion within a 
polycentric international society, the nature and status of the HRC’s opinions and decisions 
must themselves be more closely examined. 
 
6.2.2  Resolutions of the HRC 
 When considering the mechanisms by which the HRC formally develops and 
expresses its opinions, it must initially be noted that, “[i]n principle the HRC applies the rules 
of procedure of the General Assembly’s main committees, as applicable.”421  As a 
consequence, the processes leading to decisions and resolutions of the HRC, as well as the 
particular configuration of any formal outcome, cannot be said to be any more or less capable 
of providing for normative integration than other aspects of the wider UN system.  
Furthermore, and as discussed above, the HRC has a membership that, whilst being 
geographically representative, is not universal.  The combination of these factors suggest that 
other aspects of the UN system, such as the General Assembly, might be better suited to 
providing for the development of normative integration within international society. 
 As previously examined, however, it is the unique focus of the HRC on issues of 
human rights that is the primary driver as to why this, and not other organs of the UN, is the 
appropriate focus for developing normative integration.  It is understandably disappointing, 
therefore, that the HRC has received substantial criticism for its lack of a genuine focus on 
human rights issues.  The HRC, for example, has been compared to “a contaminated egg 
because of its singular lack of a principled approach in dealing with situations of gross 
420 Kobrin, S. J., ‘Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy’, (1998) 
51(2) Journal of International Affairs 361, p. 369. 
421 Ramcharan, p. 39. 
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violations of human rights.”422  Perhaps more colourfully, it has also been described as being 
a “caterpillar with lipstick”.423 
 Nevertheless, despite the existence of such criticisms, it must be noted that the 
success or failure of the HRC in tackling human rights issues is not the primary concern of 
the present discussion.  Instead, what is of interest is whether or not it is capable of providing 
common values and standards that contribute to the normative integration of a polycentric 
international society.  Given the lack of significant distinction within its processes and 
procedures, however, it is primarily the substance, rather than the form, of its decisions that 
must be considered. 
 When considering this more substantive dimension of the HRC, it would initially 
appear as though a certain degree of normative integration is the natural outcome of its work.  
Indeed, it can be said that “[t]he Human Rights Council has taken forward the standard-
setting role of its predecessor and has so far contributed a fair set of new standards”.424  Some 
of the more recent developments in this area include attempts to elaborate the human rights 
demands on transnational corporations, elaboration of the right to conscientious objection to 
military service and discussion of the relationship between human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law.425  The ability of the HRC to develop, or at least explore, such common norms 
and standards is perhaps to be expected when one considers that a driving factor behind 
reform of the former Commission on Human Rights and the creation of the HRC was an 
attempt to emphasise “the development of common standards and the pursuit of a 
‘cooperative’ approach to human rights.”426 
 As was stated earlier, however, the HRC has not been welcomed uncritically and it 
has been suggested “that the criticisms leveled [sic] against the UNHRC's predecessor have 
not lost all their relevance.”427  Such criticism, however, does present a possible line of 
enquiry.  Although on its own it is not a decisive factor, the very fact that such criticism 
422 Ibid., p. 120. 
423 See generally, Rajagopal, B., ‘Lipstick on a Caterpillar? Assessing the New U.N. Human Rights Council 
through Historical Reflection’, (2007) 13 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 7. 
424 Ibid., p. 99. 
425 The relevant United Nations Human Rights Council Resolutions being the following: Elaboration of an 
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect 
to human rights, A/HRC/RES/26/9, (14/07/2014); Conscientious objection to military service, 
A/HRC/RES/24/17, (27/09/2013); Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, A/HRC/RES/19/36, 
(19/04/2012). 
426 Cox, p. 89. 
427 Hug, S., and Lukács, R., ‘Preferences or blocs?  Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council’, (2014) 
9 Review of International Organizations 83, (henceforth, Hug and Lukács), p. 103. 
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exists is indicative of the difficulties faced by the HRC in attempting to establish and promote 
common values across a diverse range of states. 
In this regard, one particularly noteworthy critique is the argument that “power 
politics and raw state interest have had a heavy influence on the council.”428  This is 
particularly evident in discussions targeting specific states.  In the early years of the council, 
for example, “just three states - Israel, Sudan and Myanmar [Burma] - have accounted for 72% 
of all country-specific resolutions.”429  Particular criticism has been raised against the HRC’s 
apparent focus on Israel, with it being observed that, in these discussions, the HRC “was 
expected to serve as a political battleground between Western democracies and the 
developing world.”430  More broadly, difficulties in adopting common standards and values 
have been observed at an empirical level, where it has been remarked that “[w]hile a large 
majority of all resolutions [of the HRC] are adopted without opposition or only abstentions, 
70 votes between 2006 and 2010 ... revealed clear divergences of opinion with some 
countries opposing the proposal.”431  Thus, whilst there are clearly some attempts at 
establishing and promoting common goals, there would seem to remain a diverse range of 
opinions within the HRC as to exactly what those goals should be. 
 This diversity of opinion being expressed within the HRC suggests that it is generally 
incapable of providing genuine normative integration across international society.  Whilst its 
membership can be considered as being broadly representative of the geographic distribution 
of the states to which the HRC relates, such representative membership does not appear 
sufficient to enable the adoption and promulgation of common norms and values.  It ought to 
be noted, perhaps, that issues of representation and normative integration are not unique to 
the HRC itself.432  Nevertheless, as outlined earlier, it is the extent to which the HRC 
provides an institutional framework for addressing these questions at the global level that is 
of most concern at present.  Before discounting the HRC entirely, however, it must be 
considered that disagreements in the development of a resolution are not by themselves 
problematic.  Indeed, they may still be considered as global standards if those who disagree 
428 Ramcharan, p. 15. 
429 Cox, p. 111. 
430 Seligman, S., ‘Politics and principle at the UN Human Rights Commission and Council (1992-2008)’, (2011) 
17(4) Israel Affairs 520, p. 538. 
431 Hug and Lukács, p. 84. 
432 Indeed, similar questions can be seen as confronting the international human rights system more broadly, 
particularly in the case of south-east Asia.  For instance, see generally, Ryu, Y., and Ortuoste, M., 
‘Democratization, regional integration, and human rights: the case of the ASEAN intergovernmental 
commission on human rights’, (2014) 27(3) The Pacific Review 357. 
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with the values being adopted remain willing to modify and adapt their own preferences to 
reflect changes in the global norms being advanced by the HRC.  It becomes necessary, 
therefore, to examine the mechanisms by which the HRC can compel or encourage 
compliance with its decisions and, in doing so, consider the extent to which it does or does 
not interfere with the development of international polycentricity. 
 
6.3  Polycentricity 
 As highlighted through the earlier historical examination of the HRC, there are three 
principal sectors to be taken into consideration in examining the relationship between the 
HRC and the maintenance of polycentricity within international society.  The first of these 
relates to the relationship between the HRC and other institutional organs and systems.  This 
particularly concerns the HRC’s interactions with other intergovernmental bodies, 
specifically in the field of human rights.  If other state-based bodies assigned to examine 
human rights issues display a forced compliance with decisions of the HRC, this might 
suggest a degree of centralisation of the field which would be incompatible with a polycentric 
system.  On the other hand, if these other bodies voluntarily follow and comply with the HRC, 
these relationships could be examined for the existence of common norms and values which 
could be seen as sustaining the polycentric relationships among them.  A final alternative that 
might be discovered is that such bodies do not pay significant attention to the HRC at all.  In 
such a scenario, the existence of a certain degree of normative integration amongst the 
members of international society might remain possible, but this would not arise through the 
HRC. 
 The remaining factors to be considered concern the associations between the HRC 
and states on the one hand and between the HRC and civil society on the other.  Regarding 
the ways in which the HRC relates to states themselves, the focus must be on the practical 
impact of the HRC’s debates and decisions.  In a similar manner to the preceding discussion 
regarding other human rights bodies, the relationships between the HRC and the states 
participating in international society as a whole must be examined in order to determine the 
degree to which compliance is forced, encouraged or evaded.  Regarding the HRC’s 
relationship with civil society, however, the question is not one of compliance but rather one 
of influence.  If the opinions of the HRC are heavily influenced by a strong and vocal civil 
society, it could be suggested that this is inimical to the idea of polycentricity.  Alternatively, 
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an HRC that is able to function as a fully independent centre, implementing its own decisions 
and opinions, could be seen as at least being indicative of an international polycentric system. 
Consequently, it is these dimensions which the following discussion proceeds to consider. 
 
6.3.1  The HRC and Other Human Rights Bodies 
 An initial aspect to be examined regarding the relationship between the HRC and 
other human rights bodies is the fact that, like the former Commission on Human Rights, the 
HRC 
“is intended to be the lead organ, watching over the human rights field, 
spotting areas where existing instruments might be inadequate or where new 
instruments might be needed, and generally monitoring the consistency, 
integration, and systematization of the international code of human 
rights.”433 
This apparent pre-eminence of the HRC would seem to suggest that it primarily functions as 
a centralising body, influencing other human rights bodies in excess of what might be 
expected within a polycentric system.  Combined with its nature as a state-based organ, a 
centralising role for the HRC would seem to grant the states who participate in it a degree of 
power and influence that would be incompatible with the idea of an international separation 
of powers. 
 This perception is particularly evident when one considers the powers and 
responsibilities with which the HRC was imbued at its creation.  In particular, the HRC was 
given the responsibility to “promote the effective coordination and the mainstreaming of 
human rights within the United Nations system”.434  This suggests a role of supervision and 
oversight in excess of what might be expected within a polycentric system.  In spite of these 
reservations, however, what must be borne in mind is that there is no suggestion of the UN 
itself being a self-contained polycentric system.  Rather, the concern is with the maintenance 
of polycentricity within international society as a whole.  As this aspect of the HRC’s work 
that relates to the consolidation and co-ordination of human rights efforts is only applicable in 
the context of the United Nations, there remains scope for the HRC to preserve some degree 
of international polycentricity. 
433 Ramcharan, pp. 66-7. 
434 UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 3. 
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 In order to assess this possibility, attention must naturally be paid to developments 
outside the UN system.  Whilst the present discussion has generally been limited to the 
framework of the United Nations, membership of the UN does not exclude states from 
participating in other international bodies and organisations.  Although it is expected that UN 
member states prioritise their obligations under the UN over conflicting international 
agreements,435 this does not prevent them from giving preference to action in other regional 
or thematic systems as an alternative to utilising the UN framework.  Indeed, the freedom to 
act in alternative spheres of influence would be expected from within a polycentric society.  
Consequently, the HRC might still be considered to support a polycentric system if its 
coordinating and centralising role was restricted to mechanisms within the United Nations.  
In contrast, the HRC cannot be said to support polycentricity if participation within the HRC 
also grants states an ability to directly coordinate and influence human rights bodies that are 
otherwise external to the UN system.  It is, therefore, the relationship between these non-UN 
bodies and the HRC that must be explored further. 
 Of these non-UN human rights systems and organisations, particular attention must be 
paid to the primary regional mechanisms for human rights protection.  The principal 
mechanisms concerned are those associated with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.436  More recently, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
also begun to progress in a similar direction with the establishment of the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).437 
 Of these regional systems, “[i]t has long been argued that the [European] Convention 
remains by far the most successful manifestation of the aspiration of the UDHR and that it 
has created the most effective system of international protection of human rights in 
existence.”438  This ‘UDHR’ being the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,439 there would seem to be clear links between both the UN and European systems.  
435 See UN Charter, Art. 103. 
436 The relevant treaties being, in order, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended), (04/11/1950), United Nations Treaty Series I-
2889, (henceforth, ECHR); the American Convention on Human Rights, (22/11/1969), United Nations Treaty 
Series I-17955, (henceforth, ACHR); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (27/06/1981), 
United Nations Treaty Series I-26363, (henceforth, ACHPR). 
437 See generally, http://aichr.org/about/ (last accessed, 06/05/15). 
438 Bates, E., The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its Inception to the Creation 
of a Permanent Court of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), (henceforth, Bates), p. 2. 
439 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III), 
(10/12/1948). 
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Indeed, the Preamble to the ECHR states that it aims “to take the first steps for the collective 
enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration”.440  Similarly, the 
American system is established “in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights”441 and the African mechanism seeks to have “due regard to the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.442  Finally, and in a like manner, 
one of several purposes of the AICHR is “[t]o uphold international human rights standards as 
prescribed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”.443 
 It is possible, however, that this apparent influence over the founding of these 
regional mechanisms is simply reflective of a degree of normative commonality within and 
between these regions and not indicative of centralised authority emanating from the UN 
system.  Additionally, the normative influence of the UDHR, adopted in 1948, does not 
automatically translate to direct political and legal control belonging to the HRC, which was 
only established in 2006.444  In fact, in the years preceding the creation of the HRC, such 
political and legal influence seemed to be flowing in the opposite direction, with some 
suggestions for remodelling the UN system being based on the example set by the European 
model.445  Consequently, it would appear as though any influence exerted by the HRC over 
these alternative human rights mechanisms is both minimal and indirect. 
 Such a conclusion is only reinforced by an examination of the practices within these 
regional systems.  For example, whilst the ECHR does institute a judicial mechanism for 
assessing human rights complaints, the court that it establishes is prevented from hearing any 
matter which “has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation 
or settlement”.446  On the surface, this would seem to suggest deference of the European 
system to other international organs, which would include the HRC.  In relation to the former 
UN Commission on Human Rights, however, the European court was of the opinion that this 
was not the case as the Commission “is essentially an inter-governmental organ composed of 
440 ECHR, Preamble. 
441 ACHR, Preamble. 
442 ACHPR, Preamble. 
443 ASEAN Secretariat, Terms of Reference of ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 
(Jakarta, Indonesia: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), Art. 1.6.  Available at http://aichr.org/documents/ (last accessed, 
06/05/15). 
444 UNGA Res. 60/251. 
445 See, for instance, Wilkins, B., ‘International Human Rights and National Discretion’, (2002) 6(4) Journal of 
Ethics 373. 
446 ECHR, Art. 35(2)(b). 
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State representatives, which deals with situations rather than individual complaints and which 
offers no redress to individual victims.”447 
 Whilst it is true that such a decision was based on the procedures established as part 
of the Commission on Human Rights, similar procedures have been translated into the work 
of the HRC.448  Of particular note is the fact that it was at least partly the inter-governmental 
and state-centred nature of the former Commission which led to the European court's 
rejection of its procedures as amounting to a process of ‘international investigation or 
settlement’.  Whilst the newer procedures established by the HRC appear to slightly diminish 
the official role given to states when addressing specific complaints, it remains to be seen as 
to whether this will be sufficient as to alter this perception of the overall process.449 
 However, this apparent diminution in the role of states is not the only factor to be 
considered.  Unlike the procedures established by its predecessor, and more akin to the 
ECHR provision outlined above, the complaints procedure of the HRC is expected to declare 
as inadmissible any complaints which are “already being dealt with by a special procedure, a 
treaty body or other United Nations or similar regional complaints procedure in the field of 
human rights”.450  This would seem to provide a direct contradiction to the suggestion that 
the HRC has a direct, controlling and supervisory role in relation to other human rights 
bodies, even within the UN system.  Instead, in an apparent attempt to reduce the overlap in 
the work of international human rights bodies, the HRC appears unwilling, or potentially 
even unable, to exercise a role that is supervisory or appeals-based in nature. 
 It must be acknowledged, however, that this conclusion is limited to the work of the 
HRC in relation to its receipt of specific, individual complaints.  Nevertheless, this can be 
considered as being reflective of its ability to set and promulgate human rights standards.  
Were there to be significant conflict between the norms advocated by the HRC and those 
adopted within the various regional human rights mechanisms, the reluctance of the HRC to 
admit complaints being dealt with elsewhere would suggest, at best, an inability to generate 
compliance with its own normative values. 
447 Mikolenko v. Estonia, European Court of Human Rights Decision, no. 16944/03, 5 January 2006.  The 
specific procedure being addressed was that established under ECOSOC Resolution 1503(XLVIII) of 27 May 
1970, as amended (see supra, fn. 396). 
448 See Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, United Nations Human Rights Council 
Resolution, A/HRC/RES/5/1, (18/06/2007), Art. 86. 
449 See ibid., Art. 96 and 97. 
450 Ibid., Art. 87(f). 
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 It remains inconclusive, therefore, as to whether the HRC can be seen as leading other 
human rights bodies in the adoption of normative values or simply following global trends 
that have been initiated elsewhere.  What can be concluded, however, is that the relationships 
between the HRC and other human rights bodies do not present a significant threat to the 
establishment or maintenance of international polycentricity.  There does not appear to be a 
significant risk that those states participating in the HRC will develop an ability to influence 
and control other international systems in a manner that would be incompatible with a global 
separation of powers.  At the same time, however, the distinct lack of coordinating and 
supervisory capabilities suggests that the HRC would struggle to maintain such polycentricity 
beyond that which is enabled by its role as an arena for the development of normative 
integration.  It remains possible, however, that the HRC is more capable of maintaining 
polycentricity through its relationships with states themselves.  It is consequently this aspect 
of its work that shall now be considered. 
 
6.3.2  The HRC and States 
 When examining the relationship between the HRC and states, it must first be 
acknowledged that the HRC is itself a state-based body.  Consequently, there are two 
categories of states which must be considered.  These relate to the states who directly 
participate in the decision-making processes of the HRC and those who do not.  This second 
category could be further sub-divided, distinguishing UN member states who do not 
participate in the HRC from those states that do not participate in the UN system at all.  
However, when discussing the degree to which the HRC hinders or supports international 
polycentricity, the primary factor to be considered is the level of influence it exerts over those 
states who can be seen as participating, either directly or indirectly, in its processes and 
procedures.  Consequently, the relevant states to be considered are those which actively 
participate as full members of the UN system, whether or not they directly participate within 
the HRC. 
 As outlined earlier, there are three possible ways in which these states might be 
influenced by the statements and decisions of the HRC.  It might be the case that the HRC 
exerts an investigatory and punitive capacity sufficient as to view it as directly inhibiting the 
liberty of states to act as they see fit.  Such an eventuality would be inimical to the 
maintenance of an international polycentric system.  In contrast, states might be in a position 
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where they can recognise the commonality of the norms and standards being promulgated 
through the HRC and thus voluntarily follow and comply with its decisions.  This voluntary 
relationship would support a view that the HRC promotes the cohesion and integration of an 
international society and is therefore supportive of international polycentricity.  Finally, there 
remains the possibility that states view statements and resolutions of the HRC as being 
completely optional and devoid of any coercive force, voluntary or otherwise.  Such an 
outcome, whilst being indicative of the state-based liberty underlying the global 
constitutional process, would have little to offer to support and maintain the sovereign 
equality of states through a polycentric international system. 
 Initially, it must be noted that the activities of the United Nations system generally as 
regards human rights can be categorised as relating to either their ‘promotion’ or their 
‘protection’.  Of these, it is the element relating to human rights protection which “embraces 
activities that may be more sensitive or confrontational ... such as investigations, monitoring, 
casework, public reporting, and advocacy.”451  Even from within this potentially more 
invasive aspect, however, the HRC has no power to directly punish and penalise states who 
act against its advice or opinions.  In some ways, this approach can be seen as a remnant of 
an attitude prevalent within the HRC’s predecessor, in which there was “a belief [held] by 
many of the member states of the organization in its early days that scrutiny of any individual 
state’s human rights practices constituted improper intervention in matters essentially within 
the domestic jurisdiction of states”.452  During the transformation into the HRC, the UN’s 
General Assembly did become entitled to “suspend the rights of membership in the [Human 
Rights] Council of a member of the Council that commits gross and systematic violations of 
human rights”.453  Such punishment, however, is not only administered by the General 
Assembly and not the HRC directly, it also appears somewhat limited in its significance and, 
at the time of writing, has not yet been applied. 
 In spite of this apparent shortfall in its capacity to enforce compliance, the HRC does 
possess considerable ability to investigate, reprimand and chastise states with whom it 
disagrees or of whom it disapproves.454  This disapproval, however, can often be seen as 
being politically sensitive.  Indeed, “[i]n the HRC’s work thus far there is incontrovertible 
451 Darrow, M., and Arbour, L., ‘The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the 
United Nations’, (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 446, p. 476. 
452 Rodley, p. 51. 
453 UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 8. 
454 See generally, UNGA Res. 60/251.  See also, Ramcharan. 
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evidence that different weights and measures are applied to governments favored by the 
council majority and those disfavored.”455  As was noted earlier, this purely political element 
of the HRC has been particularly marked in the case of Israel as “[b]y the council’s second 
year, Israel had been criticized fifteen times and Myanmar [Burma] only once.”456 
 In spite of this political sensitivity, the HRC does possess at least one investigatory 
mechanism that would appear to avoid this apparent bias, at least on the surface.  This is the 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR).  The UPR is a peer-review system and “[b]y virtue of this 
mechanism, every state has the opportunity to review the human rights performance of every 
other UN member state.”457  This universality would seem to afford the UPR a degree of 
protection from accusations of political bias.  However, whilst arguably counteracting the 
potential for displays of partiality and prejudice in the work of the HRC, this universality also 
results in a process with little, if any, direct coercive force.  Instead, it is “[s]haring good 
practices among peers, as well as offering constructive technical assistance and other forms 
of capacity building, [which] are cornerstones of the process”.458  These practical ways in 
which the UPR has thus far been implemented would seem to suggest that the “mechanism 
benefits those states most concerned with preventing UN intervention in their domestic 
affairs, at the expense of those that wish to more intensely promote human rights standards 
around the world.”459  Consequently, it cannot be said that the UPR is a means by which the 
HRC is able to enforce state compliance with human rights standards, although it may be a 
mechanism for their promotion and encouragement. 
 In contrast to the broad universality of the UPR, the HRC is also capable of instituting 
a variety of more specific and targeted proceedings.  In particular, there is a variety of special 
rapporteurs, working groups and others that can be collectively termed ‘Special Procedures’.  
Inherited from the former Commission on Human Rights, these special procedures form “a 
unique and effective mechanism that allows independent, periodic, on-the-ground scrutiny of 
a country’s record of respect for human rights.”460  Despite their significant capacity for 
investigative work, however, these special procedures remain subordinate to the HRC itself, 
455 Ramcharan, p. 93. 
456 Weiss, T. G., et al, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, (7th edn.), (Boulder, USA: Westview 
Press, 2014), (henceforth, The UN and Changing World Politics), p. 213. 
457 Smith, R., ‘“To see Themselves as Others see Them”: The Five Permanent Members of the Security Council 
and the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review’, (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 1, p. 2. 
458 Ibid., p. 9. 
459 Cox, p. 116. 
460 Piccone, T., ‘The contribution of the UN’s special procedures to national level implementation of human 
rights norms’, (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 206, p. 209. 
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which has “not always appreciated the labours of those they have mandated to discharge the 
functions of a special rapporteur.”461  Furthermore, and in a similar manner to the lack of 
direct enforcement action possible within the UPR, there remains a large extent to which the 
various special procedures “must rely on political pressure and moral persuasion to influence 
state behaviour.”462  The combination of these factors creates an environment whereby the 
special procedures of the HRC cannot be said to have a particularly significant impact on the 
maintenance of international polycentricity. 
 Whether, then, through its special procedures or the more recent developments of the 
UPR, it does not appear as though the HRC can be seen as having a direct legal and political 
influence that would prevent the development of an international polycentric system.  In 
contrast, it would seem to have developed “a political strategy to promote compliance that 
hybridizes an awareness of power imbalances in politics with the insights about 
depoliticization and discourse that emerge from the study of persuasion.”463  The overall 
picture, therefore, would seem to be one of an HRC which encourages compliance through 
‘political pressure and moral persuasion’ but without direct enforcement capabilities. 
 
6.3.3  The HRC and International Civil Society 
 The apparent lack of direct enforcement capabilities on the part of the HRC could 
perhaps mitigate the significance of its relationship with civil society.  If the HRC is unable 
to directly enforce its decisions against the will of sovereign states, then whether or not the 
HRC is able to act as a centre that is independent of the opinions of civil society is a question 
that loses a degree of its immediate importance.  As discussed, however, the HRC is able to 
encourage compliance through the exertion of pressure and persuasion and, as a result, its 
relationship to civil society is not entirely insignificant.  If it is found that the HRC is itself 
directly influenced by the opinions of civil society, then it could be argued that this is 
inimical to international polycentricity as the HRC would not be acting as an independent 
centre capable of counterbalancing other international legal and political centres. 
 In addressing this issue, the first matter of concern is the establishment of exactly 
what is meant by the term ‘civil society’.  From within the founding resolution of the HRC, 
461 Rodley, N. S., ‘On the responsibility of special rapporteurs’, (2011) 15(2) The International Journal of 
Human Rights 319, p. 319. 
462 Ibid., p. 210. 
463 Davies, p. 460. 
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this is not entirely clear.  As mentioned above, the HRC is required to “[w]ork in close 
cooperation in the field of human rights with ... civil society”,464 yet this is as far as that 
section of the resolution goes.  At one end of the scale, it is possible to understand this term 
as relating to the entire arena in which “social life (the public sphere) is modelled on 
exchange and persons meet in order to arbitrate their pre-existing interests which have been 
‘self-authored’ (chosen in the private sphere).”465  At the other end of the spectrum, however, 
the same resolution that creates this relationship with civil society also provides for “the 
participation of and consultation with observers [at the HRC], including ... non-governmental 
organisations”.466  Consequently, whilst it may be entirely plausible to understand civil 
society as a much broader concept than referring simply to non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), it would seem to be this narrower definition that is of principal concern at the 
present moment. 
 At this point, then, the question immediately at hand concerns the ways in which these 
NGOs and the HRC actually relate to one another.  In relation to the former CHR, it has been 
claimed that it was NGOs which succeeded in placing “human rights on the international 
agenda and ... [these] NGOs have occupied a central place in the development of 
international human rights from the very beginning.”467  This close connection between the 
CHR and NGOs can arguably be seen as having continued until its abolition, with it being 
“[h]uman rights NGOs, in particular, who had followed the work of the Commission since its 
inception, [and] paid tribute to what they had described as its ‘remarkable achievements’.”468  
As a consequence of the relatively recent nature of the creation of the HRC, however, it is 
less clear as to whether or not this close relationship has been perpetuated. 
 As mentioned above, the HRC is asked to work “in close cooperation” with NGOs, 
who may participate as “observers”, yet this creates no compulsion on the HRC to act in 
accordance with the opinions of these other organisations.469  Significantly, however, the 
General Assembly of the UN decided that, at the HRC, the “participation of and consultation 
with [these] observers ... shall be based on arrangements ... and practices observed by the 
Commission on Human Rights, while ensuring the most effective contribution of these 
464 UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 5(h). 
465 Hopgood, S., ‘Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable Hegemony of the Liberal 
Self’, in Frost, M., (ed.), International Ethics, (Vol. 2), (London: Sage, 2011), p. 25. 
466 UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 11. 
467 Mitoma, G. T., ‘Civil Society and International Human Rights: The Commission to Study the Organization 
of Peace and the Origins of the UN Human Rights Regime’, (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 607, p. 609. 
468 Lauren, p. 317. 
469 See UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 5(h) and Art. 11. 
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entities”.470  The implication, therefore, is that whilst the opinions of NGOs by themselves 
may not be sufficiently influential as to dictate and direct the development of the HRC’s 
work, they must nevertheless be accounted for and taken into consideration.  This has been 
particularly evident in the operation of the Universal Periodic Review, in which “there was 
substantial success in injecting human rights concerns raised by NGOs into the UPR process, 
but states showed considerable resistance to accepting NGO recommendations.”471 
 This apparent resistance of states to the recommendations of NGOs is not the only 
difficulty faced by attempts to influence the HRC through civil society.  Whilst there does 
exist an expectation that the HRC consider the input and opinions of a variety of NGOs, there 
are also a variety of practical obstacles to such participation.  In particular, these challenges 
include 
“(1) the difficult process of obtaining consultative status for those that do 
not already have it; (2) the high financial costs and the unavailability of 
staff to participate in the sessions in Geneva; (3) the lack of familiarity with 
the workings and procedure in the HRC; (4) the lack of access to 
information, including language barriers; and (5) the difficulty [of] deriving 
any tangible benefits from this participation in the day-to-day work in their 
countries of origin.”472 
At least partly as a result of such difficulties, and despite the expected involvement of NGOs 
at the HRC, it remains true “that responsibility for the success of the HRC lies squarely with 
the countries that comprise the new body.”473 
 As a result, it may well be considered that the HRC is technically capable of acting as 
an independent centre within a wider polycentric system.  The strength of this independence, 
however, is called into question by the degree to which the HRC is responsive to the opinions 
of the various NGOs to whom it relates.  Nevertheless, it may yet be argued that this 
relationship between the HRC and NGOs is not significant enough as to exclude the 
possibility of the HRC maintaining and supporting a form of international polycentricity.  In 
470 UNGA Res. 60/251, Art. 11. 
471 Moss, L. C., ‘Opportunities for Nongovernmental Organization Advocacy in the Universal Periodic Review 
Process at the UN Human Rights Council’, (2010) 2(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 122, p. 123. 
472 Nader, L., ‘The Role of NGOs in the UN Human Rights Council’, (2007) 7(4) International Journal on 
Human Rights 7, p. 10. 
473 Ibid. 
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order to more fully assess this possibility, however, a wider view must be taken of the 
relationship between the HRC and the broader global constitutional process. 
 
6.4  The HRC and the Global Constitutional Process 
 Having more closely examined the relationship between the HRC and the 
maintenance of an international polycentric system, it is now possible to more fully consider 
its connection to the wider process of global constitutionalism.  In particular, there remains 
the question as to whether the HRC is capable of supporting a global separation of powers 
through a polycentric international society.  It must be remembered, however, that this is 
addressed with the aim of establishing the extent to which such polycentricity might be able 
to preserve the state-based liberty and equality upon which the contemporary global 
constitutional process is founded. 
 In this regard, and as discussed above, the first point to be noted is that the HRC as it 
currently exists does not appear to pose a significant threat to the maintenance of 
international polycentricity.  Although its own independence is arguably threatened by an 
intentionally close relationship with NGOs, the strength of this relationship does not appear 
sufficient as to counteract the independence of its role in other areas.  It is particularly worth 
noting that, whilst the HRC does appear to have a centralising and co-ordinating role in 
relation to other aspects of the UN human rights system, this does not extend further.  For 
instance, the HRC does not dictate legal or normative standards to the various regional 
human rights bodies, nor does it have the capacity to directly enforce its wishes upon states, 
whether or not such states are active participants within the UN system.  Indeed, the primary 
mechanisms for enforcement of the HRC’s decisions appear to be through attempts at 
political and moral persuasion.  This approach to implementation and enforcement techniques 
would seem to suggest that the HRC is capable of providing a degree of normative 
integration to international society, whilst simultaneously refraining from direct interference 
in the maintenance of international polycentricity. 
 Once subjected to a more thorough examination, however, this provision of normative 
integration would seem to be, at best, difficult to sustain.  A representative system that is 
based purely on the geographic distribution of states seems to create a situation in which the 
HRC becomes highly politicised and divisive.  This has been particularly evident in the initial 
identification and enumeration of potential global norms, such as the “Human Rights 
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Council’s biased and unbalanced focus on Israel [which] drew a rare rebuke by Secretary-
General Ban”.474  This failure to overcome the criticisms directed at its predecessor suggest 
that the maintenance of purely geographic criteria for membership on the HRC provides an 
insufficient level of integration to overcome the different political and cultural outlooks of its 
various members.  As a result, and in spite of several successes, many of the HRC’s decisions 
remain politically controversial even after their adoption and promulgation.  In a system that 
relies upon political persuasion for its enforcement capabilities, such controversy signifies a 
distinct absence of ability to co-ordinate and consolidate differing perspectives within 
international society.  To put it another way, there appears to be a lack of normative 
agreement and integration within the workings of the HRC and this is not overcome by a 
system of representation constructed exclusively around the geographic distribution of 
member states. 
 This absence of normative agreement within the HRC must also be combined with a 
recognition that, from a state-based perspective, there does not appear to be any inherent 
quality of human rights themselves that would provide this cohesion where the political 
process does not.475  As a result, it cannot be said that the HRC is currently in a position to 
directly support and maintain the liberty and equality of states within the global constitutional 
process.  Whilst its own processes and internal workings might be considered as 
manifestations of these values, this internal machinery of the HRC cannot be said to directly 
contribute to their preservation.  Although there is no direct interference with international 
polycentricity, and therefore an implied support for the liberty of states, the HRC is unable to 
provide normative integration and cohesion to international society.  As a result, the 
maintenance of a focus on the liberty and equality of states, and arguably the maintenance of 
international society itself, reverts to the ‘great power’ model that has already been 
established as being both insufficient and unsustainable. 
 There remains, however, an alternative option that may yet be pursued.  This is the 
possibility that, by lessening the constitutional participation of the states themselves, the 
overall constitutional process may preserve their liberty and equality.  It falls to the next 
chapter, then, to examine this possibility more closely, through the UN’s Office of High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
474 The UN and Changing World Politics, p. 213. 
475 It must be noted, however, that alternative options to a human rights-based approach do exist.  For instance, 
see the discussion on international environmental governance in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 7 
The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
 In the previous chapter, it was established that the United Nations Human Rights 
Council (HRC) is currently incapable of preserving a constitutional process that is both 
liberal and global.  An alternative option exists, however, through a pursuit of more 
cosmopolitan theories.  From the focus on the individual that is developed within such 
perspectives, there emerges the possibility that an examination of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) may yet prove able to preserve the 
liberty and equality of states within the global constitutional process.476 
 In order to examine this possibility in more detail, however, there are a number of 
factors that must be considered.  To begin with, the relationship between the OHCHR and 
theories of cosmopolitanism warrants a more detailed examination.  Specifically, there is the 
question of whether or not the OHCHR actually assists in the incorporation of a focus on the 
individual into processes of international law.  If, in fact, it is primarily a state-based organ 
along similar lines to the HRC, then further discussion of its relationship to the global 
constitutional process begins to lose any significance it may have had. 
 Secondly, an investigation into the constitutional role of the OHCHR must necessarily 
consider its relationship to states themselves, particularly as regards their status as being 
sovereign equals.  Such an investigation must pay particular attention to the extent to which 
the OHCHR is capable of integrating its relationship to states with its relationship to 
individuals within those states.  If the integration of these two apparently competing ideas 
does not, or cannot, take place, this would negate the possibility that this cosmopolitan 
approach might be capable of preserving the contemporary liberal form of the global 
constitutional process.  Having already dismissed a polycentric approach through the HRC, 
and in the absence of any potential reforms to the UN system, this would leave the great 
power method as being the only viable, albeit flawed, option currently available. 
476 See supra, Chapter 5. 
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 It is possible, however, that the OHCHR does prove capable of integrating the role of 
individuals with the liberty and equality of states.  If that is the case, it then becomes 
necessary to more closely examine the extent to which the OHCHR is able to incorporate an 
intra-constitutional view of rights into the overall process of the global constitution.  In order 
to do so, the relationship between the OHCHR and other international bodies must also be 
explored.  Having undergone such an investigation, it ultimately becomes possible to assess 
the overall contribution of the OHCHR to the maintenance of a liberal global constitutional 
process. 
 
7.1  Role of the Individual 
 As mentioned above, the first aspect of the OHCHR that must be established is the 
extent to which it incorporates, or is at least capable of incorporating, the individual into 
processes of international law and global constitutionalism.  In order to do so, a brief foray 
into the origins of the OHCHR may prove beneficial.  In relation to both the HRC and the 
Commission which preceded it, it has been said that “[t]he paradox of asking States, who are 
violators of human rights, to be the sole enforcers against themselves, has never been 
resolved. ... States acquire an incentive to protect each other’s dirty secrets.”477  In contrast to 
this state-based enforcement mechanism, various alternative suggestions have been proposed.  
For instance, prior to the establishment of the UN system itself, there were calls for the 
creation of a ‘High Commission of the Rights of Man’, which “shall consist of independent 
persons of the highest distinction”.478  This idea of human rights protection being 
independent from the actions and desires of states was continued when, “during the drafting 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Professor René Cassin from France put 
forward the idea of an Attorney-General for Human Rights.”479 
 Whilst these ideas occasionally resurfaced in various forms, they ultimately came to 
fruition in 1993 with the creation of the UN’s Office of High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.480  In creating this office, the General Assembly decided that the person of the High 
477 Rajagopal, B., ‘Lipstick on a Caterpillar?  Assessing the New U.N. Human Rights Council Through 
Historical Reflection’, (2007) 13 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 7, p. 15. 
478 Lauterpacht, H., An International Bill of the Rights of Man, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), 
(Reprinted 2013), p. 196. 
479 Clapham, A., ‘Creating the High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Outside Story’, (1994) 5 European 
Journal of International Law 556, (henceforth, Clapham), p. 556. 
480 See generally, ibid. 
                                                     
149 
 
Commissioner “shall be the United Nations official with principal responsibility for United 
Nations human rights activities”.481  Accordingly, the High Commissioner is issued with an 
extensive and varied mandate covering a wide range of circumstances in which human rights 
issues are, or might be, raised.  The extent of this mandate is reflected in the considerable, 
and often conflicting, expectations that have been placed upon the office.  For instance, 
“advocates have urged the High Commissioner to be a champion who 
opposes all human rights abuses wherever found and a critic of states large 
and small and governments powerful and weak.  The High Commissioner 
has been called on to engage with victims of abuse yet at the same time 
speak truth to power.  The High Commissioner is asked to reach the world's 
top diplomats and prime ministers and to be a consensus-builder with the 
power to convince even the cruelest among them to change their abusive 
practices.  At the same time, the High Commissioner is instructed to 
respond to human rights crises, as well as to take preventive action to avert 
future emergencies.  As if this were not enough, the High Commissioner is 
also mandated to carry out the instructions of governments acting through 
the Human Rights Council and to be an administrator, coordinator and 
manager for OHCHR.”482 
Given the breadth and scope of such a considerable remit, as well as the accompanying 
expectations placed upon the office, it is perhaps to be expected that “the individuals 
nominated and selected for the post of High Commissioner have felt the pressure of trying to 
satisfy them.”483 
 It is precisely these individuals, however, who can arguably be seen as presenting the 
strongest link between the OHCHR and the incorporation of human individuality into 
international law, through the role of the High Commissioner herself or himself.  Whilst not 
explicitly stated in the resolution establishing the position, there is an expectation that the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights is as independent of states as any other member of the 
UN’s administrative machinery.  This is due, at least in part, to the fact that “[t]he High 
481 High Commissioner for the promotion and protection of all human rights, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution, A/RES/48/141, (20/12/1993), (henceforth, UNGA Res. 48/141), Art. 4. 
482 Gaer, F. D., and Broecker, C. L., ‘Introduction’, (henceforth, Gaer and Broecker), in Gaer, F. D., and 
Broecker, C. L., (eds.), The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Conscience for the World, 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), (henceforth, Conscience for the World), pp. 17-18. 
483 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Commissioner is a department of the UN secretariat, not an independent agency or body of 
the organization.”484  As a result, appointments made to the position, although subject to 
approval by the General Assembly, are made directly by the UN’s Secretary-General.485  
Furthermore, it is expected that the appointee “[b]e a person of high moral standing and 
personal integrity and [that they] shall possess expertise ... necessary for impartial, objective, 
non-selective and effective performance of the duties of the High Commissioner”.486 
 This requirement for impartiality allows the High Commissioner to act in a way 
which is not automatically dependent on the wishes and opinions of the states themselves.  
Instead, there is an expectation that whoever occupies this post shall “act to protect 
individuals from abuse and promote dignity, equality, and freedom for all.”487  Despite 
having such seemingly lofty goals, however, the question remains as to whether or not these 
aspirations have proven capable of augmenting the integration of the individual into 
processes of global constitutionalism.  In order to more fully assess the contribution of the 
OHCHR in this area, it becomes necessary to return to theories of cosmopolitanism.  
Specifically, consideration must be given to the extent to which the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, as well as the OHCHR more broadly, is capable of imbuing international law 
with a perspective that “the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons - rather 
than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states.”488 
 As referred to above, the position of High Commissioner can be seen as integrating 
the role of a single, specific individual into the development of certain aspects of global 
governance.  There remains a degree of uncertainty, however, as to whether or not this 
extends beyond the role of the OHCHR and its position within the UN system.  Given the 
evidence presented up to this point, it could perhaps be argued that the Secretary-General of 
the UN is a more appropriate embodiment of these ideas.  Nevertheless, the specific remit 
and mandate of the OHCHR, whilst being both broad and generalised, is restricted enough to 
offer some clues as to its particular role in this area. 
 Before examining this remit, however, it ought to be recalled that the very reason the 
OHCHR was thought to be worth consideration was because of its focus on issues relating to 
484 Boyle, K., ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: Origins, Antecedents, and Prospects’, (henceforth, 
Boyle), in Boyle, K., (ed.), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 43. 
485 See UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 2(b). 
486 UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 2(a). 
487 Gaer and Broecker in Conscience for the World, p. 31. 
488 Pogge, T., ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, (1992) 103 Ethics 48, p. 48.  Footnote omitted. 
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human rights.  Indeed, it was argued that the cosmopolitan suggestion “that every human 
being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern”489 creates an inherent 
expectation that the political development of cosmopolitan ideas will naturally incorporate 
elements of human rights thought and practice.490  Whilst there remains significant debate 
about the philosophical nature and status of universal human rights, for present purposes it 
suffices to note that the OHCHR is to “[b]e guided by the recognition that all human rights ... 
are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”.491  What is of relevance to the 
present discussion is simply the approach taken by the OHCHR as it conducts itself within 
international legal and political processes.  The philosophical justifications that underlie the 
beliefs upon which it is founded are of less immediate concern.  Consequently, to the extent 
that the OHCHR is seen to be guided by a belief in the universality of human rights, it can be 
seen as fulfilling the cosmopolitan expectation that such rights form an integral part of the 
development of international law and politics. 
 However, it cannot be assumed that this universalist position is inherently self-
sustaining.  In particular, it must be noted that “[t]he growth of identity-based politics in the 
context of globalization has fuelled the challenge to the principle of universality”.492  
Nevertheless, it must be equally recognised that “despite the cultural, political, regional, and 
economic diversity of the contemporary world, there is near universal agreement on not only 
the existence but also the substance of internationally recognized human rights.”493  It is 
possible to conclude, therefore, that the OHCHR is adequately justified in working from a 
position that assumes the inherently universal application of the concept of human rights.  
Simultaneously, however, whilst such a position may indeed be compatible with particular 
forms of cosmopolitan individualism, this does not by itself signify that a cosmopolitan 
approach has been undertaken.  As a result, whilst formal reliance on the universality of 
human rights can be taken as indicative of this cosmopolitan approach, it is not by itself 
sufficient to establish the extent to which the OHCHR incorporates the individual into the 
global constitutional process. 
489 Pogge, T., World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, (2nd edn.), 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), (henceforth, World Poverty and Human Rights), p. 175. 
490 See supra, Chapter 5. 
491 UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 3(b). 
492 Abeysekera, S., ‘The High Commissioners’ Promotion of Universality of Human Rights’, (henceforth, 
Abeysekera), in Conscience for the World, p. 121. 
493 Donnelly, J., Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, (3rd edn.), (London: Cornell University Press, 
2013), p. 95. 
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 These difficulties in establishing a more detailed examination of the relationship 
between individuals and the OHCHR are exacerbated by a closer inspection of the official 
mandate given to the High Commissioner.  For example, the HRC does possess an ability, 
albeit somewhat restricted, to examine any individual complaints that are placed before it.494  
In contrast, the OHCHR is not directly mandated as being involved in these considerations.  
Instead, there is an expectation that the High Commissioner “coordinate relevant United 
Nations education and public information programmes”495 and that they “rationalize, adapt, 
strengthen and streamline the United Nations machinery in the field of human rights”.496  
This administrative and managerial impression is only enhanced by expectations that the 
High Commissioner “carry out the tasks assigned to him/her by the competent bodies of the 
United Nations system”497 and “engage in a dialogue with all Governments”.498  From a 
consideration of this official remit, the OHCHR can be seen as primarily relating to member 
states of the UN and the wider United Nations system.  Whilst this provision of support and 
co-ordination in human rights matters does appear to strengthen the OHCHR’s relationship to 
broader processes of global constitutionalism, it does not provide evidence of its integration 
of a cosmopolitan perspective into such a process. 
 This absence of an official mandate to consider individualised circumstances has the 
result of shifting the direction of the present enquiry.  Instead of examining the formal remit 
received upon its creation, consideration must be given to the practical activities of the 
OHCHR and the ways in which its conduct affects the incorporation of the individual into the 
global constitutional process.  Of particular note are the ways in which 
“[t]he High Commissioners have accomplished the expansion of UN human 
rights activities outside Geneva as a result of both the merging of the Centre 
for Human Rights into the [OHCHR] ... and, more significantly, the 
establishment of an impressive network of field presences.”499 
494 See supra, Chapter 6. 
495 UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 4(e). 
496 Ibid., Art. 4(j). 
497 Ibid., Art. 4(b). 
498 Ibid., Art. 4(g). 
499 Broecker, C. L., ‘Protection through Presence: The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
the Field’, in Conscience for the World, p. 159. 
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The proliferation of these field presences has been facilitated by the fact that, in order to 
establish them, the OHCHR is under “no specific requirement to seek the approval of the 
political organs of the UN”.500 
This freedom of action has allowed the OHCHR to establish numerous field presences 
in a variety of locations and with a variety of mandates.501  However, these operations appear 
to be primarily directed at engaging with governments rather than citizens.  Indeed, it must be 
acknowledged that 
“[t]he main objectives of the majority of field presences include (1) to 
contribute to the establishment of structures for the protection and 
promotion of human rights at national and regional levels and (2) to 
establish a coordination mechanism for human rights activities both at 
national and regional levels.”502 
This engagement with, and focus on, formal structures and mechanisms can be seen as 
reflecting the expectation that “[e]ngagement and dialogue with countries will be the primary 
means through which OHCHR works to ensure the implementation of human rights.”503 
This engagement and dialogue with countries themselves would seem to indicate a 
lack of attention being paid to individual human beings in those locales.  Such a perception is 
only reinforced by a position that focuses on the structures and mechanisms available at the 
national and regional levels, rather than the personal circumstances of specific cases.  The 
two perspectives, however, are not inherently mutually exclusive.  Instead, it can be argued 
that the adoption of an “integrated approach allows the HCHR to be frank with a government 
by defining human rights problems, but as opposed to simply denouncing these violations, 
allows the HCHR to form a productive working relation to jointly establish targets for 
improvement.”504  Indeed, in many cases, “[t]he results that OHCHR achieved cannot be 
500 Ibid. 
501 See generally, ibid. 
502 Alizadeh, H., ‘A Proposal for How to Realize Human Rights at the National and Regional Level: A Three-
Pillar Strategy’, (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 826, p. 828. 
503 In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 
Addendum, ‘Plan of action submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’, 
A/59/2005/Add.3, (26/05/2005), p. 28, para. 127. 
504 Howland, T., ‘Mirage, Magic, or Mixed Bag?  The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
Field Operation in Rwanda’, (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 1, p. 44. 
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attributed to individual actions or to specific advocacy measures but is the outcome of their 
combined and flexible application.”505 
 In other words, there is a certain degree of flexibility and variety within the field 
operations of the OHCHR which does seem to enable the incorporation of a view of 
individual human beings into its official work.  Nevertheless, this is not achieved through the 
direct contributions and involvement of private actors within the scope of the OHCHR’s 
activities.  Instead, there is a view of the individual predominantly as a passive recipient and 
beneficiary of human rights protection that is attributed to them on the basis of agreements 
concluded between states rather than seeing them as being active contributors to the 
development and implementation of human rights.  As a result, it remains the case that, whilst 
the principal focus might be individual human beings, the primary origin of the work 
performed by and through the OHCHR remains states rather than individuals.  Individuals 
can be seen as benefitting from such work, but such a view is not significantly different from 
that attributable to other international bodies that attempt to protect human rights.  
Consequently, it might potentially be concluded that the OHCHR does not incorporate a 
direct consideration of the individual into processes of international law and politics any 
more than other international human rights bodies. 
 Significantly, however, there are a number of key factors that ought to be considered 
before settling upon such a conclusion.  In particular, the mandate given to the High 
Commissioner includes the ability “[t]o play an active role in removing the current obstacles 
and in meeting the challenges to the full realization of all human rights and in preventing the 
continuation of human rights violations throughout the world”.506  This active and 
preventative role enables the OHCHR to be more proactive in its engagement with human 
rights issues than more response-oriented bodies.  This is highlighted through the very 
existence of the field presences of the OHCHR, which allow for a more direct and integrated 
approach to human rights developments than either the more abstract standard-setting work 
or the purely responsive complaints procedure of the HRC. 
 A potentially more decisive factor, however, is the fact that the OHCHR is not a state-
based organ of the UN.  Whilst this wider organisation is centred upon the activities of its 
member states, the OHCHR is an officially neutral and impartial body.  It is thereby capable 
505 Volkmann, C. S., ‘Evaluating the Impact of Human Rights Work: The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Reduction of Extrajudicial Executions in Colombia’, (2012) 4(3) 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 396, (henceforth, Volkmann), p. 439. 
506 UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 4(f).  Emphasis added. 
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of functioning without having to depend directly on the wishes of states.  Consequently, the 
OHCHR can be seen as providing oversight of, and contributions to, the development of 
international human rights systems in a way which is not exclusively derived from the whims 
of the states that comprise the membership of those same systems. 
 It would be mistaken, therefore, to rush to a decision that the OHCHR is no different 
from other international human rights bodies.  It must be acknowledged that it would be 
difficult to describe the OHCHR as being democratic or truly representative of human 
individuality in any way.  Additionally, the apparent grounding in a universalist vision of 
human rights suggests a pre-constitutional understanding of such rights that has already been 
established as being incompatible with liberal constitutionalism.  However, the particular 
combination of a focus on human rights issues with an absence of a state-oriented 
composition does enable the OHCHR to be seen as a more cosmopolitan approach to the 
global constitutional process than other polycentric or state-based approaches.  This 
conclusion is reinforced by a consideration of the presence of the OHCHR in the field.  Such 
operations can be seen as enabling greater attention to be paid to specific cases, despite the 
involvement of individuals not being as extensive as might be expected from a ‘pure’ 
cosmopolitan position. 
 At the same time, however, an acknowledgement of the close relationship between the 
OHCHR and state governments does raise another concern.  In particular, there is the 
possibility that, in engaging with states and promoting human rights within particular state-
controlled territories, the OHCHR encourages an interference in state sovereignty that would 
be incompatible with a liberal global constitutional process.  In order to assess this possibility, 
the relationship between the OHCHR and states themselves must be more closely examined. 
 
7.2  Relationship to States 
 As has already been established, the OHCHR is not composed of state representatives, 
nor are its activities directed by any particular government or governments.  Simultaneously, 
however, there does seem to be a general expectation that the OHCHR work in and with 
states and their governments.  From the perspective of liberal global constitutionalism, this 
can appear somewhat problematic as there does exist the suggestion that a cosmopolitan 
approach necessarily “requires a global institutional reform with significant reductions in 
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national sovereignty.”507  Additionally, this state-oriented activity takes place within a 
framework which claims to emphasise the importance of individual human rights within 
international law and politics.  Indeed, it has even been suggested that “[h]uman rights 
discourse often seems to wish for an eventual disappearance of states in favor of universal 
human rights”.508  Questions naturally arise, therefore, as to the extent to which the OHCHR 
undermines, influences or otherwise affects the maintenance of the sovereign equality of the 
states to which it relates. 
 Regarding the relationship between the OHCHR and states themselves, the first aspect 
to note concerns a return to the original mandate of the High Commissioner.  Through this 
mandate, there is an expectation that the OHCHR “provide ... advisory services and technical 
and financial assistance, at the request of the state concerned”.509  Making the provision of 
assistance conditional upon the desire of the state affected would seem to indicate a strong 
tendency to support the concept of state sovereignty.  This is supported by the way in which 
the High Commissioner is expected to “engage in a dialogue with all Governments”.510  
There is also a requirement that the work of the High Commissioner “respect the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and domestic jurisdiction of States”.511  The official remit received by the 
High Commissioner, therefore, would seem to suggest that the position maintains a strong 
degree of support for the sovereignty of individual states.  As a result, it can be said that the 
overall impression is of an office that is subservient to states. 
 Once again, however, the original text of the mandate given to the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights is less significant than the ways in which this mandate has 
been applied and implemented in practice.  Of particular note is “the support for the 
establishment and strengthening of national human rights institutions by OHCHR [which] has 
certainly contributed to the large increase in the number of these institutions and their impact 
in the promotion and protection of human rights”.512  Conducted under the auspices of 
providing ‘advisory, technical and financial’ assistance to governments, these relationships 
between the OHCHR and national human rights institutions can potentially be seen as 
undermining the sovereignty of the states concerned.  Such a risk was particularly evident 
507 World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 201. 
508 de Mello, S. V., ‘Symposium on the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The First Ten 
Years of the Office, and the Next: Remarks’, (2003-4) 35 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 509, p. 513. 
509 UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 4(d).  Emphasis added. 
510 Ibid., Art. 4(g). 
511 Ibid., Art. 3(a). 
512 Thipanyane, T., ‘The High Commissioner and National Human Rights Institutions’, in Conscience for the 
World, p. 217. 
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during a period in which there were many of these institutions “with enormous teething 
problems, [and] who still need an ongoing measure of both technical support and external 
political support to get up and running.”513 
 The provision of this support by the OHCHR could potentially be seen as 
circumventing the proper authority of the state concerned.  Nevertheless, in suggesting such a 
view, recognition must be given to the fact that these national institutions typically form part 
of the governmental infrastructure of a state, as opposed to being truly independent of it.  At 
the same time, however, by relating directly to such an institution, the OHCHR is capable of 
bypassing the established authority structures within the state and promoting its own agenda 
within that state’s institutions.  This is particularly the case where “[t]he overall goal of 
OHCHR involvement in national mechanisms is to sponsor the creation of human rights 
institutions that would serve as impartial, independent, and autonomous entities to enforce 
national and international human rights norms.”514  An attempt to establish an independent 
institution that is capable of enforcing international norms against the wishes of the state 
concerned would seem to be a clear infringement on the liberty of that state to act as it sees fit. 
 A perception that this is an attack on the sovereignty of a state is only enhanced by the 
High Commissioner’s “role in highlighting human rights abuses in specific countries, and in 
specific situations”.515  Whilst there has been noticeable variation in the practices adopted by 
specific High Commissioners, it has also been observed that, “[o]ver the last twenty years, 
the High Commissioner has had to transition from quiet diplomacy in the corridors of power 
to public diplomacy through the global media.”516  At least one reason behind this general 
transition is quite simply an acknowledgement that “[t]he strategy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ did 
not work.”517  Although indirect, the more public commentary on the human rights record of 
specific states increases the extent to which the High Commissioner is capable of applying 
political and moral influence on a state in order to bring about a change in its policies or 
behaviour. 
513 Aoláin, F. N., ‘Symposium on the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The First Ten 
Years of the Office, and the Next: Remarks’, (2003-4) 35 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 523, p. 523. 
514 Mertus, J. A., The United Nations and Human Rights: A guide for a new era, (2nd edn.), (New York, USA: 
Routledge, 2009), (henceforth, Mertus), p. 28.  See also, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
April 1993. 
515 Abeysekera, p. 126. 
516 Ignatieff, M., ‘Rights Inflation and Role Conflict in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’, 
in Conscience for the World, p. 37. 
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 It must naturally be acknowledged that offering public criticism of the human rights 
record of specific states is not in and of itself an infringement of that state’s sovereignty.  
However, acting in combination with the direct relationship between the OHCHR and 
national human rights institutions, this encourages a situation in which there is potential for 
the OHCHR to be viewed as bypassing the legitimate role of the government itself.  This 
threat to the sovereignty of states is particularly noticeable from within an OHCHR which 
makes its support 
“contingent on a demonstrated willingness to meet internationally accepted 
standards and a genuine commitment to produce results.  In the case of 
institutions which are subservient to Governments that violate their 
international human rights obligations, support has not been forthcoming - 
nor will it be.”518 
The OHCHR, therefore, can be seen as actively promoting the independence of national 
human rights institutions from their own governments.  This lends additional support to a 
view that the methods employed by the OHCHR threaten the preservation of state 
sovereignty.  This is enhanced still further by the apparent attempts of the OHCHR to make 
its advice and assistance to states dependent on their willingness to cooperate.  As a result, it 
would appear as though there is a degree to which the OHCHR can be seen as inhibiting the 
ability of states to act without restraint. 
 Placing these limitations on the sovereignty of states, however, can only legitimately 
be seen as restricting their sovereignty to the extent that these states were already reliant on 
external support.  A state that does not see itself as being in need of advice or guidance from 
the OHCHR is unlikely to change its behaviour in order to receive any such assistance.  This 
only serves to highlight, therefore, that “[i]t has been particularly difficult for the High 
Commissioner to achieve results because neither she nor the independent human rights 
mechanisms staffed by OHCHR have enforcement power beyond moral suasion.”519  As a 
result, it cannot be said that the OHCHR can be seen as unduly restricting the sovereignty of 
states.  There would seem to be considerable potential, however, for the OHCHR to influence 
518 Address by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 18th April 
2001, as appearing in Conscience for the World, pp. 202-203. 
519 Genser, J., ‘The High Commissioner and Human Rights in Burma (Myanmar)’, in Conscience for the World, 
p. 367. 
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a state’s behaviour and, therefore, indirectly affect the ways in which such a state chooses to 
exercise its sovereignty. 
 At the same time as acknowledging this influence over the sovereignty of states, it is 
also worth noting that the OHCHR is also capable of acting independently of such 
sovereignty.  Whilst the OHCHR does form part of the UN system, and is therefore 
ultimately liable to the wishes of UN member states, this relative independence from the 
sovereignty of states is visible through the operation of the OHCHR field presences that were 
discussed above.  Such independence is, however, limited.  Whilst the OHCHR is capable of 
establishing a presence in the field without seeking specific approval from the more 
politicised bodies of the UN system, “[t]he legal basis for the operation of field offices is a 
negotiated agreement with the respective government”.520  Consequently, the mere 
establishment of a field presence in a specific state cannot be seen as a direct infringement on 
that state’s sovereignty, nor can it be taken as indicating the complete independence of the 
OHCHR from state decisions. 
 Nevertheless, these field offices do not fall under the direct control of the state 
concerned.  Instead, they remain a part of, and remain accountable to, the broader OHCHR.  
As a result, they contain an inherent potential to act in ways which are contrary to the 
sovereignty of the state in which they are placed.  This becomes particularly evident when it 
is noted that the Human Rights Officers who staff these field presences “are gaining greater 
potential for influencing how governments and non-governmental organizations respond to 
human rights abuses.”521  However, in a similar manner to the political influence and moral 
persuasion that stems from public statements, being able to influence how governments react 
to infringements of human rights can only be seen as, at most, an indirect inhibition on their 
sovereignty. 
 The overall impression, therefore, would seem to be that the current operation of the 
OHCHR does not contain an inherent and necessary restriction on the sovereignty of the 
states to which it relates.  The limitation of the OHCHR’s enforcement capacities to instances 
of political influence, moral persuasion and public criticism would seem to suggest that, 
whilst potentially affecting the operation of a state’s sovereignty, this is not unduly restrictive.  
The primary exception to this would seem to be the OHCHR’s pursuit of relationships with 
520 Mertus, p. 19. 
521 Horowitz, J., ‘OHCHR Pre-Deployment Human Rights Training: Adapting to the Evolving Roles, 
Responsibilities, and Influence of UN Human Rights Officers’, (2010) 2(1) Journal of Human Rights Practice 
28, p. 28. 
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national human rights institutions.  However, whilst these relationships do contain the ability 
and potential to undermine a state’s sovereignty, it must be remembered that such institutions 
are created and maintained by the state in question.  Consequently, any relationship between 
the OHCHR and a national human rights institution must of necessity interact with, and be 
reliant on, the wishes of the state concerned. 
 There is, however, an additional theme which appears to emerge from an examination 
of the relationship between the OHCHR and state sovereignty.  In particular, although it is 
possible to infer a relationship between the human rights activities of the OHCHR and wider 
theories of cosmopolitanism, as already discussed, it remains unclear as to how its activities 
might interact with the operation of the wider global constitutional process.  Consequently, in 
order to more fully consider the level of constitutional impact exercised by the OHCHR, it 
becomes necessary to examine the relationships between this office and other international 
bodies. 
 
7.3  Relationships with Other International Bodies 
 At this point, it has been established that the OHCHR adopts a markedly different 
approach to the international system than the HRC.  Specifically, the work of the OHCHR is 
more cosmopolitan and more oriented towards the individual human being than the position 
of its primarily state-centred counterpart.  At the same time, however, the limitations of the 
OHCHR mean that it is incapable of having an adverse impact on the nature of state 
sovereignty to the extent that it could reasonably be supposed to directly threaten it.  Instead, 
the OHCHR adopts a position that attempts to complement the role of the state, working with 
national governments rather than against them.  The particular combination of both of these 
factors seem to suggest that this cosmopolitan approach is more capable of preserving the 
liberty and equality inherent within the global constitutional process than the polycentric 
method that was examined earlier.  However, in order to more fully assess the extent to which 
this is indeed the case, it first becomes necessary to consider the relationship between the 
OHCHR and other international bodies. 
 The reasons for conducting such an investigation are twofold.  Firstly, there remains a 
potential argument that the work of the OHCHR is too restricted to be considered as having a 
significant impact on the overall process of the global constitution.  Such a possibility is 
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directly affected by the extent to which the OHCHR is capable of influencing, or is 
influenced by, its activities relating to other aspects of the international society within which 
it operates and to which it relates.  In addition to this, questions must also be asked as to 
whether or not the OHCHR is capable of actively preserving state sovereignty within the 
international system, as opposed to merely respecting it. 
 In order to more thoroughly examine these factors, then, it becomes necessary to more 
closely consider the relationship between the OHCHR and other international bodies.  To 
facilitate such an investigation, the other bodies concerned can broadly be divided into three 
distinct categories.  The first category to consider concerns the relationship between the 
OHCHR and other bodies within the United Nations system.  If the OHCHR is restricted to a 
relatively limited and technical role within its own organisation, it is perhaps unlikely that its 
work can be seen as having broader constitutional implications across international society as 
a whole.  A second category to be examined is the relationship between the OHCHR and 
state-based bodies that are external to the UN system.  Of particular note in this regard is the 
extent to which the OHCHR integrates, or is capable of integrating, its focus on the 
individual into the operations of bodies that are more explicitly focused on the concerns of 
states themselves.  A final set of relationships to be considered are those which exist between 
the OHCHR and various non-governmental organisations.  If the OHCHR is to be considered 
as protecting the idea of state sovereignty, then it is arguably its relationships with 
organisations that most directly test such an idea that ought to be examined in greater detail. 
 
7.3.1  The OHCHR and the United Nations 
 In the earlier attempt to examine the nature, or even existence, of a focus on the 
individual on the part of the OHCHR, the point was highlighted that the primary aims of the 
High Commissioner’s mandate appear to concern his or her relationship with the broader UN 
system.  In particular, upon creation of the post, the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
was given the responsibility “[t]o carry out the tasks assigned to him/her by the competent 
bodies of the United Nations system in the field of human rights”.522  He or she also has 
responsibility for coordinating both “relevant United Nations education and public 
information programmes”523 and “the human rights promotion and protection activities 
522 UNGA Res. 48/141, Art. 4(b). 
523 Ibid., Art. 4(e). 
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throughout the United Nations system”.524  As well as these, there is also an expectation that 
the person fulfilling this role shall “rationalize, adapt, strengthen and streamline the United 
Nations machinery in the field of human rights”.525 
 Such roles and responsibilities are perhaps to be expected given the intention “that the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights shall be the United Nations official with principal 
responsibility for United Nations human rights activities”.526  The initial reaction, therefore, 
might well be to view the OHCHR as effectively integrating a diverse array of UN machinery 
on issues relating to the implementation, promotion and protection of human rights.  This 
position, however, would appear to sit uneasily with the simultaneous implication that the 
OHCHR is subordinate to other bodies within the UN system and exists simply to aid in the 
administration of their decisions.  Consequently, the practical functioning and operations 
undertaken in respect of this mandate warrant a more detailed examination. 
 In particular, attention must be paid to the relationship between the OHCHR and the 
HRC.  As the principal state-based human rights organ within the UN system, the HRC can 
be seen as being the most affected by, or most likely to affect, the OHCHR.  It must be noted, 
however, that “the ambiguities in the relationship between the new [Human Rights] Council 
and the High Commissioner have been a source of tension between the two bodies.”527  The 
inherent relationship, however, appears to be primarily one of mutual complementarity rather 
than competition or hierarchy.  In essence, it can be described as being a relationship in 
which it falls “to the High Commissioner and OHCHR to capitalize upon the opportunities 
for action created by ... [the Human Rights] Council.”528  Whilst being principally 
cooperative in nature, this does suggest that the OHCHR is restricted in its freedom of action 
unless and until a specific geographic or thematic area has been positively addressed by the 
HRC. 
 For example, throughout the initial years of its operations, the OHCHR took no overt 
steps to explicitly address human rights issues that directly concerned matters of sexual 
orientation.  However, in 2011 the HRC passed a resolution which requested “the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to commission a study … documenting 
524 Ibid., Art. 4(i). 
525 Ibid., Art. 4(j). 
526 Ibid., Art. 4. 
527 Boyle, p. 43. 
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discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their 
sexual orientation and gender identity, in all regions of the world”.529  Following this single, 
and somewhat skeletal, resolution, the OHCHR has launched a “global public education 
campaign for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) equality”530 which aims to raise 
“awareness of homophobic and transphobic violence and discrimination, and … [to promote] 
greater respect for the rights of LGBT people everywhere.”531  The HRC’s resolution on the 
subject neither authorises nor requests the OHCHR to launch such an initiative and yet the 
OHCHR did not take such action until after the matter was directly addressed by the HRC.  
The implication, therefore, is that while there do exist close links between the HRC and the 
OHCHR, “successive High Commissioners have also built up an independent protection role 
mandated by the General Assembly resolution establishing the post.”532 
 Connected to this more independent role, and as was examined earlier, is the 
establishment and operation of field presences of the OHCHR which are not subject to the 
approval of political bodies of the United Nations, including the HRC.  Combined with the 
knowledge and awareness gained from these operations in the field, this independence 
strengthens the ability of the OHCHR to relate to the HRC as an informed equal rather than a 
purely subordinate administrator.  In turn, this grants the person of the High Commissioner 
herself or himself a position from which they are able “to draw global attention to the need to 
halt abuses and promote accountability ... [and provide] competent support to the independent 
mechanisms [of] the Council.”533  In other words, the normative and standard-setting work of 
the HRC can be seen as providing the OHCHR with direction and opportunities for action.  
Simultaneously, the work of the OHCHR permits a level of practical and apolitical 
engagement with human rights issues that is not possible within the confines of the state-
based HRC. 
 Whilst this relationship between the OHCHR and the HRC may indeed be seen as 
complementary and not confrontational, it remains unclear as to whether or not it is sufficient 
as to imbue the OHCHR with a genuinely constitutional role.  The HRC, however, is not the 
only other UN body to which the OHCHR can and does relate.  In particular, it must be noted 
529 Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution, 
A/HRC/17/19, (15/06/2011), Art. 1. 
530 https://www.unfe.org/en/about (last accessed, 06/05/15). 
531 Ibid.  For more information about this campaign, see generally, https://www.unfe.org/ (last accessed, 
06/05/15). 
532 Boyle, p. 43. 
533 Nossel and Broecker, p. 244. 
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that, “many other UN agencies are identified or identify themselves as being concerned with 
human rights.”534  Nevertheless, the position of the OHCHR is unique in that, as a 
“ranking Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, the High 
Commissioner carries great authority ... [and b]ecause human rights is 
considered a ‘cross-cutting issue,’ the High Commissioner is a member of 
all four executive committees of the United Nations: Peace and Security, 
Economic and Social Affairs, Development Cooperation, and Humanitarian 
Affairs.”535 
This level of authority combined with a multi-faceted role across the work of the UN system 
allows the High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide the whole framework with a 
coordinated and integrated approach to a wide variety of issues. 
The fundamental importance of human rights across the work of the UN was 
reinforced by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who declared that “we will not enjoy 
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will 
not enjoy either without respect for human rights.”536  This so-called ‘mainstreaming’ of 
human rights at the United Nations is highlighted by the way in which even “the [Security] 
Council normally includes a human rights component in the peacekeeping operations it 
authorizes.”537  This inclusion of human rights in the work of the Security Council naturally 
increases the connections between that Council and the OHCHR, a relationship which is 
reflected in “[t]he increasing frequency of the Security Council’s invitations to the High 
Commissioner to brief it on specific situations”.538  Consequently, whilst it cannot be said 
that the OHCHR is in any way directive or commanding in the way it relates to the wider UN 
system, the High Commissioner can be seen as having extensive participation in, and 
engagement with, the other elements of the UN.  However, in order to more fully assess the 
constitutional role of the OHCHR, attention must also be paid to the way in which it relates to 
actors outside of the UN system. 
 
534 Hannum, H., ‘Human Rights in Conflict Resolution: The Role of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in UN Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’, (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 1, (henceforth, 
Hannum), p. 11. 
535 Mertus, p. 13. 
536 In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 
A/59/2005, (21/03/2005), (henceforth, In larger freedom), p. 6, para. 17. 
537 Hannum, p. 13 
538 In larger freedom, p. 37, para. 144. 
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7.3.2  The OHCHR and Other State-based Bodies 
 Before examining the relationships between the OHCHR and bodies that are, at least 
on the surface, unconnected to the UN system, there exists a particular group of actors that 
could be said to occupy a somewhat peculiar form of middle-ground.  These are the various 
bodies that have been established in connection with specific international treaties and 
covenants.  Each of these 
“human rights treaty bodies (with the exception of the ECOSOC-established 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) is a sui-generis 
independent body, established by treaty and not answerable to the political 
organs of the UN.  However, the treaties specify that secretariat services be 
provided by the UN Secretary-General.  This secretariat function has always 
been provided by the UN’s human rights program”.539 
 This secretarial provision in support of the human rights treaty bodies is arguably one 
of their more consistent aspects as, in other respects, there can be considerable variation 
amongst and between them.  One area of difference that ought perhaps to be expected is the 
precise subject matter being addressed, with each treaty body serving a particular treaty that 
is intended to address a specific, and most often thematic, area of concern.  At the time of 
writing, such areas included the prevention of torture, the rights of children and the 
elimination of racial discrimination.540 
 In relation to the mechanisms and operation of these treaty bodies, however, there 
would appear to be a certain degree of similarity, although there remains considerable 
divergence relating to exact details.  As a generalised view, it can be said that the 
responsibilities of these bodies usually relate to the fulfilment of “some, if not all, of the 
following functions: review of state reports; state-to-state, individual and other forms of 
communications; the issuance of ‘General Comments’; thematic discussions and other open 
fora; and establishing ‘National Plans of Action’.”541  In addition to the variation of remits, 
there are also some inherent tensions underlying the operation of these bodies as, whilst they 
539 O’Flaherty, M., ‘The High Commissioner and the Treaty Bodies’, (henceforth, O’Flaherty), in Conscience 
for the World, p. 101.  O’Flaherty notes the exception of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women which, for a time, was administered to by the UN Division for the Advancement of Women. 
540 For some more specific examples, as well as more detailed discussion of the operations and functioning of 
human rights treaty bodies, see generally Mertus, pp. 82-94.  A full list of the treaty bodies currently serviced by 
the OHCHR is available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx (last accessed, 
06/05/15). 
541 Mertus, p. 65. 
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are established by and reliant on treaties concluded between states, those who serve in them 
predominantly “work as independent individuals, rather than representing the interests of 
their own home countries.”542 
 Overall, then, the work of the human rights treaty bodies can be said to be varied and 
diverse.  The ways in which the OHCHR relates to these bodies, however, is broadly 
consistent in spite of such differences and variation.  In general, these relationships have 
“come over time to embrace at least three dimensions: delivery of secretariat support, 
substantive partnership of human rights actors, and the High Commissioner’s facilitatory 
leadership in confronting the problems of the system.”543  In and of themselves, none of these 
dimensions are indicative of the constitutional nature of the work of the OHCHR.  In 
particular, there does not seem to be any indication that the OHCHR is responsible for any 
incorporation of individual personhood into the activities of these treaty bodies.  Any 
possibility of individual petitions or communications is dependent on the methods established 
by the treaty bodies themselves and is independent of any overt desires or actions of the 
OHCHR.  At the same time, however, the relationships between the OHCHR and the human 
rights treaty bodies do seem to demonstrate a certain degree of integration of the OHCHR 
into various processes and activities within the wider realm of international human rights law. 
 Examining these broader aspects of international law, however, seems to suggest that 
efforts to incorporate a more individualised, or potentially cosmopolitan, perspective have 
developed relatively independently of any influence exerted by the OHCHR.  In a general 
sense, it can be argued that 
“the ever growing role of the individual in contemporary international law is 
linked to three other phenomena of general and gradual change of 
international law which may be so summarized: a) a widening of the scope 
and of the material content of international law; b) a process of progressive 
narrowing of the ‘private’ normative nature of international law and of 
widening of its ‘public’ nature; c) a process of widening of the formal 
addressees of international law”.544 
542 Ibid. 
543 O’Flaherty, p. 118. 
544 Mazzeschi, R. P., ‘Impact on the Law of Diplomatic Protection’, in Kamminga, M. T., and Scheinin, M., 
(eds.), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), (henceforth, The Impact of Human Rights Law), pp. 212-213. 
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The suggestion has even been made, in fact, that the individual “has always remained in 
contact, directly or indirectly, with the international legal order.”545 
 A clear and direct example of this within the existing systems of international law is 
found within the practices of the European Court of Human Rights, which “may receive 
applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals”.546  
Nevertheless, it may well be possible to argue that certain systems developed through the 
United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations, “were some of the first 
international experiments to grant procedural capacity directly to individuals”.547  Such 
procedures, however, were concretely established many years before the creation of the 
OHCHR. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, individuals are not only able to claim enforcement 
of their rights under international law, but opportunities also now exist for their prosecution 
for violations of the rights of others.  Whilst it remains true that a general regime “which 
would enable national courts to prosecute and punish foreign state officials for severe human 
rights violations”548 has not yet been made manifest at an international level, other 
opportunities for similar prosecutions do now exist.  In particular, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) has “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern”.549 
 In the case of the ICC, however, there are links between its own mechanisms and 
those of the United Nations system.  Whilst it was established outwith the purview of the 
official UN machinery, the parties creating the ICC did agree that it would “be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations”.550  This relationship, however, is primarily with the 
Security Council of the UN.551  As a result, any influence the OHCHR might exert on the 
proceedings is both limited and indirect.  This indirect relationship is highlighted by 
“personnel moves [which] happen at the working level, when staffers from the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court ... transfer to work within the Office of the 
545 Trindade, A. A. C., The Access of Individuals to International Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), (henceforth, Trindade), p. 3.  Emphasis added. 
546 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended), (04/11/1950), United Nations Treaty Series I-2889, Art. 34. 
547 Trindade, p. 19. 
548 Rensmann, T., ‘Impact on the Immunity of States and their Officials’, in The Impact of Human Rights Law, p. 
151. 
549 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (17/07/1998), United Nations Treaty Series I-38544, Art. 1. 
550 Ibid., Art. 2. 
551 For more detailed discussion of the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council, see Arbour, 
L., ‘The Relationship Between the ICC and the UN Security Council’, (2014) 20 Global Governance 195. 
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High Commissioner for Human Rights.”552  This interchange of staff, happening in both 
directions, lends support for “the merging of the movements of international criminal justice 
and international human rights”.553 
 Consequently, whilst the influence of the OHCHR beyond the UN system may be 
indirect at best, it is equally true that these external relationships demonstrate the broad scope 
of activities to which the OHCHR is connected.  As regards the overall global constitutional 
process, however, the significance of these relationships appears somewhat limited.  This is 
particularly the case when it is noted that the OHCHR has been completely disconnected 
from the development of “[t]he free and full exercise of the right of individual petition 
directly before international human rights tribunals (such as the European, Inter-American 
and, more recently, African Courts)”.554 
 Any evidence, therefore, of individual participation within international law cannot of 
itself be directly attributed to the role and influence of the OHCHR.  Simultaneously, 
however, it is also possible to see the OHCHR as having a relatively broad impact that affects 
international proceedings beyond the purely administrative issues of other UN bodies.  As a 
result, it remains the case that the OHCHR can be situated within a wider cosmopolitan 
perspective on the global constitutional process, despite not having a monopoly on its 
direction.  Nevertheless, in order to more fully assess the extent of any influence that the 
OHCHR is capable of exerting, it is also necessary to examine the ways, if any, in which it is 
able to preserve and maintain the centrality of state sovereignty, as opposed to merely 
respecting it in its own work.  In order to achieve this, it becomes necessary to consider the 
relationships between the OHCHR and organisations that are not composed of states or their 
direct representatives. 
 
7.3.3  The OHCHR and Non-Governmental Organisations 
 Initially, it might be expected that there would be much mutual support between the 
OHCHR and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  This is especially the case when it is 
considered that, in submitting their opinion to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, 
various NGOs advocated for “[a]n office of a High Commissioner for Human Rights [which] 
552 Kaye, D., ‘Human Rights Prosecutors?  The High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Justice, 
and the Example of Syria’, in Conscience for the World, p. 246. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Trindade, pp. 48-9. 
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should be established as a new high-level independent authority within the United Nations 
system”.555  In spite of this support, however, when it came time for the UN to outline the 
mandate and role of this new office, “the Chairman [of the working group debating the issue] 
reserved the right to exclude NGOs when sensitive matters were discussed.”556  This 
exclusion, whilst limited, does suggest a degree of suspicion and distrust between a UN 
system centred upon sovereign states and a privately-organised system of NGOs. 
 Nevertheless, it remains the case that “the role of the NGOs in promoting and 
conceptualizing the idea of a High Commissioner over the years is now reflected in the 
Office’s reliance on them for information, suggestions and support.”557  For the purposes of 
the present discussion, however, establishing in any great detail the extent or nature of the 
information and support provided to the OHCHR by NGOs would not be particularly 
revealing.  This is a position that only increases in significance once it is noted that in NGOs 
possessing a “far-flung organizational formation the professional NGO staff wields 
tremendous discretionary power, unaccountable to either beneficiaries or supporters, to 
massage information to reflect the expectations of the partners rather than the reality of the 
mission.”558 
 For the time being, therefore, the relevant factor for consideration is not the 
information provided by NGOs to the OHCHR.  What is more relevant is, rather, the extent 
to which the OHCHR is capable of preserving a respect for state sovereignty within the 
operations of its relationships with NGOs.  This is particularly significant from within an 
environment in which “there has been a prolific attempt to build a case against NGOs 
suggesting that they are undermining national sovereignty and democracy”.559  Attempts by 
NGOs to transform the operation of the political scene have not been restricted to the level of 
the state itself.  It has even been suggested, for instance, that “an emerging global civil 
555 Note by the Secretariat, Report by the General Rapporteur, Manfred Nowak, as adopted by the Final Plenary 
Session of the NGO-Forum, World Conference on Human Rights, A/CONF.157/7, (14/06/1993), Annex II, I.A., 
para. 3. 
556 Clapham, p. 562. 
557 Ibid., p. 567. 
558 DeMars, W. E., NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics, (London: Pluto Press, 
2005), p. 7. 
559 Jordan, L., and van Tuijl, P., ‘Rights and Responsibilities in the Political Landscape of NGO Accountability: 
Introduction and Overview’, in Jordan, L., and van Tuijl, P., (eds.), NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles 
and Innovations, (London: Earthscan, 2006), (henceforth, NGO Accountability), p. 3. 
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society may hold the potential for forging new forms of democracy and social mediation on a 
global scale.”560 
 This transformational potential, however, is yet to be realised.  Nevertheless, it does 
suggest that the natural tendency of NGOs is to undermine, or at least influence, the existing 
ability of states to act as they choose, even if this influence is only indirect.  To a certain 
degree, this is perhaps to be expected, given that NGOs are specifically non-governmental 
organisations.  Consequently, it is the very nature of NGOs themselves which leads to a 
position that “one should not expect NGOs to be accountable to governments.”561  This 
independence of NGOs as regards sovereign states is equally applicable to the relationship 
between NGOs and the OHCHR.  Whilst these organisations are permitted to provide 
information and support, the OHCHR has no specific control over the actions of any NGOs to 
whom it relates, nor does it even possess a remit that would grant the possibility of such 
control.  As a result, it cannot be said that the OHCHR is capable of enforcing a respect for 
state sovereignty upon any NGOs that would otherwise be willing to ignore it. 
 At the same time, however, it remains possible to suggest that these NGOs “are 
necessarily implicated in the reproduction of the inter-state system and to that extent must 
still formulate their demands with reference to the sovereign state”.562  Nevertheless, 
acknowledging state sovereignty is not coterminous with respecting it and it cannot be said 
that the OHCHR has the capacity to impose such respect on either NGOs or the even more 
nebulous concept of a ‘global civil society’.  Indeed, it can even be suggested that any 
influence that does exist between the UN system and NGOs is actually flowing in the 
opposite direction, with the United Nations demonstrating an increasing willingness to 
receive advice and suggestions from a wide variety of such organisations.563 
 From a particularly benign perspective, this apparent willingness to more openly 
consider the opinions of NGOs can be attributed to a belief that such organisations represent 
“the rise of civil society [which] is one of the landmark events of our times, and that the 
growing participation and influence of non-state actors is enhancing democracy and 
560 Turner, S., ‘Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging Paradigm’, in Frost, M., 
(ed.), International Ethics, (Vol. II), (London: Sage, 2011), p. 60. 
561 Charnovitz, S., ‘Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in Global Governance’ in NGO 
Accountability, p. 21. 
562 Colás, A., International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 
(henceforth, Colás), p. 139. 
563 For just one example, see generally, Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society 
Relations, We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance, A/58/817, (11/06/2004). 
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reshaping multilateralism”.564  Simultaneously, however, it must also be borne in mind that 
“undermining state sovereignty can be as detrimental to the objective of accountable, 
democratic politics as it is in some instances beneficial”.565  Some critics have even presented 
the argument that “[w]hile the project of building a global civil society sounds benign and 
entirely progressive, in reality ... it offers a human face to the ugly practices of global 
corporate capital.”566 
 It is not the place of the present discussion, however, to assess the relative merits or 
intentions of a global civil society.  For the time being, it shall suffice to conclude that the 
OHCHR appears inherently unable, and potentially even unwilling, to integrate the 
foundations of a liberal global constitutional process with its relations to non-governmental 
organisations.  Whether or not such a conclusion can be extended to describe the entire 
relationship between the OHCHR and the global constitutional process is an assessment that 
must be undertaken within the overall context of the various factors discussed above. 
 
7.4  Contribution of the OHCHR to the Global Constitutional Process 
 The fundamental question that led to an examination of the OHCHR was whether or 
not a cosmopolitan perspective on the global constitutional process may be able to preserve 
the liberty and equality of states through the development and maintenance of an intra-
constitutional view of rights at the global level.  As examined in the course of this chapter, 
the OHCHR can indeed be seen as an institution which provides for some degree of 
incorporation of the individual human being into the global constitutional process.  
Simultaneously, however, there is a maintenance of respect for state sovereignty which, 
whilst occasionally subject to challenge, retains a privileged position within the work of the 
OHCHR. 
 Nevertheless, despite initial appearances to the contrary, examining the relationship 
between the OHCHR and other international bodies appears to reveal the inherent inability of 
the office to maintain a liberal global constitutional process.  Although it may possess a 
certain degree of constitutional status and integration as regards such relationships, it is 
564 Lindblom, A.-K., Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 410. 
565 Colás, p. 138. 
566 Gamble, A., and Kenny, M., ‘Ideological contestation, transnational civil society and global politics’, in 
Germain, R. D., and Kenny, M., (eds.), The Idea of Global Civil Society: Politics and ethics in a globalizing era, 
(London: Routledge, 2005), p. 21. 
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completely lacking in any ability to enforce constitutional precepts on those who would 
otherwise ignore them.  This is compounded by an incorporation of the individual which, 
whilst present, is primarily as passive beneficiary rather than active participant. 
 It is arguably this attitude towards the individual that is the principal cause of the 
OHCHR’s inability to support a liberal global constitutional process.  By failing to truly 
engage the individual as a participant in the process, the OHCHR fails to adopt a truly 
cosmopolitan perspective on constitutional issues.  Ultimately, whilst the office may not be 
directly controlled by states themselves, this position leaves the OHCHR as a passive 
addressee of a state-operated and state-directed constitutional process.  Such an arrangement 
is then simply highlighted by the absence of any direct ability to participate in the 
enforcement phase of the process, which results in an incomplete, and therefore ineffective, 
engagement with constitutional mechanisms.  The implications of such a conclusion for the 
broader concepts of liberal global constitutionalism shall be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
  
173 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 Over the course of the present discussion, it has been established that it is possible to 
view a constitution as an ongoing, multiphase process, as opposed to a singularly static and 
monolithic entity.567  By focusing on the conceptually dominant form of liberal 
constitutionalism, it was also possible to establish the existence of a global constitutional 
process operating on the basis of the sovereign equality of the autarchic communities known 
as states.568  Nevertheless, the capacity of an international society of states to maintain a 
liberal global constitutional process has been called into question. 
 The United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) was shown to be lacking the 
capacity for normative integration that would be necessary to support a polycentric approach 
to maintaining the sovereign equality of liberal global constitutionalism.569  Similarly, the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was 
considered to be lacking the necessary integration of individual participation to maintain a 
cosmopolitan approach to the same issue.570  According to the earlier analysis, therefore, it 
would appear as though reliance on the beneficence of great powers, as unsustainable as it 
may be, remains the only way to ensure the maintenance of a liberal global constitutional 
process.571 
 Before unreservedly supporting such a conclusion, however, greater attention must be 
paid as to why the alternatives have seemingly failed.  In particular, it must be noted that 
neither the polycentric nor cosmopolitan approaches were shown to be lacking in and of 
themselves.  Rather, there was a failure of the human rights institutions of the United Nations 
(UN) to fully embody the prerequisites necessary for the respective theoretical approaches to 
take hold.  Consequently, there proceeds from this analytical framework the opportunity for 
more normative arguments as to the reforms that would be necessary within international 
society if reliance on the unreliable great power approach is to be avoided. 
567 See supra, Chapters 2 and 3. 
568 See supra, Chapter 4. 
569 See supra, Chapter 6. 
570 See supra, Chapter 7. 
571 See supra, Chapter 5. 
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 The present chapter, then, proceeds to examine such arguments in greater detail.  This 
analysis, however, is not intended to be exhaustive.  Instead, the aim is to more closely 
examine such claims in order to reveal possible directions for future research and 
investigation.  Underlying this discussion are the particular contributions made by the 
adoption of an understanding of a constitution as a process composed of the distinct, though 
interrelated, phases of identification, enumeration, implementation and enforcement. 
 
8.1  Reforming the United Nations 
 As stated above, the earlier discussions surrounding the primary human rights 
institutions of the UN have shown both of them to be lacking the ability to develop and 
support a constitutional framework that is both liberal and global.  In the case of the HRC, it 
can be argued that a greater focus on integrating competing normative views across and 
between international society would strengthen its ability to act as a normative centrepoint 
around which a polycentric society could cohere.  As for the OHCHR, it could be suggested 
that a greater focus on enabling and encouraging public participation in its activities, and 
potentially even in its direction, would strengthen the role of the individual within 
international affairs and thereby help provide the groundwork for a cosmopolitan approach to 
a liberal global constitutional process.  It cannot be suggested that these reforms would be 
either easy or likely.  Indeed, it must be conceded that in previous years “[t]he widely 
endorsed project of UN reform disappointed even before it failed.”572  Nevertheless, it 
remains equally true that there may be “concealed opportunities for transformative politics [to] 
exist in relation to the future of the United Nations.”573  Consequently, the possibilities just 
outlined do merit a more detailed examination.  It is, therefore, this examination that shall 
now be conducted. 
 
8.1.1  Reforming the HRC 
 It was considered earlier that the HRC as it currently stands presents very little threat 
to the maintenance of an international polycentric system.  Instead, the problem that was 
572 Falk, R., ‘The Outlook for UN Reform: Necessary, but Impossible’, in Paolini, A. J., et al, (eds.), Between 
Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998), p. 296. 
573 Ibid., p. 310. 
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presented was an apparent inability to convincingly integrate a wide variety of normative 
values and concerns.574  At this point, then, the logical question to consider would be whether 
or not there exist ways in which such normative integration might become possible.  Whilst, 
as already suggested, reforms to the UN system remain both rare and difficult, it must also be 
noted that the HRC was itself born out of reform and it can be argued that “[i]f it is doing its 
work properly, the council should have its eyes on developments that will shape the world of 
the future.”575  Consequently, there may yet be insights to be gleaned from considering ways 
in which the HRC could develop. 
 In particular, it ought to be recalled that one of the principle reasons behind the lack 
of normative integration at the HRC was found to be its reliance on a purely geographic 
system of representation.  As a result, a natural solution might be to suggest a reconfiguration 
of the selection procedures for membership of the HRC in order to diminish the significance 
of geographic location.  There are, however, a number of significant obstacles to such a 
suggestion. 
 Firstly, there is the consideration that a “serious concern surrounding the [former] 
Commission was its composition”,576 which resulted in membership of the HRC forming one 
of the most contentious issues surrounding its creation.577  Consequently, any attempt at 
altering its composition could expect to encounter similar resistance and objections.  This 
complication is compounded further by the fact that “these [geographical] groupings have 
been used throughout the United Nations system for the purpose of election to seats including 
in the Security Council, General Assembly, [and] ECOSOC”.578  This has the result that any 
change in this area within the HRC would likely require broader reforms, or at least would 
have broader implications, than altering the membership of the HRC alone. 
 Furthermore, consideration must also be given to the fact that there is “only mixed 
evidence that blocs are relevant in this new UN institution.”579  This observation can be 
574 See supra, Chapter 6. 
575 Ramcharan, B. G., The UN Human Rights Council, (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 2. 
576 Besant, A., and Malo, S., ‘Dim Prospects for the United Nations Human Rights Council’, (2009) 4 Yale 
Journal of International Affairs 144, p. 145. 
577 See generally, Lauren, P. G., ‘“To Preserve and Build on its Achievements and to Redress its Shortcomings”: 
The Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council’, (2007) 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly 307, (henceforth, Lauren). 
578 Boyle, K., ‘The United Nations Human Rights Council: Origins, Antecedents, and Prospects’, (henceforth, 
Boyle), in Boyle, K., (ed.), New Institutions for Human Rights Protection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 18. 
579 Hug, S., and Lukács, R., ‘Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council’, (2014) 
9 Review of International Organizations 83, (henceforth, Hug and Lukács), p. 103. 
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combined with an argument that “[s]tates are linked by political and other interests and 
affinities which in some cases, such as Africa, coincide with geography but in others, such as 
Eastern Europe, equally reflect geo-political realities”.580  Working together, these factors 
give rise to a recognition that, for the most part, controversy at the HRC is not simply due to 
geographic representation but “is largely introduced by countries with blemished human 
rights records.”581  Consequently, it becomes difficult to sustain an argument that simply 
altering the geographic balance of the council will produce the desired level of normative 
integration. 
 Instead, it can be argued that the above observations highlight an alternative 
possibility.  As opposed to focusing on the exact nature of any geographic balance, and to the 
extent that instability in the HRC is introduced through states with a poor human rights 
record, greater consideration could be given to the provisions that voting members of the 
HRC ought to respect human rights themselves.  Provided that election was still undertaken 
through the General Assembly of the UN, strengthening these conditions could arguably 
maintain the necessary level of representation of the broader UN membership whilst 
simultaneously improving the ability of the HRC to provide cohesive and coherent normative 
integration. 
 At this point, making the normative argument for such an eventuality may not appear 
particularly innovative or surprising.  After all, the HRC was created with the hope that states 
“would regard membership as a reward for their demonstrated support for human rights.”582  
Despite these hopes, however, “[i]n the final design, a state’s human rights record was not a 
major impediment to membership on the HRC”.583  Consequently, it can be argued that many 
of the original debates surrounding such criteria remain applicable.  Nevertheless, what the 
constitutional analysis of polycentricity has shown is that strengthening the criteria for 
membership of the HRC does not automatically have to proceed from a desire to strengthen 
human rights protection.584  Instead, this perspective highlights the fact that these 
developments would actually be beneficial to states wishing to protect their sovereignty in the 
580 Boyle, p. 19. 
581 Hug and Lukács, p. 103. 
582 Lauren, p. 332. 
583 Cox, E., ‘State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations Human Rights Council’, 
(2010-11) 6 Journal of International Law and International Relations 87, (henceforth, Cox), p. 117. 
584 Whilst it is not strictly relevant to the present discussion, whether or not stronger membership criteria would 
actually benefit human rights themselves has been the subject of some debate.  See, for instance, Ghanea, N., 
‘From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council: One Step Forwards or Two Steps 
Sideways?’, (2006) 55(3) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 695, particularly at pp. 699-700. 
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international sphere, understood in an analogous manner to individual liberty at the national 
level.  Principally, this would be through an improved degree of normative integration which 
would enable a variety of political and legal centres to overlap and compete without 
threatening the overall viability and coherence of the international society itself. 
 In developing this integration, however, it must be noted that the HRC would still 
need to maintain a degree of representation of the broader UN membership.  Consequently, 
tighter controls would need to be balanced with maintaining a variety of opinions and 
perspectives.  Additionally, a degree of restriction would need to remain regarding the HRC’s 
ability to act as a significant political and legal centre in its own right.  This is particularly 
emphasised by an acknowledgement of the distinct constitutional phases of identification, 
enumeration, implementation and enforcement.  For instance, it has been suggested that, in 
creating the HRC, states succeeded in “designing an institution that reflected the 
overwhelming desire of many states not to have an overly strong human rights enforcement 
body.”585  Such a position is precisely what is supported by the present argument.  Excessive 
centralisation of power in the hands of the HRC would increase the threat to polycentricity by 
encouraging a tendency towards hierarchical domination of international society.  As a result, 
there remains reason to support and encourage a situation in which “power and persuasion sit 
side by … [side] as part of the same intellectual schema.”586 
As a consequence of these positions, it can be argued that a reformed HRC must be 
better able to build consensus regarding international human rights norms whilst 
simultaneously continuing to be broadly representative of the wider UN system and without 
requiring stronger enforcement capabilities.  In essence, this would require a degree of 
political acumen that would rely on somewhat nebulous factors such as trust, respect and 
integrity.  Uncovering the exact mechanisms by which such achievements might be 
developed and maintained, however, is an investigation that must await another day.  For the 
time being, it shall suffice to conclude that the HRC remains a viable contender for grounding 
a global separation of powers, as expressed through a polycentric society.  This would only 
be possible, however, were it to strengthen its ability to build consensus around key human 
rights concerns. 
 
585 Cox, p. 117. 
586 Davies, M., ‘Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations’, (2010) 
35(4) Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 449, p. 464. 
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8.1.2  Reforming the OHCHR 
 In contrast to the HRC, reforming the OHCHR would initially appear somewhat 
simpler and easier to achieve.  As was evident through its establishment of field presences 
and the UN Free and Equal campaign, the secretariat- rather than state-based nature of the 
OHCHR provides it with more flexibility to vary its operations than appears possible in the 
state-centred HRC.  The extent of reforms that would be necessary to make the OHCHR a 
viable supporter of a liberal global constitutional process, however, puts even this increased 
flexibility to the test. 
 As previously identified, the primary area in which support is lacking regards the 
OHCHR’s apparent inability to incorporate a particular view of individuality into the global 
constitutional process.  The cosmopolitan reasoning underpinning the need for such a 
development could potentially be seen as being substantially similar to a constitutionalism-
as-governance view of rights, seeing them as a form of fundamental morality.  However, the 
universalist, and potentially imperialist, implications of such a position can make it difficult 
to sustain and certain trends within cosmopolitan thought seek instead “to overcome this 
problem by calling for an order wherein all will be subject to a law of which all are the 
authors”.587  One of the reasons that led to an examination of the OHCHR, however, was a 
desire to focus on existing institutions as they are now and so avoid an approach which 
“leaves us suspended between our present unsatisfactory condition and this utopian 
horizon.”588 
In order to escape this destiny, it is possible to argue that, through emphasising 
individuals as rights-holders and rights-claimers, a cosmopolitan approach leads to an 
increased focus on the need to incorporate a greater degree of democratic practices within the 
operation of the OHCHR.  Whilst it could potentially be suggested that simply “[s]tating that 
the international community is a constitutional community evokes the constitutionalist 
principle of democracy”,589 it has already been established that contemporary notions of 
democracy are more properly linked with liberal values of equality and liberty than with 
constitutionalism per se.590  Having also established, however, that the contemporary global 
587 Ingram, J. D., Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism, (New York, USA: 
Columbia University Press, 2013), (henceforth, Ingram), p. 246. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Peters, A., ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Klabbers, J., et al, (eds)., The 
Constitutionalization of International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), (henceforth, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law), p. 154.  Emphasis in original. 
590 See supra, Chapter 3. 
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constitution can be described as a system of liberal constitutionalism,591 there does remain the 
possibility that encouraging the development of a cosmopolitan democracy may well assist in 
the preservation of these liberal principles at the global level. 
 Such a suggestion, however, immediately gives rise to a vast array of challenges and 
difficulties, both theoretical and practical.  At the theoretical level, this approach “requires a 
rethinking of some of the basic principles of democratic practice and organization”.592  One 
such reconceptualisation of democracy that is particularly relevant is the argument that 
“[w]hile democracy is typically associated with familiar representative and 
electoral institutions, these institutions are commonly conflated with the 
values or principles that animate them ... Representative and electoral 
institutions can be (better) understood as requirements that follow from 
democratic principles in particular settings.”593 
Through establishing this focus on principles rather than institutions, it becomes possible to 
argue that if “we understand democracy as a form of political action rather than a regime, we 
can understand practices of claiming rights as themselves democratic, and democracy as 
arising wherever and to the extent that such practices come into being.”594  Through such a 
conceptualisation of democracy, it becomes possible to suggest that, to the extent that it 
encourages and enables the practice of claiming rights, the OHCHR is already democratic, or 
at least supportive of democracy. 
 From the present perspective, however, an argument that the OHCHR already 
supports democracy because it encourages the widening of participation in rights-based 
practices is neither particularly helpful nor informative.  At best, this approach merely recasts 
the original arguments that justified the earlier examination of the UN's non-state-based 
human rights work.  As already argued, however, the OHCHR's relationship to individuals is 
primarily as passive recipients rather than active participants in rights practices.  If nothing 
else, then, the case of the OHCHR can simply be taken as evidence that support for 
supposedly democratic values and principles does not automatically translate into the 
implementation of traditional democratic practices. 
591 See supra, Chapter 4. 
592 Archibugi, D., ‘Cosmopolitan democracy: a restatement’, (2012) 42(1) Cambridge Journal of Education 9, p. 
10. 
593 Goodhart, M., and Taninchev, S. B., ‘The New Sovereigntist Challenge for Global Governance: Democracy 
without Sovereignty’, (2011) 55 International Studies Quarterly 1047, p. 1061. 
594 Ingram, p. 258. 
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 This more practical angle, however, does highlight certain opportunities for reform, as 
well as more criticisms.  Notably, the point must be emphasised that, whilst the OHCHR is 
not itself composed of representatives of states, it remains inextricably connected with the 
state-based system of the United Nations itself.  As a result, it is perhaps only to be expected 
that the OHCHR would fail to establish a satisfactory incorporation of the individual into the 
global constitutional process.  At this point, however, it must be left to future research to 
more fully examine the extent to which the OHCHR’s failure is a result of this lingering and 
tangential presence of states within its operation and direction.  For the time being, there do 
exist opportunities for reform that might achieve the goals outlined above even if this 
seemingly minor involvement of states were to remain. 
 In particular, these opportunities concern the relationship between the OHCHR and 
the various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to which it relates.  Specifically, the 
argument can be made that such “global civil society institutions constitute a kind of 
democratic infrastructure.”595  Seen in this way, NGOs can “become a necessary part of the 
formal accountability mechanisms of global governance institutions”596 such as the OHCHR.  
In other words, by viewing NGOs as a global demos, the argument can be put forward that 
through developing closer integration of NGOs into the life of the OHCHR then this office 
could be seen as becoming more democratic. 
 Inevitably, however, adopting such a position is not without difficulties of its own.  
Not least among these difficulties is the observation that greater involvement of NGOs in the 
work of the OHCHR does not equate to an increase in the participatory role of individuals.  
Indeed, it would be difficult to argue “that all civil society activities inherently and 
automatically enhance democratic accountability in global regimes.”597  This objection 
becomes particularly strong once it is noted that “NGOs do not enjoy any democratic 
mandate by (global) citizens, but are self-appointed.”598  As a result, there is an apparently 
strong argument that “such an approach cannot solve the problem of the democratic 
deficit.”599  Additionally, it is possible to suggest that “increasingly institutionalized 
595 Peters, A., ‘Dual Democracy’, (henceforth, Dual Democracy), in The Constitutionalization of International 
Law, p. 315. 
596 Volk, C., ‘Why Global Constitutionalism Does not Live up to its Promises’, (2012) 4(2) Goettingen Journal 
of International Law 551, (henceforth, Volk), p. 564. 
597 Scholte, J. A., ‘Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance’, (2004) 39 Government 
and Opposition 211, p. 213. 
598 Dual Democracy, p. 316. 
599 Falk, R., and Strauss, A., ‘On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of 
Popular Sovereignty’, (2000) 36(2) Stanford Journal of International Law 191, p. 214. 
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participation in global governance risks modifying and distorting what NGOs are able to 
achieve in terms of substantive policy outcomes.”600 
Despite this opposition, an argument can be presented “that civil organisations are not 
functional or institutional equivalents of political parties, thus any assessment of the political 
representation of the former based on parameters suited to the latter leads to predictable and 
sometimes trivial conclusions.”601  As a result, it becomes possible to conclude that “[t]he 
democratic function of NGOs is not to be representatives in a parliamentary sense.”602  
Nevertheless, it is precisely such a representative role that is needed in relation to the 
OHCHR if its ability to support a liberal global constitutional process is to be strengthened 
through a greater focus on the individual. 
The broader relationships between NGOs, ‘civil society’ more broadly, and the wider 
United Nations has already been examined elsewhere.603  Unfortunately, however, the precise 
details of exactly how the OHCHR itself might strengthen the representative nature of the 
NGOs to which it relates, as well as increase the participation of such representative NGOs 
within its own operations, are matters that must await a more detailed consideration than is 
possible at the present time.  For present purposes, it shall suffice to note that, in order for the 
OHCHR to achieve a more cosmopolitan approach to liberal global constitutionalism, 
increasing both the role and the representative nature of NGOs could well prove beneficial. 
 
8.2  The Great Power Approach 
Despite the possibilities for reforming the UN system that are outlined above, it must 
be recognised that these normative arguments were prefaced with an acknowledgement of the 
difficulties involved in implementing such reformative proposals.  Provided that such 
obstacles continue, it would seem as though there is little choice but to conclude that the only 
option for maintaining an integration of liberal values within the global constitutional process 
is through the ongoing support of great powers.604  In other words, given the preceding 
analysis, any desire to preserve the contemporary liberal global constitutional process must 
600 Dany, C., ‘Janus-faced NGO Participation in Global Governance: Structural Constraints for NGO Influence’, 
(2014) 20 Global Governance 419, p. 419. 
601 Lavalle, A. G., ‘NGOs, Human Rights and Representation’, (2014) 20 SUR: International Journal on Human 
Rights 293, p. 294. 
602 Dual Democracy, p. 316. 
603 See, for instance, Weiss, T. G., et al, ‘The “Third” United Nations’, (2009) 15 Global Governance 123. 
604 See supra, Chapter 5. 
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rest on the hope that the states with the power and ability to dictate the operation of this 
process continue to do so in a liberal manner. 
It must be noted, however, that this suggestion should not be seen as imbuing the 
concept of ‘great powers’, or even that of power more generally, with any form of 
explanatory ability, predictive utility or moral justification.  On the one hand, this position 
does imply a general degree of support for the claim that “[n]orms and values certainly do not 
operate divorced from power.”605  Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case that 
acknowledging the role of great powers in shaping the operation of the current global 
constitutional process involves an equal recognition that “[t]he sphere of power is 
independent of the sphere of justice, rendering the state an autonomous actor, able to pursue 
its own interests, limited only by its own capabilities.”606  At most, the current position could 
potentially be seen as concurring with “the old truth that though law cannot exist without 
power, still law and power, right and might, are not the same.”607  Such conclusions and 
debates about the role, nature and significance of power itself, however, do not inherently and 
directly affect the concept of a global constitutional process.  Instead, they can simply be seen 
as having the potential to help elucidate exactly who operates the process and how they might, 
can or should go about it. 
In developing such arguments, however, there must necessarily be a recognition that a 
great power approach to the global constitutional process is not in and of itself inherently 
sustainable.  As power waxes and wanes, so too are there fluctuations in a global 
constitutional process that is dependent on such power.  As has already been indicated, there 
are no principles automatically contained in this approach that would guarantee the 
maintenance of a liberal constitutional order at the global level independently of the relative 
power held by those wishing to support it.  There is, perhaps, an argument that certain liberal 
values, particularly sovereignty, can be maintained through “states balancing each other in 
order to protect their interests … [and this] balance of power … can also function in a 
constitutional way”.608  Whilst the constitutional possibilities presented by theories regarding 
605 Donnelly, J., ‘Human Rights, Globalizing Flows, and State Power’, (henceforth, Donnelly), in Brysk, A., 
(ed.), Globalization and Human Rights, (London: University of California Press, 2002), p. 235. 
606 Braumoeller, B. F., The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical 
Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 1. 
607 Kelsen, H., (trans., Wedberg, A.), General Theory of Law and State, (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University 
Press, 1946), p. 121 
608 Lang Jr., A., ‘Global Constitutionalism as a Middle-Ground Ethic’, (henceforth, Lang), in Navari, C., (ed.), 
Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs: Arguments from the Middle Ground, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), (henceforth, Ethical Reasoning), p. 108. 
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the balance of power should certainly not be ignored, it must equally be recognised that 
“much of the conventional wisdom about the balance of power does not survive contact with 
non-European evidence.”609 
Consequently, there may well be scope to advance an argument that it will frequently 
and naturally be in the interests of great powers to preserve a global constitutional process 
founded upon the liberty and equality of states.  This position is lent further support by a 
recognition that “the progress of those norms cannot be reduced to the power of their leading 
sponsors.”610  As noted, however, the desire of any great powers to advance such values 
cannot be relied upon.  It has been observed, for instance, that 
“great powers, like small powers, frequently behave in such a way as to 
promote disorder rather than order; they seek to upset the general balance, 
rather than to preserve it, to foment crises rather than to control them, to 
win wars rather than to limit them, and so on.”611 
An argument that the support of great powers is necessary for the maintenance of a liberal 
and global constitutional order is, therefore, somewhat less than ideal.  This is particularly the 
case once it is recalled that there is no inherent reason why great powers might choose to 
preserve such an order, beyond any moral, ethical or interest-based justifications that might 
be presented to them. 
Simultaneously, however, it must also be noted that the potential alternatives to a 
great power approach that have already been explored do not appear to be inherently unique.  
Whilst the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations may indeed present the most 
appropriate embodiment of both the polycentric and cosmopolitan approaches at the time of 
writing, this is not to say that such a scenario precludes the future development of these same 
approaches using different bodies.  Indeed, in the earlier discussion that led to an examination 
of the HRC, it was noted that the existing regime of international environmental governance, 
whilst not yet capable of supporting a polycentric approach, may present such a possibility in 
the future.612  Once such a possibility is acknowledged, there must inevitably be a similar 
acknowledgement that other comparable opportunities may yet arise.  Nevertheless, it is 
609 Wohlforth, W. C., et al, ‘Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy in International Systems’, in Kaufman, S. J., et 
al, (eds.), The Balance of Power in World History, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 1. 
610 Donnelly, p. 235. 
611 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (4th edn.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), (henceforth, Bull), p. 201. 
612 See supra, Chapter 5. 
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almost tautological to point out that “[i]t is not possible, by definition, to foresee political 
forms that are not foreseeable”.613  For the time being, therefore, it would seem as though the 
great power approach is the most appropriate, albeit flawed, option available. 
 
8.3  Human Rights and the Global Constitutional Process 
 At this point, it may appear as though the discussion regarding alternatives to the 
great power approach has begun to fragment into an examination of the HRC on the one hand 
and a consideration of the OHCHR on the other.  As stated above, however, no suggestion 
has been made that would preclude the appearance of some other body that would be better 
suited to the task.  Additionally, it must also be noted that nothing has yet been raised that 
would appear to suggest that the two apparently divergent approaches outlined thus far are, in 
fact, mutually exclusive.  In order to avoid this conclusion, or to more thoroughly assess its 
possible accuracy, it becomes necessary to consider some of the broader themes and ideas 
that can be seen as uniting these investigations, or at least as being held in common by them.  
As both approaches can be said to be attempts to maintain a form of liberal constitutionalism 
at the global level, these shared themes can equally be divided into the two areas of liberal 
values and constitutional theory. 
 As regards the possible maintenance of liberal values, the conclusion cannot be 
escaped that nothing in the present discussion has advocated the desirability of such a 
position.  Whilst the focus thus far has been on the interconnected, though potentially 
incommensurable, ideas of liberty and equality, the point was explicitly made earlier that 
there is nothing inherent to a constitutional approach that automatically requires the 
incorporation of these ideas.614  The argument was presented, however, that it is this liberal 
vision of the world that currently prevails at the global level and, therefore, it is only 
reasonable to consider these values and not others in relation to the operation of a global 
constitutional process.615 
 In spite of this position, the objection must be noted that “[g]lobal constitutionalism 
and its purveyors are too strongly biased in favor of the status quo.”616  Additionally, it has 
been suggested that contemporary discussions of global constitutionalism suffer from a 
613 Bull, p. 247. 
614 See supra, Chapter 3. 
615 See supra, Chapter 4. 
616 Volk, p. 562. 
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variety of “omissions and biases [which] are caused by investment in a particular kind of 
political practice and thought, namely the unquestioned extrapolation of liberal democratic 
precepts”.617  Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that the approach to, and understanding of, 
global constitutionalism that has been presented in the current discussion has not been in 
favour of the status quo in and of itself, nor has it unquestioningly adopted liberal thought.  
Instead, the preceding arguments have been advanced through a separation of liberalism and 
constitutionalism that must acknowledge the viability of alternative mechanisms by which the 
constitutional process may be operated. 
 Despite the seemingly fragmentary nature of the discussion, then, it is this distinctive 
approach to constitutional theory that can be seen as the primary strand of thought which 
gives cohesion to the various and diverse elements presented thus far.  By considering a 
constitution as a process composed of distinct, though related, phases, an approach to 
international society was revealed which presented opportunities for analysis and reform that 
had previously remained unexamined.  In particular, the connections between cosmopolitan 
thought and the OHCHR have been conspicuously unexplored by much contemporary 
literature.  Whilst acknowledging this distinctiveness, however, recognition must also be 
given to the argument that an 
“involvement with ethical theory is not something we do after having come 
to grips in some direct ‘empirical’ and norm free way with the key features 
of how things stand in the practices of world politics, but is part of the very 
process required in order to understand our contemporary world.”618 
Consequently, it cannot be said that recognising the plasticity and utility of the constitutional 
process is coterminous with a suggestion that the process is entirely neutral and value-free. 
Indeed, it could be argued that the desirability of the constitutional process itself depends 
upon an assumption that “order has its positive dimensions, for it provides the basis for 
stability”.619  This connection between constitutionalism and order was particularly 
highlighted in the earlier discussion on global constitutionalism, where it was found that 
617 Schwöbel, C. E. J., ‘Organic Global Constitutionalism’, (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 529, 
p. 529. 
618 Frost, M., Constituting Human Rights: Global civil society and the society of democratic states, (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 1. 
619 Bleiker, R., ‘Order and Disorder in World Politics’, in Bellamy, A. J., International Society and its Critics, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 179. 
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neither anarchy nor hierarchy could be taken as a pre-determined starting point.620  Instead, a 
constitutional approach was presented as supporting a position that incorporated both without 
presuming either.  It is in such a way that this understanding of constitutional theory can be 
seen as supporting a form of ‘middle-ground’, where the aim is “to achieve reconciliation 
between the two positions, generally by respecting elements in each.”621  These connections 
between the constitutional process and the attempted seizure of the middle ground are also 
highlighted by the development of the constitutional process itself, as a response to the 
distinction between governance- and government-based approaches to constitutional 
thought.622 
 From this position, therefore, it might appear possible to argue that there are 
significant “links between global constitutionalism as defined through the political theory of 
constitutionalism and the middle-ground ethics of the English School as understood primarily 
through Martin Wight’s conception of rationalism.”623  This connection is only strengthened 
through a recognition that “[t]he central concern of the English School is with the problem of 
order”.624  Despite these close similarities, however, there is a particularly marked and 
distinguishing feature between an English School understanding and the constitutional 
approach outlined in the present discussion.  In particular, it must be noted that the 
underlying question behind an English School approach to many of these issues concerns the 
extent to which “the inherited political framework provided by the international society of 
states continue[s] to provide an adequate basis for world order”.625  In contrast, the 
constitutional approach outlined thus far has adopted a perspective which asks to what extent 
world order, as understood through the operation of a global constitutional process, can 
continue to provide an adequate basis for a political framework based upon an international 
society of states. 
 It is in attempting to address issues from this point of view that the current discussion 
led to an examination of the polycentric capabilities of the HRC and the cosmopolitan 
possibilities presented through the OHCHR.626  In examining the commonalities behind these 
assessments, however, there remains no clear evidence of their inherent mutual exclusivity.  
620 See supra, Chapter 4. 
621 Navari, C., ‘The Terrain of the Middle Ground’, in Ethical Reasoning, p. 1. 
622 See supra, Chapters 2 and 3. 
623 Lang, p. 109. 
624 Hurrell, A., ‘Order and Justice’, in Navari, C., and Green, D. M., (eds.), Guide to the English School in 
International Studies, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), p. 143. 
625 Ibid. 
626 See supra, Chapter 5.  See also, supra, Chapter 6 (on the HRC) and Chapter 7 (on the OHCHR). 
                                                     
187 
 
Instead, the possibility remains open that both a polycentric and a cosmopolitan approach to 
the global constitutional process could be adopted if the desirability of maintaining the liberal 
status quo was to be established.  Unless and until the necessary reforms occur, however, the 
requirement of maintaining such a position falls to the responsibility of those states with the 
power to direct the operation of the global constitutional process.  The extent to which the 
human rights machinery of the UN currently contributes to such a process is, therefore, 
minimal. 
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